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SYNOPSIS
Individual consumers as well as managers within any
organisation regularly make purchasing decisions. Some of
these decisions will relate to product or service markets
that are characterised by homogeneity in all aspects
except price. There may be a benefit, therefore, from
searching for a lower price. The bulk of this thesis is
concerned with investigating individual search behaviour
when making purchases in such circumstances. After a
comprehensive review of formal search models, together
with the corresponding experimental evidence, a series of
new experiments are described that, in particular,
uncover several heuristics that might govern search
behaviour in practice. A large number of simulated
purchases is used to assess the performance of these
heuristics in comparison with the optimal, theoretical
model. A related judgemental bias - functional fixation -
is also reviewed in detail and tested experimentally.
Finally, the understanding of individual search behaviour
is further developed using a research experiment set in a
more complex, and less highly structured, business
decision context.
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CHAP TER
ONE
CHAPTER ONE
AN OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the information search
behaviour of individuals required to make decisions in
experimental markets characterised by incomplete
information. Mostly, its specific focus is individuals'
behaviour when purchasing common consumer products and
services. Clearly, in general, such choices may involve
weighing-up many characteristics of information (price,
quality, size etc...) across each alternative item being
considered. Payne (1976) as well as Paquette and Kida
(1988) provide concise reviews of possible decision
strategies in these multi-dimensional situations,
including decision strategies characterised by reduced
processing requirements.
In general though, the scope of this thesis is limited to
product and service markets that are homogeneous in all
aspects except price. Decisions are made, therefore, on a
single-dimensional basis. Decision makers, having already
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established the specific type or model of product (or
service) they wish to purchase, must simply decide for
how long it is worth shopping around for a suitably low
price. This decision will depend on the individual's
search cost, together with his knowledge (if any) of the
price distribution.
Accordingly, the thesis seeks to contribute to the
existing literature on information search behaviour in
the following three ways
(i) The presentation of a detailed, but concise,
synthesis of the empirical evidence concerning market
price dispersion, the economic models that prescribe
optimal search behaviour, and the experimental
evidence regarding observed price search behaviour.
(ii) The discovery and development of several new
search strategies that describe observed behaviour
well, and perform well when compared with an optimal
model, in varying prior knowledge conditions
concerning the distribution of prices.
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(iii)	 The presentation of new evidence concerning
Human	 Information	 Processing
	 capabilities;
specifically the ability of individuals to use
information sets in different ways in order to meet
different objectives (for example, a price quote can
be used not only as an offer to sell at that price,
but also as information with which to update the
searcher's knowledge of the underlying price
distribution).
The above work develops some links between decision
making strategies and information search behaviour in the
context of a highly structured task environment - the
searching for a low price. These links are extended, so
that an additional objective of the thesis is
(iv)	 The exploration of the role of information
search in a relatively unstructured task environment
- the setting of a price under conditions of
uncertainty and incomplete information. Again, though,
the context is such that the price set is the only
criterion on which ultimate decisions will be taken.
4
BACKGROUND
First, though, as existing, formal search models are
embedded in the framework of expected utility theory, the
major characteristics and limitations of this decision
making paradigm are briefly reviewed.
Over the second half of the twentieth century, expected
utility theory has been the major conceptual paradigm in
decision making. Although most of the theoretical
developments within the model are relatively recent, its
foundations can be traced back more than 250 years to
Cramer (1728) and Bernoulli (1738) who sought to explain
the St. Petersberg Paradox. This relates to the situation
below, as stated in Machina (1987, p 122).
"Suppose someone offers to toss a fair coin repeatedly
until it comes up heads, and to pay you $1 if this
happens on the first toss, $2 if it takes two tosses
to land a head, $4 if it takes three tosses, $8 if it
takes four tosses, etc. What is the largest sure gain
you would be willing to forego in order to undertake a
single play of the game?"
The expected value, E(n), of this game at the n th toss is
given by
E(n)	 =	 ir1 Pr. 2r-1
=
5
where pr
 is the probability of gaining a head on the rth
toss. Thus, E(n) = n/2 , and so, if there is no limit
set on n, the game has an infinite mathematical
expectation. The paradox is that most individuals would
value the game at a low, finite amount.
In attempting to unravel this paradox, Cramer (1728) and
Bernoulli (1738) proposed that individuals did not
maximise expected monetary value, but rather maximised
expected utility, arguing, for example, that a gain of
$200 was not necessarily worth twice as much as a gain of
$100. Bernoulli suggested a logarithmic utility function
that exhibited diminishing increases in utility for equal
increments in wealth, and he demonstrated that expected
utility of the game (I(1/2) rloge(2r)) was indeed finite.
Two centuries later, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
were the first to offer a formal axiomatic basis for
expected utility theory (EUT) as a rational decision
making model. Its foundations are laid by the five basic
axioms (as adapted from Schoemaker, 1982, pp 531-532, and
Ezzamel and Hart, 1987, p 140) reproduced below. In each
case, x > y denotes that an individual prefers
alternative x to alternative y, while x y denotes
indifference between the two. Finally, L(r,x,y) denotes a
lottery offering a probability r of receiving x and a
probability (1-r) of receiving y, where 0 < r < 1.
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Completeness - For the entire set of uncertain
alternatives, x > y, or y > x, or x -..-- y. This
preference is consistent such that, if x > y, then
L(p,x,y) > L(q,x,y) if and only if p > q.
Transitivity - If x > y and y > z, then x > z. Also,
if x = y and y .----- z, then x .---- z.
Substitution	 -	 If x----, y, and if z is any other
alternative, then L(p,x,z) --.-- L(p,y,z).
Measurability	 -	 If x > y and y > z, then there
exists a unique probability p such that L(p,x,z) = y.
Compound Lotteries - A compound lottery, whose
outcomes are also lotteries, is equally attractive as
the simple lottery that would result when multiplying
probabilities in accordance with standard probability
theory. That is, L(p,L(q,w,x),L(r,y,z)) --... L', where L'
offers a probability pq of receiving w, p(1-q) of
receiving x, (1-p)r of receiving y, and (1-p) (1-r) of
receiving z.
These axioms are designed to provide a systematic and
consistent ordering of an individual's preferences over
the whole set of possible, alternative outcomes.
Regardless of whether the EUT model is being used for
descriptive, predictive or prescriptive purposes, it has
several limitations. These are discussed below under
three sub-headings; (1) the validity of the underlying
axioms, (2) direct empirical evidence, and (3) bounded
rationality.
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(1) EUT - the validity of the underlying axioms 
Research experiments have uncovered violations of all
five axioms that lay the foundations of EUT. These
findings limit its general applicability as a theory of
choice, although admittedly sometimes the violations
occur in unusual, one-off circumstances. The results
below represent a brief indication of the findings of
research studies rather than an exhaustive list.
Regarding the completeness axiom, Mosteller and Nogee
(1951), in one of the earliest experimental tests of EUT,
discovered that subjects on repeated measures of
preferences were inconsistent in their responses. Further
evidence, on what has become known as the "preference
reversal" phenomenon, was reported by Lichtenstein and
Slovic (1971) in a classroom experiment, and by the same
authors (1973) in a real-life setting, where customers
staked their own money at a Las Vegas casino.
Systematic and predictable violations of the transitivity 
axiom were shown by Tversky (1969). He suggested that
violations were most likely to occur where choices
involved evaluation of items over several dimensions.
Inconsistencies may occur if the relative, subjective
importance of specific dimensions changes during the
course of the choice process.
The third axiom, substitution, was investigated in some
depth by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as a generalisation
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of Allais' (1953) paradox. Outcomes obtainable with
certainty seemed to carry disproportionately higher
weights than those which were uncertain, that is the
result of a lottery.
Coombs (1975) tested the measurability axiom by requiring
subjects to rank three gambles in order of preference,
where one was a probability mixture of the other two, and
should, therefore, be ranked in-between. Nearly 50% of
subjects ordered it otherwise.
Finally, Bar-Hillel (1973) discovered evidence that the
compound lotteries axiom was violated, subjects tending
to over-estimate the probability of conjunctive events,
and under-estimate the probability of disjunctive events.
(2) EUT - direct empirical evidence 
It might be argued that the non-optimal behaviour
exhibited by subjects in some of the illustrations above
would not be reproduced in real world situations. The
apparent axiomatic violations are merely a reflection of
the hypothetical nature of the experiments.
While such an argument carries a degree of plausibility,
the over-riding conclusion of empirical research studies
is that people have difficulty focusing on both
9
probabilities of outcomes and magnitudes of outcomes at
the same time, leading to seemingly sub-optimal
behaviour.
For instance, Kunreuther et al (1978) found that most
home owners in flood plain areas were not covered by
flood insurance, despite the availability of up to 90%
federal subsidies. That is, home-owners were unwilling to
purchase flood insurance for, say, $200, where insurance
organisations would normally charge $2,000. Although the
insurance company's estimate will include a profit
margin, this is unlikely to be substantial given the
highly competitive nature of the insurance industry.
Thus, the implication is that individuals perceive the
risk to be considerably lower than do the "expert"
actuaries employed by the insurance organisations. In
turn, this suggests that people may have difficulty
assessing low probability, high loss events. Robertson
(1974) reported similar evidence concerning the general
reluctance to wear safety belts in motor vehicles.
In contrast, Eisner and Strotz (1961) discovered a
surprisingly high demand for aeroplane flight insurance,
when compared with the demand for cheaper, regular life
insurance. This suggests that, at other times, people
focus more on the loss dimension than the probability
dimension.
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(3) EUT - bounded rationality
The rational economic man postulated by EUT is assumed to
have "global rationality". That is, as described by Simon
(1955, p 99)
"(he) is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant
aspects of his environment which, if not absolutely
complete, is at least impressively clear and
voluminous. He is assumed also to have a well-
organised and stable system of preferences, and a
skill in computation that enables him to calculate,
for the alternative courses of action that are
available to him, which of these will permit him to
reach the highest attainable point on his preference
scale."
Thus, an individual is assumed to know his utility
function (or preference scale), to know all possible
consequences of decisions he might take now or at any
time in the future, and to be able to perform lengthy,
non-trivial calculations.
This is an uncomfortable set of assumptions. First, in
terms of the ability to store sufficient information to
attain "global rationality", consider the extract below
from Ries and Trout (1981, p 77)
"(The average supermarket today) has 10,000 different
products or brands on display. This means that a young
person has to sort out and catalogue 10,000 different
names in his or her head.
When you consider that the average college graduate
has a speaking vocabulary of only 8,000 words, you can
see the problem. The kid spends four years in a
university and ends up 2,000 words down."
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Further, several researchers have discovered substantial
inaccuracies in the way that individuals perform even
slightly complex calculations that require the evaluation
of uncertainty (see, for example, Bar-Hillel, 1982;
Salop, 1987).
These criticisms have led to the idea of global
rationality being replaced by the idea of "bounded
rationality" : not everything can be known in advance,
and so decisions will often be based on incomplete
information about alternatives and outcomes. In addition,
there are relevant costs associated with acquiring,
storing and processing information. Hence, as Newell and
Simon (1972) conclude, individuals will use various
heuristics or rules of thumb in performing complex tasks,
in order to keep the information processing demands of
the situation within the bounds of their limited mental
capacity. This, in turn, implies a willingness to
"satisfice" rather than maximise; that is, to seek an
outcome that achieves some target level of adequacy,
rather than one that is necessarily the best possible.
The findings reported in this section suggest that while
Expected Utility Theory may provide the basis for a
solution to any purchase decisions, in practice,
individuals are more likely to employ simple heuristics
to arrive at such choices.
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Three important research questions follow. What kinds of
heuristics might actually be used?, ..
• 
what are their
implications for individual search behaviour?,	
• 
and
how well do these heuristics perform in comparison with a
theoretically optimal decision making model? The work
that follows in the next nine chapters explores these
issues.
In attempting to answer the three questions above, an
experimental research approach is adopted. Laboratory
experimentation in economics and related studies has two
important properties. First, the economic environment is
totally controlled by the experimenter; second, the
experimenter has virtually unrestricted access to his
subjects. Such experiments (in economics) have their
origins as far back as the early eighteenth century in
the development of the St. Petersberg Paradox discussed
above, but as Roth points out (1988, p974):
... it is probably only in the last ten or fifteen
years that laboratory experimentation can be clearly
seen to have truly begun its now steady and sustained
transformation from an occasional curiosity into a
regular means for investigating many kinds of economic
phenomena."
Roth's article provides a detailed methodological
overview of the role and scope of experimental research
in economics. He concludes that, broadly speaking, it is
a justifiable method of investigation, though warning
that (1988, p1023):
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” ... the major pitfall to be aware of ... is that,
since decisions made in the design of the experiment
cannot be regarded as random samples from the space of
possible design choices, there is room for an
experimenter's prior beliefs about the likely outcome
of the experiment to influence the outcome, through
these design decisions. Sometimes this is explicit,
deliberate, and desirable, as when the experimenter
wishes to demonstrate that some phenomenon is
possible, rather than general. The danger is of
inadvertently reading experimental evidence as
supporting an overly general conclusion based on
observations made in special cases."
Care is taken in the design of the new experimental work
described and analysed in Chapters 5, 6, 8 and 9 to avoid
this potential pitfall.
OUTLINE OF THESIS
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines
the empirical evidence regarding market price
dispersions. The evidence shows that price dispersion is
found commonly, and, in some cases, can be substantial.
Thus, "shopping around" for a low price may yield
significant benefits.
Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical models that have been
developed over the last few decades to prescribe optimal
behaviour in this single-dimensional purchase setting.
Essentially, a consumer should set a "reservation" price
prior to commencing search, and then continue searching
until a price has been located lower.
 than or equal to
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this target value. Purchase should then be undertaken at
this price.
Chapter 4 discusses the experimental studies that have
been carried out to investigate search behaviour in
markets with price variation, and also, in particular, to
test the optimal, theoretical models above. The research
findings reported in Chapter 4 lead to the suggestion and
formulation of several rules of thumb that may better
encapsulate observed behaviour than the more complex and
computationally demanding reservation price strategy.
The two subsequent chapters describe some new
experimental and simulation work that extends this theme
further. New search rules are presented which fit well
with observed behaviour, and perform well in comparison
with an "optimal" model that has full knowledge of the
underlying price distribution parameters. In particular,
Chapter 5 focuses on situations where searchers either
have no initial knowledge of the underlying price
distribution, or have full knowledge of its shape
(normal) and its defining parameters (mean and standard
deviation).
In contrast, Chapter 6 considers the situation where
searchers have partial prior knowledge of the price
distribution. That is, some prices from the distribution
are known to the searcher in terms of magnitude, but not
in terms of location. Neither is the searcher aware of
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the representativeness of these prices. This setting more
accurately reflects real-world purchase decisions in a
single-dimensional context, than do the no knowledge and
full knowledge situations.
Although, in general, the search strategies proposed in
Chapters 5 and 6 are reduced processing strategies, and
therefore attempt to economise on the "mental effort"
required for their adoption, they may still be affected
by various judgemental biases. Chapter 7 examines the
relevant findings of the Human Information Processing
literature, with particular emphasis on one potential
source of bias - functional fixation - that seems to
have an influence on single-dimensional price search
processes. This phenomenon relates to the difficulty that
some individuals have in finding a second function for an
object that they are familiar with using in one certain
way. Where individuals have partial initial knowledge of
a price distribution, there exists a tendency to view
subsequent price quotes only as offers for sale, rather
than also as pieces of data with which to update their
knowledge of the price distribution. Accordingly, a new
experiment, designed and undertaken to investigate
functional fixation is described and assessed in Chapter
8.
Essentially, the price search studies above investigate
individuals' search behaviour in a highly structured task
environment, where there is a single, clear objective,
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and where the type and form of extra information
available is fully known in advance. Two implications of
the reported results are first, the choice of a decision
making strategy or rule will have an influence on
subsequent search behaviour, and second, such strategies
are not necessarily determined at the outset, but may
formulate over time.
Many decision situations will be far less well structured
than this. Not only is there incomplete information, but
also a decision maker may not necessarily be aware of the
exact nature and type of information available, nor its
direct relevance (if any) for the task at hand. Chapter 9
describes an experiment designed to investigate
individual search behaviour in a more unstructured
environment, and is aimed in particular at discovering
the general applicability of the findings above from the
highly structured price search studies.
Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the main findings of the
thesis, and suggests various extensions, implications and
applications.
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CHAPTER
TWO
CHAPTER TWO
PRICE DISPERSION -
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with decisions that hinge on one
key characteristic, but where that characteristic has an
underlying distribution of values rather than a single,
constant value. Usually, this characteristic carries a
value that can be measured in monetary terms - for
example, the price at which an everyday consumer product
is sold or a service provided, or the wage rate at which
an employment contract is reached. As these problems are
essentially equivalent in terms of formal search theory,
discussion will be restricted mostly to the former - the
search for a suitably low priced homogeneous product or
service.
In a world of perfect competition and perfectly efficient
markets whose participants act rationally, have complete
knowledge of the market, and identical transactions
costs, the price for which any two homogeneous products
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are offered for sale, and sold, would be the same. No
benefit could be gained from shopping around, and so a
product would simply be purchased at the first sales
outlet visited. A formal theory of search in this context
would be trivial. In the real world, however, this is not
the case. The prices of apparently homogeneous products
and services vary. This chapter examines the empirical
evidence for such price dispersion.
By way of introduction, and before discussing the more
extensive surveys that have been reported in the research
•literature, the results of a recent, personal survey are
presented. Several local Van-Hire organisations were
contacted with a view to seeking a price quote for the
hire of a van for private removal purposes. Specifically,
the required "product" was an 18 cwt. Transit Van for one
day with an unlimited mileage facility. All such
organisations were canvassed that (a) advertised within
the "Van and Lorry Hire" section of the Coventry Yellow
Pages by means of a box advertisement (as opposed to a
single line entry), and (b) were located in the
Coventry/Kenilworth area - that is, within five miles of
and easily accessible from the University of Warwick.
Contact was made by telephone, a total of 12
organisations meeting all the requirements. Table 2:1
lists the price quotes received.
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TABLE 2:1
TRANSIT VAN HIRE PRICE QUOTATIONS 
Supplier	 Price per day
£
_
Avis	 40.65
Brady Self-Drive	 37.38
BRS Truck Rental
	
44.28
Budget Rent-a-Van	 28.50
Ford Rent-a-Van	 33.93
G. Y. Transport Hire	 31.63
Kenilworth Garage Van Hire	 25.00
Kenilworth Vehicle Rental	 29.90
Newtown Car and Van Hire 	 33.50
J. & R. Pedley Vehicle Hire	 46.00
Quinton Van and Car Hire	 26.00
Swan National	 34.43
Source : Telephone contact on 24 May 1990
All vans were less than two years old, and all price
quotes were fully inclusive of VAT and insurance. Some
suppliers also required a deposit for fuel (the vans all
came with full tanks of petrol), usually amounting to £25
or £30, but in all cases this was fully refundable. It is
not considered, therefore, to significantly effect the
homogeneity of the products. In terms of other service
characteristics, all suppliers included temporary
membership of one of the leading national breakdown
organisations.
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The price quotes listed in Table 2:1 have a mean of
£34.27 and a standard deviation of £6.76, while the
highest price is nearly double the lowest. If a
coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio between
the standard deviation and the mean, expressed as a
percentage, then its value here is 19.7%, indicating a
large degree of variation. Given that search costs are
likely to be relatively small, each search mostly being
limited to telephone charges together with the
opportunity cost of a few minutes, then it may be
worthwhile for an individual, wishing to hire a van, to
shop around for a low price quote.
The issue central to this thesis is to ascertain
appropriate search strategies to adopt in such
circumstances, balancing the costs of search with the
expected likelihood of finding a lower price. For
instance, where an individual commences his search
without prior knowledge of the price distribution, one of
the simplest search models is to canvass three suppliers
only, accepting the lowest price quote received (this is
rule G, discussed in Chapter 5). Returning to the Transit
Van illustration, if it is assumed that all 12 suppliers
have an equal a priori chance of being approached, then
elementary probability theory reveals that adoption of
the three-search model would result in a 25% chance of
not receiving a quote less than £30, and a 55% chance of
not receiving either of the two most -favourable quotes -
£25.00 and £26.00.
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As stated above, the main focus of this thesis is to
understand the search behaviour of individuals: included
in this is an evaluation of particular search strategies
that perform well in circumstances where price dispersion
exists in otherwise homogeneous product markets. It is
not concerned with why such price dispersion exists. Some
possible explanations, however, are outlined below.
First, it may be that organisations adopt cost-based
pricing policies. This might create substantial
variations in price due to differences in the actual
costs incurred in production of a good, differences in
managers' perceptions of the relevant costs associated
with production, or differences in the way in which
certain costs are built-up; for instance, there may be
variations in overhead allocation procedures or in
depreciation policy. Further, the number of vehicles
owned may effect unit costs. An organisation with double
the fleet size of a competitor may incur only slightly
more general administrative expenditure. Its apportioned
administrative cost per vehicle will be just over half
that of the competitor. Empirical surveys by, for
example, Skinner (1970), and Atkin and Skinner (1975)
provide supporting evidence of cost-based pricing
policies. In the former study, questionnaires were sent
to all members of the Merseyside Chamber of Commerce. Out
of 172 responses, 70% claimed to use cost-plus pricing,
of whom 57% used it for pricing all products.
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Alternatively, prices charged may reflect deliberate
responses to perceived market conditions or desired
strategic positioning. Thus, a firm may be adopting a
"penetration price" policy, sacrificing profit for higher
volume through price cutting, and thereby establishing a
wider market base before gradually raising prices closer
to a profit maximising level. Other firms may be adopting
a "price skimming" policy, this time charging higher
prices and sacrificing profits for lower unit sales,
perhaps due to capacity constraints. Finally, a firm that
predicts that potential customers will not shop around
much, if at all, for alternative quotations, may
concentrate efforts on ensuring that their firm is
canvassed more than the average, possibly by placing more
noticeable advertisements. If prospects are reluctant to
search, this should result in a high level of acceptances
even where prices charged are relatively high. To some
extent, the impact of this was reduced in the informal
study above, by restricting the suppliers canvassed to
those using box-sized advertisements.
Another explanation for price dispersion is that the vans
are not truly homogeneous, and price differences are
merely reflecting variations in quality or reliability.
While such factors may account for part of the
dispersion, they are unlikely to account for it all,
especially as care is taken at the outset in specifying
the particular product.
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Stigler (1961, p214) concludes similarly
u 
...price dispersion is a manifestation - and, indeed,
it is the measure - of ignorance in the market.
Dispersion is a biased measure of ignorance because
there is never absolute homogeneity in the commodity,
if we include the terms of sale within the concept of
the commodity. Thus, some automobile dealers might
perform more service, or carry a larger range of
varieties in stock, and a portion of the observed
dispersion is presumably attributable to such
differences. But it would be metaphysical, and
fruitless, to assert that all dispersion is due to
heterogeneity."
PUBLISHED EVIDENCE OF PRICE DISPERSION
A small number of published surveys have been concerned
with discovering empirical evidence for price dispersion.
Stigler, again in his 1961 paper (p 214), presents two
examples of such dispersion; one relating to anthracite
coal, the other to an automobile. The prices for
anthracite coal were bids for federal government
purchases, while the automobile prices, for an identical
model, were those quoted after an "average amount of
haggling". This does raise some doubts about the
objectivity of the latter study. Table 2:2 reproduces the
two sets of prices.
Again, there is a noticeable degree of price dispersion
though the coefficient of variation (defined as before)
is small for the anthracite coal, and virtually
negligible at 1.7% for the Chevrolets.
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TABLE 2:2 
ASKING PRICES FOR TWO COMMODITIES
A : Anthracite Coal, Washington DC, April 1953
Price per ton Number of
Bids
15.00 -	 15.50 2
15.50 -	 16.00 2
16.00 -	 16.50 2 Mean $	 16.90
16.50 -	 17.00 3 Std. Dev. $	 1.15
17.00 -	 18.00 1 Coeff. of Var. 6.8%
18.00 -	 19.00 4
B : Chevrolets, Chicago, February 1959
Price	 Number of
Dealers 
2350 - 2400 4
2400 - 2450 11 Mean $	 2436
2450 - 2500 8 Std. Dev. $	 42
2500 - 2550 4 Coeff. of Var. 1.7%
The price dispersion phenomenon is also evident in the
labour market. Stigler (1962), in his second seminal
paper in the information search field, presents an
example concerning wage offers in the labour market,
based on the USA national sample of wage offers to new
graduates each year. The results are summarised in Table
2:3.
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TABLE 2:3 
MONTHLY HIRING RATES OF LARGE CORPORATIONS
FOR COLLEGE GRADUATES, 1958 - 1960 
Number	 Year
Occupation of Companies 1958 1959 1960
Mean Salaries ($)
Engineering 66 472 493 515
Accountancy 40 421 435 457
Sales 29 410 426 447
General Business 41 403 416 431
Coeff. of Var. (%)
Engineering 66 4.0 4.2 4.3
Accountancy 40 6.5 6.9 6.4
Sales 29 8.8 8.2 9.1
General Business 41 8.6 9.0 8.6
It is much more difficult to find true homogeneity in
labour markets as there are so many employee benefits
which are non-trivial to evaluate : for instance,
	 happy
work force, peaceful surroundings, sports and social
facilities, as well as promotion prospects and the
expected scale and timing of future salary increases.
Nevertheless, across the three years of Table 2:3 annual
salary increases are fairly standard at around four to
five percent. For each occupation, the coefficients of
variation show little deviation from year to year,
indicating a stable, recurrent wage rate dispersion.
There are small differences, however, in the amount of
dispersion between different occupations. Again, then,
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there is an empirical justification for shopping around
for a better offer.
Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) 
The most extensive published survey on price dispersion
was conducted by Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979), and
concentrated on consumer products and services. The
authors compiled a sample of 50 products and services by
selecting pages randomly from the Yellow Pages section of
the Boston Telephone Directory, and choosing the first
item line on each selected page. The sample was reduced
by eliminating items where price information was expected
to be, or proved to be, difficult to ascertain (for
example, airport construction), or insensitive (funeral
quotes). For the remaining 39 items, a relatively
standardised product (or service) was chosen, as an
attempt to ensure homogeneity. Every listed supplier was
contacted by telephone and asked to specify the price at
which he would be willing to sell. A summary of the price
statistics obtained is reproduced and extended in Table
2:4, while further details of the specific products and
services chosen are presented in Appendix 2:1 at the end
of this chapter.
28
TABLE 2:4
PRICE DIFFERENCES ACROSS 39 PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
No.of Mean Std. Max! Coeff. Shape
Product/Service Firms Price Dev. Min of Var. Param.
(*)
Air conditioners 14 16.74 4.23 2.50 25.3 5.5
Aquarium 12 17.38 3.66 2.16 21.1 3.8
Auto tune-up 15 39.57 7.27 1.83 18.4 7.0
Bicycle 7 144.77 6.34 1.11 4.4 24.3
Board poodle 13 4.00 .68 1.83 17.0 8.4
Boat 15 602.87 104.89 1.97 17.4 9.6
Calculator 12 123.44 12.27 1.42 9.9 16.5
Camera 15 329.12 29.78 1.42 9.0 28.8
Canvas goods 14 40.46 28.87 6.38 71.4 .5
Carnations 7 .33 .14 2.50 42.4 .5
Chlorine 7 1.79 .79 5.00 44.1 2.6
Concrete 11 38.50 2.01 1.26 5.2 26.9
'Developer 15 1.44 .14 1.33 9.7 18.0
Diamond appraisal 12 7.71 2.01 2.00 26.1 6.2
Dry cleaning 20 2.08 .35 2.12 16.8 10.4
Electrodes 12 30.71 9.55 2.86 31.1 1.2
Flying instruction 9 29.67 4.15 1.70 14.0 15.7
Fuel oil 15 .38 .11 2.11 28.9 18.7
Horoscope 4 30.00 16.83 5.00 56.1 .6
Liquor 11 7.47 .65 1.23 8.7 16.8
Lumber 14 10.91 1.04 1.37 9.5 15.0
Microwave oven 5 451.50 26.15 1.16 5.8 15.9
Mufflers 19 28.58 4.97 1.57 17.4 3.5
Office furniture 15 109.45 9.03 1.35 8.3 22.0
Paint 22 8.19 .58 1.39 7.1 26.7
Peanuts 8 .53 .17 2.09 32.1 .6
Pet washing 8 15.63 2.00 1.50 12.8 16.7
Printers'	 envelopes 14 39.54 9.12 2.50 23.1 7.2
Rebuilt alternator 14 38.02 2.96 1.29 7.8 2.4
Repair clarinet 8 44.28 13.78 2.33 31.1 .9
Service station 15 13.69 1.46 1.48 10.7 16.9
Skates 15 42.83 3.53 1.39 8.2 18.1
Stationery 15 92.82 5.62 1.25 6.1 20.7
Styling brush 12 4.33 2.01 6.67 46.4 3.9
Teeth cleaned 13 16.85 3.76 2.08 22.3 2.8
Towing 10 14.04 3.57 2.50 25.4 5.2
Turntable 9 68.55 12.37 1.30 18.0 .9
Vocal instruction 12 14.79 5.17 2.65 35.0 .5
Watch cleaned 12 15.78 5.98 3.50 37.9 2.3
(*) ... this is a maximum likelihood estimate of the shape
parameter of the gamma distribution to which the
observed prices were fit.
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It is noticeable that the items selected cover a wide
range of products and services, and a wide range of
prices; the mean price of three of the items is less than
$1, while the mean price of six exceeds $100, including
one - the boat - whose average retail price was greater
than $600. Regarding price dispersion, the average
coefficient of variation across all 39 items was 22%
(similar to that for the transit vans). Only one product
- the Raleigh bicycle - had a coefficient of variation
below 5%, while two items - the canvas goods and the
horoscope reading - had coefficients exceeding 50%.
Further, for 18 of the 39 items, the highest price quoted
was more than double the lowest, the most extreme
examples being; in percentage terms, the styling brush
with prices ranging from $1.50 to $10.00, and, in
absolute terms, the Johnson 9.9 hp. outboard motor boat
with prices ranging from $425 to $839.
A least squares regression relationship was formulated by
comparing the logarithms of the estimated standard
deviations (a) with the logarithms of the estimated means
(g), yielding
	
loge a	 - 1.517 + 0.892 log e g
	
( r 2
	0.87 )
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Thus, doubling the mean price is associated with an 86%
increase in the standard deviation ( 2 0.892 = 1.86 ). As
the authors state (1979, pp 205, 211)
” ...this 86% figure might seem puzzlingly high, for
unless search costs increased dramatically with the
price of the product, the expected gains from
searching would lead to ratios between standard
deviation and price that declined rapidly with
price.The explanation may lie with the infrequent
purchase of expensive products, which reduces the
incentive of a buyer to search. Less searching, in
turn, allows greater variability among prices.
....in fact, Sam Peltzman, who commented on this paper
at the AEA meetings, selected all of our products that
were "unambiguous" consumer goods - 32 in all - and
distinguished frequently purchased goods from the
others. Using a dummy variable, D, to represent
frequently purchased goods, he obtained the following
result
	
loge a	 - 1.161 + 0.836 loge
 J..L - 1.015 D
	
r2	 0.87 )
Thus, the standard deviation of a frequent
0l purchased1Jgood is estimated to be about 36% ( e -1.	 = 0.36 )
of that of an infrequently purchased good with the
same mean."
To explore the nature of price distributions further, a
maximum likelihood estimate of the shape parameter (a) of
the gamma distribution was fitted to the observed prices
of each product or service.
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That is, the probability density function of the
distribution is of the form
1
f (x)	
	  xa-1 e-x	 for x > o
F (x)
0	 elsewhere
where a is a positive constant and r(x), the gamma
function, is defined by
y1 e-y dy
0
The final column of Table 2:4 presents the value of a
fitted for each product and service. Seven of the 39
items have a values less than one, indicating an
exponential-like distribution. Fourteen have values
between one and nine indicating price distributions
skewed to the right, while the remaining 18 items, with a
values greater than nine, are essentially normally
distributed.
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SUMMARY
All these empirical surveys concede that although
attempts were made to select standardised products,
quality differentials undoubtedly exist - for instance,
there may be factors such as location, credit policy,
service quality, and accompanying services. Their over-
riding conclusion, however, is that relatively
standardised products and services may vary substantially
in price across several suppliers, and a large part of
this phenomenon is a measure of market participants'
ignorance, or their reluctance to search, given positive
search costs and divergent beliefs. Furthermore, although
markets are, perhaps, becoming more sophisticated and
more efficient, the price variations do not appear to
lessen over time. Indeed, the levels of dispersion
discovered in the 1979 Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser survey
and the 1990 Transit Van Hire survey are far higher than
those reported by Stigler nearly 30 years ago.
Thus, there is an empirical basis for the theory of
search in markets for products and services that are
homogeneous across all aspects except price. A synopsis
of this search theory is presented in Chapter 3. In
addition, the evidence here provides some justification
for the use of normal price distributions in the
experimental studies described in Chapter 5 and Chapter
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6, as more price distributions fitted the normal price
distribution than any other.
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APPENDIX 2:1 
This appendix contains further details of the 39 products and
services whose prices were canvassed in the 1979 Pratt, Wise and
Zeckhauser survey (see Table 2:4).
Air conditioners ... repair
Aquarium ... 20 gallon fishtank
Auto tune-up ...'67 Camaro V8, parts, labour, points, plugs, timing
Bicycle ... Raleigh Grand Prix
Board poodle ... price/day, standard poodle, approx. 50 lbs.
Boat ... Johnson 9.9 hp. outboard motor, 15" shaft, manual start
Calculator ... Texas Instruments SR-50
Camera ... Konica, Autoreflex T(3), f1.7 lens, chrome, split image
Canvas goods ... cover for pick-up, 70" x 98", 3 mats, glove snaps
Carnations ... white, 200 loose, undelivered
Chlorine ... liquid, 15% strength, price/gallon
Concrete ... 3000 lbs (type or grade), price/cubic yard
Developer ... Dektol, 1 lb 2oz
Diamond appraisal ... 3 one-karat rings, price/item
Dry cleaning ... 2-piece suit
Electrodes ... E6013, 1/8", 50 lbs
Flying instruction ... aircraft with instructor, rate/hour
Fuel oil ... 500 gallons, price/gallon
Horoscope ... basic charting, including 1-hour discussion
Liquor ... case of Budweiser beer (12 quart bottles)
Lumber ... plywood, fir AC, 1/2" x 48" x 96"
Microwave oven ... RK 4D, Amana
Mufflers ... '67 Camaro, single exhaust
Office furniture ... 4-drawer letter size, HON 214, black
Paint ... acrylic flat latex, Benjamin Moore, satin super white
Peanuts ... 100 roasted in the hull, price/pound
Pet washing ... French cut and shampoo, standard poodle
Printers' envelopes ... 2000 10-size w/4 lines copy, 24 lb, white
Rebuilt alternator ... '67 Camaro V8
Repair clarinet ... repad Selmer clarinet
Service station ...'67 Camaro V8, lube, grease, oil & filter change
Skates ... ice skates, "Black Panther"
Stationery ... Southworth 330, permanent record, 10 reams
Styling brush ... Dennman Trow
Teeth cleaned ... Dental office
Towing ... initial charge, daytime, 5 mile round trip
Turntable ... BSR 2310X
Vocal instruction ... (musical) price/hour
Watch cleaned ... Clinton 25 jewel, self-winding, with day date
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CHAPTER
THREE
CHAPTER THREE
FORMAL SEARCH MODELS
INTRODUCTION
The evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests
that prices vary, sometimes substantially, across many,
common, consumer product and service markets. It may be
beneficial, then, for an individual wishing to purchase a
given product to search the market for a lower price
rather than to accept the first offer received. The
extent of this potential benefit will depend on several
factors such as the actual distribution of prices and the
costs of search.
This chapter reviews formal models of search in this
context. First, some simple search models are developed
in order to introduce some important, general
characteristics that underlie the search process.
Following this, a more complex model is derived (in two
different ways), and the effect on the model of changing
certain key assumptions is investigated.
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A SIMPLE SEARCH MODEL
The illustration in this section is based on McKenna
(1986, Chapter 9) and concerns an individual's search to
purchase an unspecified, consumer product.
Suppose that the product is known to be priced at £60,
£70 and £80; these prices being distributed across many
suppliers in the proportions 1/4, 1/2 and 1/4
respectively, with no apparent difference in quality.
Obviously, the individual would prefer to buy at £60, but
she is uncertain which suppliers will be offering to sell
at this price. If only one supplier is contacted, then
she will expect to receive an offer of £70 since
Exp (Price)	 .	 1/4 (60)	 + 1/2 (70)	 + 1/4 (80)
=	 70
She may do better, however, by contacting two suppliers.
Table 3:1 displays the possible outcomes from such a
strategy, and demonstrates how her new expected price is
calculated.
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TABLE 3:1
EXPECTED OUTCOMES FROM TWO SEARCHES
Prices
	 Joint	 Lower	 Expected
Quoted	 Probability	 Offer	 Value 
£	 £	 £
	60 , 60	 0.0625	 60	 3.75
6070I	 0.25	 60	 15
60 80,	 0.125	 60	 7.5
	
70 , 70
	 0.25	 70	 17.5
	
70 , 80	 0.25	 70	 17.5
	
80 , 80
	 0.0625	 80	 5
66.25
Contacting a second supplier, then, has lowered the
expected value of the best offer from £70 to £66.25, a
benefit of £3.75. Note, though, that in this case, unlike
before, the expected value cannot equate with the value
of any actual offer received. This procedure can be
repeated indefinitely, though after the fourth search the
calculations start to become prohibitively cumbersome.
The more suppliers that are canvassed, the nearer the
expected value is to £60. Table 3:2 summarises these
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expected values for the first six searches, as well as
the marginal fall in the expected value for each
additional search. It is noticeable that increasing the
search sample size yields diminishing marginal returns,
as would be anticipated for any stable price
distributions. Exactly how many searches would be
expected will depend on a comparison of the marginal
costs of search with the marginal expected benefit.
If it is assumed that each visit to a potential supplier
involves a fixed, known cost, c (an assumption that will
be retained for the majority of this chapter), then
clearly it will not be worthwhile continuing search if
the fall in the expected value of the best offer is less
than c. For example, suppose the unit search cost is
£1.50. Referring to Table 3:2, a sample size of three is
worthwhile, whereas extending the sample to four would
not be, as the marginal expected benefit is only £1.18.
Similarly, if the unit search cost is £2.00, then the
optimal sample size is two. This demonstrates an
important result within search theory
- the amount of search falls as the cost of search
increases.
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TABLE 3:2 
THE EFFECT ON EXPECTED VALUE OF SAMPLE SIZE 
Sample
Size
Probability that
best offer is
Expected
Value
Fall in
Expected
Value
£60 £70 £80 f. f.
1 .250 .500 .250 70.00
2 .437 .500 .063 66.25 3.75
3 .578 .406 .016 64.38 1.87
4 .684 .312 .004 63.20 1.18
5 .763 .236 .001 62.38 .82
6 .822 .178 .000 61.78 .60
The main drawback of this kind of search model is the
requirement for the sample size to be fixed, and selected
prior to the commencement of the search process. Suppose
the sample size has been set at three, as in the above
example. Then, even if an offer of £60 - the minimum
price possible - is located on the first contact, two
more suppliers would have to be searched. This is both
wasteful and unrealistic.
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So, rather than adopting the current strategy
- "search n suppliers, and accept the minimum price
offer received,"
it would seem more sensible to substitute the following
strategy
- "search at most n suppliers, and stop as soon as the
minimum price offer is received. Otherwise, accept the
lowest offer located among the n suppliers."
This second . strategy too, though, has its limitations. It
relies on a searcher not only knowing the minimum price
for which a product will be sold, but also knowing the
full distribution of all prices. This will not always, if
ever, be the case. An alternative approach to these
essentially fixed sample size search strategies, is to
adopt a sequential search process; that is, one in which
each price offer is considered on its own merits as it is
observed in the random sequence. This can be achieved by
comparing each offer with a standard reservation price,
so that the search strategy becomes
- "select a reservation price, R, and accept the first
offer received that is no greater than R."
Such a rule takes advantage of any opportunities afforded
by early, fortuitous observations of low prices. The main
difficulty with this sequential model, though, is
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concerned with calculating the critical parameter, R. One
method can be demonstrated by extending the simple
example introduced earlier
	
Let, R	 be the reservation price (which must be one
of £60, £70 or £80, since no other prices are
possible),
V(R) be the total expected net expenditure
resulting from one more search,
	
x	 be the next price offer received, and
	
c	 be the (fixed) unit search cost.
Further, the new price offer, x, could be
< R with probability p, in which case stop, or
> R with probability q ( =1-p), in which case
continue searching.
Then, V(R) = Exp (x : x  R).p + V(R).q + c	 [3:1]
and so, substituting for q,
V(R) = Exp (x : x  R) + c	 [3:2]
P
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Exp [n(R)] =	 1 [3:3]
Now consider Exp [n(R)], the expected number of searches
before finding a price less than or equal to the
reservation price. Then, clearly,
Exp [n(R)] =	 ,E
3=1
where p j is the probability that the reservation price or
lower is first encountered on the j th search. It follows
that
Exp [n(R)]	 •
	
100-1
=1 "
• p	 ic/j1
j=1
• p (1 + 2q + 3q2 + 4q3 +
• p (1-q)-2
Thus, returning to equation [3:2], the first term on the
right-hand side is the expected benefit from search,
while the second term is the expected cost; that is, the
product of the unit search cost and the expected number
of searches. Applying the result in equation [3:2] to the
numerical example above, and remembering that R can only
take one of three values, then it can easily be verified
that
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V (60) = 60 + 4c
V (70) = 66.67 + 1.33c
V (80) = 70 + c
Given the search cost, c, the reservation price is chosen
to produce the most favourable value of V(R), which in
this context is that representing the lowest overall
expenditure. If, as before, the individual's unit search
cost is £1.50, then
V (60) = 66
V (70) = 68.67
V (80) = 71.5
Therefore, the reservation price would be set at £60, and
search would continue until such an offer is received.
The expected number of searches for this to happen is
four (from equation [3:3]). Indeed, simple algebra
reveals that for any search cost up to £2.50, £60 is the
optimal reservation price, increasing to £70 for search
costs up to £10, and to £80 thereafter, the latter case
reducing the situation to accepting the first price quote
received. This demonstrates another important result
within search theory, that
- reservation prices rise as the unit search cost
increases.
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The fixed sample size and sequential search models
discussed here lend useful insights to search theory. A
more complex model is needed, however, to prescribe
behaviour in situations where there are more general, and
less artificial, underlying price distributions than in
the simplified example in the illustration. Such a model
is derived in the next section.
A GENERALISED SEARCH MODEL
Over the last 20 years several authors have derived
models of individual search behaviour. For example,
Telser (1973), Rothschild (1974), and Landsberger and
Peled (1977) in the context of searching for the lowest
priced good; Salop (1973), Lippman and McCall (1976), and
Seater (1979) in the context of searching for the highest
paid job; while Kohn and Shavell (1974), Karni and
Schwartz (1977) and McKenna (1987) derived general models
applicable in either context. While no two of these
models are identical, they are broadly similar subject to
certain changes in emphasis and underlying assumptions,
and differing terminology and notation.
The model derived here is based on Hey (1981, pp 49-50)
and concerns a situation where an individual is searching
for the lowest price of a good, with full knowledge of
the price distribution and with the facility of full
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recall; that is, past offers can be retrieved at any
future time. The impact of relaxing these constraints is
considered later in this chapter.
In formulating the model, let
F (x)	 represent the cumulative price distribution
fxf(z) dz
where f(z) is the probability density
function of the price distribution) ,
represent the minimum price so far
. encountered ,
V (m)	 represent the expected value of the
objective function starting from a lowest
price of m
represent the next price offer received, and
represent the unit search cost, which is
kept constant throughout.
The individual wishes to maximise her overall
expenditure, and so is seeking to minimise the value of
V(m), the objective function. At a given stage in the
process, she can accept the best offer so far received,
m, or search again at a cost, c.
function (this is equivalent to
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{ m ,
Thus, V(m) = min { m , V (m, y) }
min { m , c + I'	 r=	 mvV (y) dF (y) + j	 (m) dF (y) }-00
since if the new price received is greater than m, it
will be discarded, while if it is smaller than m it
becomes the new best offer.
fm
Hence, V (m) = min { m , c +
	 V (y) dF (y)
+	 V(m).{1 - F(m) } }	 [3:4]
Integrating by parts, it follows that
im
V (y) dF (y)
-00	
=	 [ V (y) .F (y) l in
	 Cm
-00 -	
j_Vee' (y)F (y) dy
im
=	 V(m).F(m)	 -	 V'(y)F(y)dy [3:5]
Substituting [3:5] into [3:4], gives
V (m) = min
Cm
 V' (y ) F (y) dy }
-00
c + V (m) -
[3:6]
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Consider those m for which V(m) < m. Then, from [3:6], it
follows that
V(m) = c + V(m) - i -
m
V'(y)F(y)dy ,
00	
and so
Vi (y)F(y)dy =
-00	
[3:7]
Now, by definition, V(y) and F(y) are non-decreasing
functions of y, and thus,	 V' (y)  0	 for all y, and
F(y) > 0 for all y. The integrand, then, is non-
negative. Therefore, there must exist some unique value
of m, say R, such that
fR
V'(y)F(y)dy = c
	
[3:8]
and,	 V' (y) = 0	 for all . 17  R
V(m), then, is a constant, say k, for all values of m
greater than R. Now consider those values of m less than
R. Then, it must be that
im
V' (y) F (y) dy <	 I V' (y) F(y) dy
-00	
-00	
[3:9]
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im
V' (y) F (y) dy
-00
C + V (m) -
Returning to equation [3:6], and using the results in
equations [3:8] and [3:9], the second term on the right-
hand side,
= V (m) + IRV' (y) F (y) dy
J-00
im
-	 V' (y) F (y) dy
> V (m)
Therefore, by definition from [3:6], within this range
V(m)	 =	 m
Summarising these results,
V(m)	 =	 k	 for m > R
V(m)	 . m	 for m  R
[3:10]
For V to be a continuous function, the two must be
equivalent when m = R , and so the constant k must equal
R.
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1R in
_
The relationship is presented graphically in Figure 3:1
below.
V(m)
R
-
Figure 3:1 ...The expected value of the objective
function for different minimum price offers
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Thus, from [3:6], if V(m) = m , search should be ceased
while if V(m) < m , it is worth continuing. From Figure
3:1, this can be seen to reduce to searching until the
first price is located less than or equal to the
reservation price, R. The reservation price can be
calculated using the expression derived from substituting
for V y (y)	 from [3:10] in [3:8], so that
IR 
F (y) dy	 =	 c	 [3:11]
The above result is an important one in search theory,
being the simplest generalised expression for the
reservation price. Thus, an individual with complete
prior knowledge of the distribution of prices, and,
therefore, the cumulative price distribution function
F(.), should first calculate a reservation price, R,
using the equation above, as well as the value of her
unit search cost, c (assumed to be constant). Having
calculated this, the individual should then search until
a price is located less than or equal to this reservation
price, and accept the first such price encountered.
Although this would seem a clear and concise solution to
the search problem, except in instances where the price
distribution	 is	 relatively	 straightforward, 	 the
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i mwhere SL(m) [ =	 (y - m)f(y)dy } is the standardised,
normal loss integral	 (see,	 for example, Hughes
	 and
evaluation of the above integral, and so the reservation
price, is non-trivial and will often require an iterative
computer process. Heuristic solutions to the search
problem requiring less computational effort are
introduced and discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Where the price distribution is normal, with mean, p, and
standard deviation, a, an alternative derivation of the
same result lends itself to a solution that can be
looked-up in statistical tables. The reservation price,
R, is given by the expression below (as derived in
Appendix 3:1):
R -  p	 +	 SL(R)
	 =	 C
	 [3:12]
a	 a	 a
Grawoig, 1971, p459). So, for illustration, suppose the
price distribution has parameters p = 86 , a = 10 , and
that the unit search cost is 4. Then the solution for R
given by [3:12] is derived from:
R - 86 +	 SL(R)	 =	 4
10	 10	 10
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Using the Unit Normal Loss Integral Tables reproduced as
Appendix 3:2, it can be seen that this is uniquely
satisfied where (to two decimal places)
the standardised function, R - 86
	 =	 0.01 , and
10
the loss function, 	 SL (R) 	 =	 0.39
10
Solving the first of these gives a reservation price of
86.10, which corresponds to the value calculated
numerically in the experimental work that follows in
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In addition, this second derivation
indicates the importance of the ratio between the search
cost and the standard deviation of the price
distribution, that is, c/a. One particularly useful
result concerning this variable, derived in Appendix 3:3,
is that:
- the expected number of searches before encountering
the reservation price or lower, is a decreasing
function of c/G (and, hence, independent of R).
This result is used further in some of the new search
rules introduced in Chapters 5 and 6 (for example, see
Rule K).
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MODEL EXTENSIONS
The basic search model developed above has two important,
underlying assumptions. First, the searcher has full
knowledge of the price distribution, in the sense of
knowing, or at least being able to calculate, the exact
probability of obtaining any given price offer. Second,
there is a full recall facility. Recall relates not just
to memory but to memory and availability; thus a recall
facility enables any past offer to be retrieved later. In
this section, the effect on the model of partially
relaxing these assumptions, as well as certain other
constraints, is investigated. Specific findings are
discussed and referenced, though formal proofs are not
reproduced.
I) - Knowledge of the Price Distribution
Given the complex nature of product and service price
distributions, it would be unreasonable to assume that,
in general, searchers have complete knowledge about a
particular distribution. If their knowledge is imperfect,
however, use of an optimal reservation price model may
compound any initial specification errors and lead to
decisions that are substantially sub-optimal. Gastwirth
(1971) explored the robustness of search models in this
context, and found that modest specification errors
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could,	 in some circumstances,
	 result in dramatic
increases in the total expected cost, as well as in the
total expected number of searches. For example, a
searcher assuming that prices were distributed evenly on
the unit interval, F(x) = x , when in reality they were
distributed on the same interval, but in accordance with
a right-triangular distribution, F(x) = x 2 , would on
average incur approximately double the total cost and
search five times as much as she would had she been
correctly informed.
In other cases, a searcher's knowledge of the price
distribution may be too limited to enable any prior
specification. As such, use of a reservation price model
would be more difficult. In these circumstances, each
offer received is not only a potential purchase or
employment opportunity, but also provides a piece of
information that can be used to update and revise prior
beliefs about the distribution.
Two cases can be distinguished. First, the searcher
receives an offer, uses it to recalculate her reservation
price, and then decides whether or not to accept it. Kohn
and Shavell (1974) have shown that in this "adaptive"
search paradigm, the reservation price is no greater than
the reservation price in the "static" search paradigm
(where prior knowledge of the distribution is complete).
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In, the second case, the offer is accepted or rejected
before the distribution is updated, and so, before the
reservation price is recalculated. Rothschild (1974,
p701) provides a counter-example demonstrating that the
reservation price property (that there exists a unique
price below which an offer should be accepted and above
which an offer should be rejected) does not always hold
here.
"Suppose	 there are three prices, $1.00, $2.00, and
$3.00, and that the cost of search is $0.01. Prior
beliefs , admit the possibility of only two
distributions of prices. Either all prices are $3.00
or they are distributed between $1.00 and $2.00 in the
proportion 99 to 1. A man with these beliefs should
accept a price of $3.00 (as this is a signal that no
lower prices are to be had) and reject a price of
$2.00 (which indicates that the likelihood that a much
better price will be obtained on another draw is
high)."
Existing experimental evidence concerning the effect on
search processes of having either full prior knowledge or
no prior knowledge about the price distribution is
discussed in Chapter 4, while new experimental work in
the area is presented and analysed in Chapter 5. In
addition, Chapter 6 reports further, new experimental
work in the situation where a searcher has partial prior
knowledge of the distribution, though using a less
pathological and more realistic setting than that
conveyed by Rothschild's illustration above.
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II) - Recall 
The search model derived in this chapter carries the
underlying assumption that any past offer may be selected
at any time. Such a regime is known as "search with
recall" and might apply to homogeneous good markets where
the total search term is low. In many other situations,
previously rejected offers cannot later be retrieved.
This type of regime is termed "search without recall",
and in the context of labour markets might be a
reasonable representation of the real-world situation
where there is a high unemployment rate, and where job
vacancies are filled quickly. In consumer product
markets, examples might include rare or specialist cars,
or segments of the property market, though clearly the
requirement for homogeneity may be more difficult to
satisfy.
A generally more realistic model of search would be
"search with uncertain (or partial) recall" ; that is,
the probability of a past offer being retrievable is
greater than zero (search without recall), but less than
one (search with recall). The probability is likely to be
linked to the price of the good, in that more favourably
priced goods are likely to be sold more quickly.
In situations where the searcher has complete knowledge
of the distribution and where search costs are constant,
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any price offer received should be assessable on its own
merits against the optimal reservation price for that
distribution. An accept or reject decision can be made
immediately, and will not alter over time. The extra
facility of recall, whether full or partial, will not
have any effect on the overall decision strategy which
remains as accepting the first price offer received no
greater than the reservation price.
Where knowledge is incomplete, or where search costs vary
over time, this may not be the case. Karni and Schwartz
(1977) derived a model incorporating uncertain recall
based on the following four assumptions (pp 41-42)
- The expected benefit of search has a finite mean
and variance over time.
- The probability that a past offer is currently
available decreases over time.
- The marginal cost of search (measured in utiles)
increases with the number of searches.
- The marginal cost of the j th search is the same
whether the search is a new draw or a backward
solicitation of any of the past observations.
The second of these assumptions is a little
uncomfortable. As stated above, intuitively, one would
expect lower price offers to be more likely to become
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unavailable than higher price offers, as they are more
likely to be seen as bargains and, therefore, accepted.
An improved assumption would allow the probability that a
past offer is currently available to be a function of
both time and its relative magnitude.
Karni and Schwartz (1977, p 48) show that in such
circumstances
- the reservation utility in the case of search with
uncertain recall is bounded above by the
reservation utility of search with recall, and from
below by the reservation utility of search without
recall.
The experiments that follow in later chapters are
attempting to understand individual search behaviour
further, though in most cases (and in all the new
experimental work) the facility of full recall is always
kept available.
III) - Other Factors 
Some further factors that may influence the behaviour of
the generalised search model include the level of search
costs, a searcher's risk attitude, her current wealth
position, time, and the concept of diminishing returns to
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search. While these factors are not developed further in
the experimental work of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, they
are discussed here briefly in the interests of
completeness. Note that although some results are
presented in the context of job search, the findings are
equally applicable in the contexts of product or service
search that is the central focus of this thesis.
- Search Costs 
Most sequential models assume (in the interests of
simplicity) that search costs remain constant through
time. Given a constant search cost, though, it follows
directly from the formula defining the reservation price
(equation [3:11]), that as search costs increase,
searchers will tend to set higher reservation prices.
Further, from the earlier result that the expected number
of searches is a decreasing function of c/a, a higher
search cost will result in a fall in the amount of
search.
Interesting empirical support for this is presented by
Barron and Mellow (1979) in the context of job search.
They developed a theory of the unemployed individual's
choice of how much "effort" to devote to search, where
the term "effort" involves both the monetary cost of
search and the time taken. They tested the theory using
data from a supplement to the May 1976 Current Population
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Survey in the USA. One particular finding supported their
prediction that an increase in the mean of the wage offer
distribution would increase the search effort input. An
increase of one dollar (from $4 to $5) in the expected
wage increased search time by 9%. Thus, a higher
reservation wage (lower reservation price) will tend to
encourage more search effort.
- Risk Attitude 
Individuals searching in the paradigm above are assumed
to be risk neutral with a linear utility function.
Nachman (1972) has shown that, other things being equal,
risk averse individuals searching in the basic search
paradigm, with or without recall, will search less and
settle for lower wages (higher prices) than will risk
neutral individuals.
Other interesting results have been found by considering
the effect on the reservation price of changing the
characteristics of the distribution, and, in particular,
its associated risk. Two types of such change in risk of
a distribution have been defined in the economics
literature. The Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) mean-
preserving change in risk may be attractive to a risk
averter despite its consequent reduction in utility. This
is because it increases the probability of extremely
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favourable observations which, coupled with an
individual's ability to sample several times, may make it
worthwhile to continue search. Kohn and Shavell (1974)
remark that this type of change in risk may either raise
or lower the reservation wage depending on the specific
circumstances. If, however, the job searcher is risk
neutral, the mean-preserving increase in risk can only
raise her reservation wage.
The second type of change in risk is the Diamond-Stiglitz
(1974) mean-utility-preserving increase in risk. Such an
increase in risk will raise the reservation wage of a job
searcher (Kohn and Shavell, 1974).
Chalkley (1984) introduced to the literature a job search
model that allowed null employment offers to be made. If
knowledge of the distribution is incomplete in the sense
that the probability, q , of receiving a positive wage
offer is not known with certainty, Chalkley found that,
in general, a more diffuse prior (a greater variance on
q) tends to reduce the reservation wage, implying that
supposedly risk neutral individuals may, when searching,
dislike risk.
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- Wealth Position 
A further potential influence on the search behaviour of
an individual is her current wealth position. As her
wealth decreases, a job searcher may be more willing to
accept a lower paid employment ("beggars can't be
choosers"). Hence, the reservation wage would be expected
to fall. Danforth (1974) confirmed this with respect to
asset holdings for an expected utility maximiser in both
the finite and infinite time horizon. Lippman and McCall
(1976) have applied the search model to the bankruptcy
problem, and concluded similarly. The special problem
here is that at a certain, very low asset value, no re-
investment is permitted, and so no further search is
possible (search costs being taken to represent general
living expenses etc.).
- Time
In the search paradigm described above there is an
infinite time horizon, and reservation values are
constant through time. If, however, this assumption on
time is lifted (that is, a searcher has only a finite
amount of time to purchase a product or find employment),
then this property of reservation values ceases to hold.
McCall (1974) shows that in the-basic search paradigm
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with a finite time horizon, the reservation wage (price)
will fall (rise) over time.
Further, Benhabib and Bull (1983) have shown that the
expected return to search with t periods remaining is
less than the expected return with t + 1 periods
remaining, for all t. This leads searchers to increase
the likelihood of terminating search by extending the
sample size within a period.
- Diminishing Marginal Returns 
There has been some discussion in the literature on the
assumption of diminishing returns to job search. Apart
from being an important property in itself, such an
assumption may go some way towards explaining the
apparent paradox of a 35 to 40 hour working week compared
with Barron and Mellow's empirically observed mean search
time of approximately 7 hours per week (1979, p396).
The hypothesis of diminishing returns to search has
itself been empirically tested by Chirinko (1982) using
two samples drawn from a special survey of unemployed
individuals in the May 1976 USA Current Population
Survey.
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A spatial explanation for this phenomenon , has been
offered by Seater (1979). His explanation is based on an
assumption that a job-seeking individual will conduct a
search for vacancies by contacting first those
prospective employers closest to home in preference to
those further away. Thus, as time passes, and the nearby
vacancies have all been contacted, subsequent search will
necessitate travelling a greater distance, thereby
incorporating greater search costs in terms of time and
money, and, therefore, yielding diminishing marginal
returns. Search may therefore be terminated earlier.
SUMMARY
This chapter has developed a formal search model set in
the context of an individual searching for a consumer
product or service at a suitably low price. In addition,
relevant extensions to the model described within the
research literature have been reviewed.
The key result is that given a cumulative price
distribution, F , and a constant unit search cost, c , an
individual should set a reservation price, R , and keep
searching until she receives a price quote less than or
equal to R. The optimal reservation price is given by the
expression
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IR F(x) dx	 c
Solving the expression is non-trivial. A new derivation,
however, that utilises normal loss integrals, enables a
tabular solution where the price distribution is normal.
Further, where a distribution is normal with standard
deviation, a , it has been shown that the expected number
of searches is a decreasing function of c/a.
The next chapter reviews the existing experimental
evidence concerning the apparent use (or non-use) of the
theoretically optimal search model.
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APPENDIX 3:1
This appendix provides an alternative derivation of the
reservation price formula that utilises standard normal
loss integrals and enables a tabular solution.
Using similar notation to before, let
f	 represent the probability density function of the
price distribution
F	 represent the cumulative price distribution I
m represent the minimum price received so far
Y	 represent the next price offer received , and
c	 represent the fixed unit search cost.
The expected gain from searching once more is m - y
with probability f(y) for all y 
 m , and 0 with
probability f(y) for all y > m. In either case there
is also a loss of c. Thus, the net expected gain, E, is
given by
f
m
E 	=	 ( m - Y) .f (Y) dY	 -	 c	 [A31:1]
-m
r-	 r	 r
=	 mf(y)dy -	 yf(y)dy +	 (Y - m)f(Y)dY
co	 -co	 m
- C
=	 m - P + SL(m) - c
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= c
i
Rm
F(y)dySO, = c (as per 3:11)
J m
where	 SL(m) [ =	 (y - m)f(y)dy } is the standardised,
m
normal loss integral. Re-writing,
E	 =	 afm-  p	 +	 SL(m)	 -	 c}J
a	 a	 a
and so, the individual should continue searching if the
expected gain, E, is positive. That is, if
m -  p	 +	 SL(m)	 >	 c
a	 a	 a
But, trivially, from [A31:1],
	
m -  p + SL(m)	 is an
a	 a
increasing function of m. Thus, there exists some R such
that
R -  p	 +	 SL(R)	 =	 c	 [3:12]
a	 a	 a
where once again, the decision rule is to continue
searching if y > R , and stop if y 5 R. R itself is
found by integrating [A31:1] by parts. Hence,
P R - Y) F (Y)]	 -	 I
R
(-1)F(Y)dY
R
— co	 — co
69
APPENDIX 3:2 
This appendix reproduces values of the unit normal loss
integral for use in calculating reservation prices in
accordance with equation (3:12].
The values in the body of the table are expected
opportunity losses for linear loss functions and a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of unity. The value represents the standardised deviation
of the break-even value from
Unit Normal Loss Integral
L * (u) = P fN* (u) - u P N*(2 > u)
.00 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
.0 .3989 .3940 .3890 .38.11 .3793 .3744 .3697 .3649 .3602 .3556
.1 .3509 .3464 .3418 .3373 .3328 .3284 .3240 .3197 .3154 .3111
.2 .3069 .3027 .2986 .2944 .2904 .2863 .2824 .2784 .2745 .2706
.3 .2668 .2630 .2592 .2555 .2518 .2481 .2445 .2409 .2374 .2339
.4 .2304 .2270 .2236 .2203 .2169 .2137 .2104 .2072 .2040 .2009
.5 .1978 .1947 .1917 .1887 .1857 .1828 .1799 .1771 .1742 .1714
.6 .1687 .1659 .1633 .1606 .1580 .1554 .1528 .1503 .1478 .1453
.7 .1429 .1405 .1381 .1358 .1334 .1312 .1289 .1267 .1245 .1223
.8 .1202 .1181 .1160 .1140 .1120 .1100 .1080 .1061 .1042 .1023
.9 .1004 .09860 .09680 .09503 .09328 .09156 .08986 .08819 .08654 .08491
1.0 .08332 .08174 .08019 .07866 .07716 .07568 .07422 .07279 .07138 .06999
1.1 .06862 .06727 .06595 .06465 .06336 .06210 .06086 .05964 .05844 .05726
1.2 .05610 .05496 .05384 .05274 .05165 .05059 .04954 .04851 .04750 .04650
1.3 .04553 .04457 .04363 .04270 .04179 .04090 .04002 .03916 .03831 .03748
1.4 .03667 .03587 .03508 .03431 .03356 .03281 .03208 .03137 .03067 .02998
1.5 .02931 .02865 .02800 .02736 .02674 .02612 .02552 .02494 .02436 .02380
1.6 .02324 .02270 .02217 .02165 .02114 .02064 .02015 .01967 .01920 .01874
1.7 .01829 .01785 .01742 .01699 .01658 .01617 .01578 .01539 .01501 .01464
1.8 .01428 .01392 .01357 .01323 .01290 .01257 .01226 .01195 .01164 .01134
1.9 .01105 .01077 .01049 .01022 .029957 .029698 .029445 .0 29198 .0 28957 .028721
2.0 .028491 .028266 .0'8046 .0 27832 .027623 .027418 .027219 .0'7024 .0'6835 .026649
2.1 .026468 .026292 .026120 .0 25952 .0 25788 .025628 .025472 .0 25320 .0 25172 .025028
2.2 .024887 .024750 .024616 .0 24486 .0 24358 .024235 .024114 .0 23996 .0 23882 .023770
2.3 .023662 .023556 .0 13453 .0 23352 .0 23255 .023159 .023067 .0 22977 .0 22889 .022804
2.4 .022720 .022640 .0 22561 .0 22484 .0 22410 .022337 .022267 .0 22199 .0 22132 .0'2067
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APPENDIX 3:3
This appendix provides a proof that the expected number
of searches before encountering the reservation price or
lower, is a decreasing function of c/a.
Again, using similar notation to before, from [3:11],
IC 	 rx
c	 =	 f(y) dydx
-00 j-00
where R = R(c,11,6). Changing the variable y using the
transformation, z = (y - g)/a , leads to
IR 1(x-.t)/
c	 =	 f0 1(z) dzdx
-00 
[A33:1]
with f01 (z) being the probability density function of
,
the normal distribution with zero mean and unit standard
deviation, and therefore, independent of both g and a.
Again, changing the variable x in [A33:1] using the
transformation, t = (x - g)/a , gives
f(	
0
R-g)/a ft
j_: ,1 (z)
 dzdtc	 = a	 [A33:2]
-00
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If, c = k, g = 0, and a = 1, then this becomes
fR(k)
	 It
k	 =I	 fo i (z) dzdt
-00	 J-- [A33:3]
Now, R(k) is independent of g and a, and is an increasing
function of k. Replacing k by c/a in [A33:3]:
f	
J
R(c/a)
	 It
c	 =	 f	 (z) dzdt0 1
a	 -00	 -00
[A33:4]
and by identifying [A33:4] with [A33:2]
R(c/a) =	 R(c,g,a)	 - g	 [A33:5]
a
It has already been shown that the expected number of
searches before finding the reservation price or lower,
E [n(R)], is equivalent to 1 (see [3:3]). But, by
P
definition,
fR
P	 =	 f (y) dy
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Changing the variable y above using the transformation
z = (y - 	 , gives
f(R-I.1)/a
P	 =	 f0,1(z) dz
-00
[A33:6]
Substituting [A33:5] into [A33:6]
P	
fR (c/a)
. f01 (z) dz
,
Therefore, p is an increasing function of R(c/a) , which
in turn is an increasing function of c/a. Thus, it
follows that E [n(R)] , the expected number of searches,
is a decreasing function of c/a , as required.
-00
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CHAP TER
FOUR
CHAPTER FOUR
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter developed a formal search model that
can be used to dictate search strategy where an
individual can sample offers from a large distribution of
offers, at a constant unit search cost. Specifically, the
individual should set a reservation price at the outset,
and then accept the first offer received no greater than
that reservation price.
This chapter reviews the experimental studies published
in this area that seek to investigate, in particular, the
extent to which individuals actually do adopt reservation
price search strategies. To date, there have been only a
limited number of experimental studies concerning single
variable search, some of which are set in the context of
searching for the lowest price of a good, while others
relate to the search for the highest paid job. As
discussed before, however, the characteristics of the
alternative settings are otherwise identical. The two
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major research contributions in this area have been made
by Schotter and Braunstein (1981), and by Hey (1981, 1982
and 1987). Schotter and Braunstein's study tested a total
of 11 hypotheses investigating a wide variety of
theoretical search results, such as the use of
reservation wages, and the effects of risk. Analysis was
carried out at an aggregate level to discover whether at
this small market level actual search behaviour complied
with the predictions of the theoretical models.
In contrast, Hey's studies adopted a behavioural
approach, with a focus at the individual level rather
than at the aggregate level. He attempted to uncover
reasonable rules-of-thumb that individuals might actually
be using in making search or buy decisions. Ideally, such
rules would be characterised by their greater simplicitly
than the optimal search model, but with only a small loss
in performance.
A review of the Human Information Processing literature
relevant to accounting and decision making (in which
framework Hey's studies are embedded) is provided in
chapter 7 of this thesis. It is included there, rather
than in the current chapter, in the interests of
continuity and coherence, as it provides an important
link between the price search studies of chapters 5 and
6, and the study of a behavioural phenomenon - functional
fixation - in chapter 8.
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Most of this chapter, then, is devoted to a description
and evaluation of the two major works above. First,
though, the results from three earlier studies are
briefly reported.
EARLY WORK
Rapoport and Tversky (1966) conducted a computer
controlled experiment where the subjects were required to
search for the "highest" offer from a distribution
function of observations that was assumed to be known.
Subjects were split into two groups; group L searching
without and group H searching with the facility of
recall. The authors concluded tentatively that search
with recall resulted in more offers being sampled than in
the case without recall, and that, in both conditions,
the amount of search decreased as the cost of search
increased. It was not clear, however, whether the
subjects were actually utilising optimal search rules.
Kahan, Rapoport and Jones (1967) conducted an experiment
into search without recall (ie. once an offer is passed,
it is no longer available) where this time, the
distribution of observations was unknown, there was a
zero search cost, and an upper limit - 200 - to the
number of searches that could be undertaken. Again,
subjects were required to discover as high an offer as
possible. Clearly, an optimal reservation price cannot be
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calculated as the distribution is unknown. The authors,
though, derived an optimal strategy by linking the
experiment to the literature on "optional stopping"
rules. A subject following an optional stopping strategy
would sample n observations in order to gain a view of
the overall distribution, and then stop at the first
subsequent price that is higher or lower than all
previous prices, depending on the particular experimental
context. In the Kahan, Rapoport and Jones experiment, the
optimal, optional stopping strategy was computed as being
to pass the first 74 offers received, and then accept the
first subsequent offer greater than the highest of the
first 74. Sixty percent of subjects behaved consistently
with such a strategy, though it seems extremely unlikely
that many subjects, if any, were actually using so
specific a decision rule. (Note that the added facility
of recall would render the experiment trivial, as the
zero search cost would imply a searcher could not lose by
searching the maximum 200 times.)
A weakness of the earlier Rapoport and Tversky (1966)
study was that in reality subjects had received minimal
prior information about the distribution function, and
had sampled only a relatively small number of offers
during the experiment. Thus, although the distribution
function was assumed to be known, in terms of its
underlying parameters, there was considerable doubt as to
whether subjects had learned its shape sufficiently well.
Rapoport and Tversky (1970) rectified this by conducting
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another experiment where the seven participants were
allowed a total of 60 hours each to become thoroughly
familiar with the two distributions used in the
experiment (A and B), by means of repeated sampling. Each
distribution consisted of four-digit numbers, A being
approximately normal with mean 1630 and standard
deviation 167, while B was again approximately normal
with the same standard deviation but a higher mean of
1797. The experiment itself followed this learning
period, the specific design being as summarised in Table
4:1.
TABLE 4:1
RAPOPORT AND TVERSKY (1970) - EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Session Dist'n N Recall
No.	 of
Trials
Unit
Search Cost
1 A 24 No 24 0,5,10,20
2 B 24 No 24 0,5,10,20
3 A 24 Yes 18 5,10,20
4 A 8 No 20 0,5,10,20
5 B 24 Yes 18 5,10,20
6 B 8 No 20 0.5,10,20
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Thus, for example, in session 3 subjects searched with
full knowledge and full recall from a normal distribution
with mean 1630 and standard deviation 167; and undertook
six separate trials for each of three search cost
conditions (c = 5,10,20), there being a maximum number of
observations permitted within each trial (N = 24). As
there was no significant difference between results from
the two distributions, they were combined in the
analysis. The authors' main finding was that in the no-
recall condition 65.2% of problems were solved optimally
where search was restricted to 24 observations, and 71.1%
where the limit was 8 observations. This compared to
61.8% of problems where there was the extra facility of
recall. They concluded (1970, p 119) that
"...the results of the present study suggest that the
optimal model provides a reasonably good account of
the behaviour of the subjects."
It should be remembered, though, that the seven subjects
who participated in the experiment were thoroughly
familiar with the distributions; they could be considered
experts. As such, the proportion of problems solved
optimally is, perhaps, surprisingly low. In any event,
given the experimental design, it is doubtful that the
findings can be generalised to more realistic settings
regarding the distribution familiarity.
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Over the next decade, there were many advances in the
theoretical literature concerning search model
derivations and extensions. It was not until 1981,
however, that a large-scale experimental study was
undertaken to investigate the practical robustness of
these advances.
SCHOTTER AND BRAUNSTEIN (1981) 
Schotter and Braunstein (1981) published the results of
an extensive experimental investigation into individual
search behaviour. They tested a total of 11 hypotheses,
the first of which, particularly relevant to the new
experimental work that follows in later chapters, is
reproduced below for illustration:
H1 - The Reservation Wage Hypothesis 
People actually search according to the reservation
wage rule and on average tend to set the optimal
reservation wage.
The remaining ten hypotheses are not reproduced here as,
mostly, they are less directly relevant to the new
experimental work that follows in later chapters.
Briefly, however, H2 and H3 are concerned with the
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effects of risk aversion with and without recall, H4 with
the effect of changing search costs, H5 with the effects
of increases in risk-mean-preserving spreads, H6 with
uncertain recall, H7 with no recall, H8 with the
constancy of reservation wages over time, H9 with a
finite time horizon, and H10 and H11 with searching from
unknown or mis-specified price distributions.
The "basic search paradigm" mentioned in several of the
hypotheses, refers to the following formally defined
scenario (1981, p 3)
"An individual, referred to as the searcher, is
seeking employment. Each and every day (until he
accepts a job), he ventures out to find a job, and
each day he generates exactly one job offer (he is not
allowed to vary the intensity of his search efforts),
offered to him from a stationary distribution of wages
known to him. The cost of generating each offer is a
constant c, and there is no limit on the number of
offers the searcher can obtain. In addition, once a
searcher is offered a job, that offer is always
available to him to accept (there is a perfect recall
of job offers). Finally, the searcher has a utility
function which is linear in income (the searcher is
risk neutral)."
The 56 undergraduates participating in the experiment
were assigned randomly to one of three groups; Group I
(the Risk Neutral group), Group II (the Risk Averse
group), and Group III (the Uncertainty group). Subjects
in Group I searched in the basic search paradigm and
performed a total of 12 experimental trials. Those trials
relevant to the hypothesis specified above are
highlighted below
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Trial 1 - search was from a symmetric triangular
wage distribution, p(w), given by
w
10,000	 for	 0  w  100
p ( w ) =
100 + (100 - w) 
10,000	 for 100 5 w  200
There was no limit to the number of
searches permitted, though each one cost
five "points".
Trial 2 - this was identical to trial 1 as far as
the subjects were concerned, but in
reality the sequence of wages was pre-
selected. The first five numbers were
80.29, 78.66, 115.64, 110.75 and 146.35,
thereby presenting the searcher with four
wages below the theoretically optimal
reservation wage of 133.00.
Trial 3 - as trial 1, but search was from a
rectangular distribution in which all
wages were equally likely. That is,
p(w) =	 1
200
Trial 12 - similar to trial 2, the pre-selected
sequence this time being such that a
subject had to search six times before
receiving an offer higher than the optimal
reservation wage (93.95, 43.58, 65.86,
82.87, 74.88, 147.76).
If a searcher searched n times, and accepted a wage w,
the payoff would be w - nc points. Subjects in Group I
were paid one penny per point as incentive. Group II
subjects performed exactly the same trials, but their
payoff conversion function was set in such a way as to
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simulate an Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion (see,
for example, Pratt, 1964).
Group III subjects were risk neutral, but performed only
eight trials. These were designed to enable comparison
with Group I subjects regarding the effects of searching
from unknown distributions, or from distributions about
which they were deliberately mis-informed.
Results
H1 - The Reservation Wage Hypothesis 
The reservation wage hypothesis was tested by considering
three parameters across trials 1, 2, 3 and 12 for Groups
I and II. The three parameters were the reported
reservation wage used - discovered by asking subjects
for the minimum bribe they would be willing to accept
rather than searching again - the highest rejected
wage, and the actual accepted wage. The results are
summarised an Table 4:2.
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TABLE 4:2
TESTS OF THE RESERVATION WAGE HYPOTHESIS
Group I : Risk Neutral	 Group II : Risk Neutral 
	
Mean of	 Mean of
Optimal	 Reported	 Optimal	 Reported
Trial	 R.W.	 R.W.	 R.W.	 R.W.
1 133 134.50 * 130 109.72 *
2 133 135.75 * 130 107.95 *
3 155 156.75 * 152 136.24 *
12 133 136.00 * 130 107.24 *
	
Average	 Average
	
Highest	 Highest
Optimal	 Rejected	 Optimal	 Rejected
Trial	 R.W.	 Wage	 R.W.	 Wage 
1 133 123.17 * 130 107.27 *
2 133 114.97 * 130 106.34 *
3 155 125.57 * 152 128.72 *
12 133 102.02 * 130 99.07 *
Expected	 Expected
Accepted	 Accepted
Wage Given Actual	 Wage Given Actual
Reported Accepted	 Reported Accepted
Trial	 R.W.	 Wage	 R.W.	 Wage 
1 155 146.45 * 136 141.40 *
2 155 139.15 * 136 123.75 *
3 170 170.38 * 157 168.72 *
12 155 134.37 * 136 124.70 *
significant at the 95% level
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As can be seen, in all cases results were significant at
the 95% level. That is, in no case were the actual
results significantly different from the optimal or
expected results. Thus, for example on trial 3, the Group
I subjects reported an average acceptance bribe of 156.75
which compares closely with the optimal 155.00.
AN EVALUATION OF SCHOTTER AND BRAUNSTEIN'S WORK
Overall, the results of Schotter and Braunstein's
extensive experiment broadly comply with the behaviour
that is predicted by theoretical search models. In
particular, it appears that the reservation wage
hypothesis holds in practice. There are, however, two
important riders to this conclusion.
First, the reported results are all based on the average
of many subjects' behaviour. They describe behaviour at a
small market aggregate level, rather than at an
individual level. Second, the results can conclude only
that subjects behaved (on aggregate) as though they were
using an optimal reservation rule. The experiment does
not seek to investigate whether they actually were using
such a rule.
The optimal search model derived in Chapter 3 requires a
searcher to set a reservation price, R , given by
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IR
j—co F(x) dx
and accept the first offer no greater than this
reservation price. The practical application of the exact
model,	 however,	 is	 characterised by three main
shortcomings, that stem mostly from the real-life
constraint of bounded rationality as discussed earlier in
Chapter 1.
First, where an individual is searching from an unknown
environment, a picture of the distribution function can
only be built-up over time. Where, in addition, only a
limited number of observations are sampled, it is
inevitable that this picture of the distribution may be
at best incomplete, and at worst totally wrong. Any mis-
specification of the model will lead potentially to
errors in the reservation price that is set. Indeed, as
Schotter and Braunstein discovered, mis-information can
result in substantially sub-optimal behaviour.
Second, even where the distribution function is known
with some accuracy, the subsequent evaluation of the
reservation price, R, is non-trivial. It requires
substantial computational power. The cost of computation,
therefore, is not sufficiently small to be ignorable.
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Third, and following on from the criticism above, the
evaluation obtained in any case is necessarily an
approximation, and it is not clear that any approximating
error is small.
The additional criticism that the model requires a
searcher to know her search costs and economic utility
functions, while valid, would apply whatever search model
was being used.
Thus, it seems unlikely that participants in Schotter and
Braunstein's experiment were genuinely behaving in
accordance with the predictions of formal search models,
at least not at the individual level. A consequent
research issue is to discover what kinds of search rules
or heuristics individuals use as substitutes. This was
addressed, to an initial extent, by the work of Hey
(1981, 1982, 1987).
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HEY (1981, 1982, 1987) - REASONABLE RULES OF THUMB
In trying to understand the impact of the practical
limitations of formal search models, Hey (1981) suggested
two alternative frameworks. Either searchers simplify the
problem first and then behave optimally with respect to
the simplification ("sub-optimal search"), or they adopt
some simple, reasonable rules of thumb. In comparing
these two, Hey suggests (1981, p 69) that
"while the former may simply be an attempt at the
latter, (or vice-versa), it is by no means clear that
the "optimal" in "sub-optimal" will dominate the
sub". Taken in conjunction with the empirical
observation that, in practice, the expected number of
searches following even the optimal strategy (with
respect to the true distribution) is likely to be
small, the paper suggests that the scope of learning
may well be limited; thus, particularly in the
presence of computation cost, reasonable rules of
thumb may well be preferable. Since minimal
requirements for "reasonableness" lead to sensible
aggregate predictions, this is not particularly
damaging to search theory."
Hey (1982) provided an experimental follow-up to these
ideas, being concerned with attempting to discover
specific "reasonable rules of thumb" that searchers
adopt. 31 subjects participated in four different cases
where a consumer durable item had to be purchased from
one of an infinite number of suppliers. Subjects were
told the maximum amount that they should be willing to
spend on the item (inclusive of search costs) as well as
the unit cost of search. They were unaware of the
underlying
	 shape
	 and	 parameters	 of	 the	 price
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distributions used. The four cases were as shown in Table
4:3, each distribution being normal.
TABLE 4:3
HEY (1982) - PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS USED
Standard Search Reservation
Case	 Budget	 Mean	 Deviation Cost	 Price 
£ £ £ £ £
1 250 215 25 2.5 192.50
2 100 86 10 2 81.10
3 250 215 25 5 202.75
4 100 86 10 4 86.10
Using an explicit record of price sequences and subjects'
decisions, together with tha analysis of verbal protocols
recorded at the time of the experiment, Hey derived the
following reasonable rules of thumb (1982, pp 72-74)
Rule A (reservation rule) 
Stop searching if a price quote is received that is
sufficiently low.
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Rule A* (optimal reservation rule) 
Stop searching if a price quote is received less than
the optimal (with respect to the true distribution)
reservation value.
Rule B (one bounce rule) 
Have at least two searches; stop if a price quote is
received larger than the previous quote.
Rule C (two bounce rule) 
Have at least three searches; stop if both the last
quote and the next to last are larger than the second
to last.
Rule D (modified one bounce rule) 
Have at least two searches; stop if a price quote is
received larger than the previous quote less the
search cost.
Rule E (modified two bounce rule) 
Have at least three searches; stop if both the last
quote exceeds the second to last less twice the search
cost and the next to last exceeds the second to last
less the search cost.
Note that as subjects did not know the true distribution,
then at most their behaviour could be as though they were
using Rule A* . As an illustration of the underlying
evidence for these rules, consider the following extract
from the protocol of subject 25 case 3
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"[ 214.05 , 207.86 ] ... so I'm doing a little better,
but I think we should search further ... [ 226.73 ]
... no, I don't like that quote ... I'll search once
more and see what happens to that •.. [ 209.23 ] ...
OK, I've spent some money on search procedures, but I
now believe that £207.86 for the cost of this item is
quite good •.. I will buy."
The subject's behaviour is consistent with both Rule C
and Rule E, though it is not possible to ascertain which
of the two rules was being used, if either.
Appendix 4:1 (a,b,c and d), included at the end of this
chapter, presents a complete record of the price
sequences obtained by the 31 subjects across the four
cases, and, for each sequence, indicates the rules with
which individuals' behaviour was consistent. Note that in
two cases a subject was permitted to give up without
buying (subject 13 case 4, subject 19 case 4) as they had
exhausted their budget, and so their price sequences have
been excluded. Table 4:4 summarises the frequency with
which rules were apparently adopted; that is, the number
of sequences for which they were consistent with observed
behaviour. As mentioned above, the same observed sequence
may well match with more than one rule, or no rules. In
addition, the results for Rule A are recorded exclusive
of results for Rule A * which is a special case of it.
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TABLE 4:4
HEY (1982) - OCCURRENCE OF SEARCH RULES
Occurrence of Search Rule
Case	 A
	
A*
1 31 8	 3 6 9 6 8
2 31 4	 7 10 7 11 8
3 31 4	 12 6 3 8 3
4 29 5	 9 8 2 11 3
21	 31 30 21 36 22122
The relatively low	 proportion of subjects (25%) whose
behaviour was consistent with the optimal reservation
price strategy (A * ) is at variance with the results of
Rapoport and Tversky (1970) and Schotter and Braunstein
(1981) discussed earlier, where subjects mostly behaved
optimally. The two likeliest contributory factors to this
are that Hey's subjects had no initial information about
the price distribution, and no pecuniary incentives to
perform. These possible explanations were both addressed
in the Hey (1987) study.
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Four experimental conditions were identified depending on
the level of information about the distribution, and
whether there was a recall facility. The grouping is
shown in Table 4:5. 32 subjects participated in the
experiment, eight being assigned to each group, and each
subject performed five trials.
TABLE 4:5
HEY (1987) - EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Recall	 No Recall
Permitted	 Permitted
Full information
about distribution	 Group a	 Group p
No information
about distribution	 Group R
	
Group 8
An incentive scheme was incorporated, subjects receiving
a fixed amount of El plus a bonus proportional to the
outcome of their performance in one of the five trials,
selected randomly.
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Appendix 4:2 at the end of this chapter presents detailed
results of the experiment. Subjects were allowed any
number of trial runs to familiarise themselves with the
technology, though not with the distributions used in the
formal experiment. A summary of the results is presented
as Table 4:6.
TABLE 4:6
HEY (1987) - OCCURRENCE OF SEARCH RULES 
Case n A
Occurrence of Search Rule
A*
a 40 9 23 3 2
P 40 12 26 - - - 2
0 40 3 13 10 5 7 5
6 40 11 21 - 3 - 2
160 35 83 13 8 9 9
Case Q, corresponding to no initial information and full
recall, is a straightforward replication of Hey's 1982
experiment, though with an added financial incentive and
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different price distributions. Its reported results are
broadly similar. In terms of adopting the optimal A*
strategy, it is notable that subjects with full knowledge
outperform those without (61% against 43%) which is not
surprising. Further, subjects with no recall facility
outperform those for whom past offers are always
available, by 65% to 58% in the full knowledge condition
and by 53% to 33% in the no knowledge condition. This
does appear surprising, though it may be that the absence
of a recall facility requires subjects to place much
greater emphasis on the relative merits of each offer as
it appears.
Although the outcome of Hey's experiments suggest that
the reasonable rules of thumb account for a high
proportion of observed behaviour, and, while not optimal,
appear fairly robust, several criticisms apply. These are
discussed below.
AN EVALUATION OF HEY'S WORK
First, considering the complete set of rules, apart from
the difficulty in distinguishing them in certain
circumstances (as mentioned above), it is also apparent
that Rules B and C fail to take into account the search
cost - which is surprising. Further, all four "bounce"
rules attach some importance to the order in which the
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price quotes are received. Hey, himself, expresses
dissatisfaction with the logic of this (1982, p 73)
"(Rule B) appears rather strange ... mainly in that it
endows the order of the price quotes with some
significance. For example, a person using this rule
would stop after receiving £230, £190, £210 in that
order, but would continue after receiving £230, £210,
£190 in that order. We fail to see the rationale
behind this phenomenon."
The explanation seems psychological rather than logical.
In the former case, the two previous decisions to
continue searching both paid off, and with at most one
search cost to lose, a further attempt might seem a
gamble worth taking. Hence, a subject will keep playing
"winning streaks". This may, in part, be due to some
framing effect (see, for example, Tversky and Kahneman,
1981; McNeil et al, 1982) in that the way in which the
problem is presented may seem to endow the order with
some importance.
Second, no distinction is made between rules appropriate
in situations where subjects have no knowledge of the
underlying price distribution and situations where they
have full knowledge. Table 4:7 compares the frequency
with which rules matched observed behaviour for groups a
(full knowledge) and Q (no knowledge) in Hey's (1987)
"Still Searching" experiment. Both groups were permitted
full recall of past offers. It is clear that the two
groups demonstrate a very different pattern of behaviour.
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The use of the four "bounce" rules is virtually
negligible where subjects have full knowledge. This is
understandable, as given their knowledge, subjects are
able to judge each price quote received on its own
merits, and not on the basis of the last or next quote.
For this reason, separate consideration should be given
to the reasonableness of the rules depending on the
subjects' knowledge level about the distribution.
TABLE 4:7
"STILL SEARCHING" - A SUMMARY OF RULES USED
Full	 No
Knowledge	 Knowledge
(n=40)	 (n=40)
Occurrence of Rules 
A or A	 32	 16
B, C, D or E
	 3	 16
The third set of criticisms apply to decision situations
where subjects have no knowledge of the distribution.
Clearly, Rule A* can only be observed to occur by
coincidence, as subjects are not able to calculate the
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optimal reservation price 	 (due to the lack of
information). Further, while searching until a
sufficiently low price quote is received is a plausible
strategy, Rule A conveys no clue as to how "sufficiently
low" is defined. Even if a subject was known to be using
Rule A, an outside observer would be unable to predict
accurately when the subject would stop searching. This is
not the case with Rules B, C, D or E. As it stands, Rule
A is considered, therefore, to be insufficiently precise.
In addition, it is noted that in Hey's experiments, out
of a total of 162 separate trials where subjects had no
knowledge bul full recall, in as many as 16 cases (10%),
subjects accepted the first offer received. Only four
explanations could account for such behaviour. First, the
cost of search might be extremely high compared with the
offer just received. In the "Search for Rules for Search"
experiment (122 trials, 10 first offer acceptances),
however, the highest such ratio was only 5.1% which is
not excessive. Second, subjects may have learned the
distribution already, possibly from the preliminary
trials. Third, the subjects had insufficient incentive to
act rationally. Fourth, and probably the most likely
explanation, is that subjects used the given budget
figure as an anchor with which to compare the price
quotes received. These possibilities are excluded in the
design of the new experimental work that follows in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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The fourth criticism concerns situations where .subjects
have full knowledge of the distribution. As discussed
above, Rules B, C, D and E do not seem appropriate.
Moreover, given the computational complexity of
calculating the optimal reservation price, it is highly
unlikely that subjects are actually using Rule A*.
Rather, they may be adopting some heuristic, albeit a
heuristic that performs well in comparison with A * . The
interesting issue is to discover the properties of such
heuristics and to identify any common threads. Merely
matching observed behaviour with Rules A or A * does not
explore this issue.
SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the experimental evidence
published in the existing research literature regarding
the behaviour of individuals when searching for the most
favourable price of an otherwise homogeneous consumer
product or service, or an employment contract.
It	 is	 evident	 that	 observed	 behaviour	 changes
substantially from situations where a searcher has full
initial information about the underlying price
distribution to situations where the searcher has no
initial information. The apparent use of the optimal
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reservation price strategy is far greater in the former
case than the latter, but even so, there is still no
evidence to suggest that subjects actually were utilising
such a search rule, given its computational complexity.
It is possible, perhaps probable, that subjects whose
behaviour was consistent with Rule A * are, in fact,
adopting some high performing heuristic.
The new experimental work that follows, particularly that
presented in Chapter 5, seeks to uncover such heuristics
which, either in the no knowledge situation or the full
knowledge situation, describe individuals' search
behaviour more fully and more accurately than Hey's
reasonable rules of thumb. These new rules - especially
in the no knowledge situation - may also perform more
closely to the optimal.
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APPENDIX 4:1 (a) 
This appendix, together with Appendices 4:1 (b), 4:1 (c)
and 4:1 (d), reproduce the raw data for the four cases in
the Hey (1982) "Search for Rules for Search" experiment.
Raw data of Case I.
Parameters: x =250, c = 2.5, jt = 215.0, a = 25.0.
no. Price quotes obtained in chronological order
Consistent
with
rule(s)"
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
224.49
184.48
213.13
232.73
240.16
207.06
251.84
185.98
236.52
222.84
255.34
280.54
211.29
197.25
223.91
CE
A*
A
C
A
(6) 191.55 185.91 183.70 194.33 224.52
(7) 184.46 275.88 243.10 C E
(8) 250.85 198.13 175.32 A*
(9) 228.41 274.91 175.30 248.00 229.19 201.49 245.67
(10) 209.05 225.40 207.19 225.10 (I)
(11) 232.10 220.42 A
(12) 203.28 187.43 191.27 B	 D
(13) 237.55 235.12 213.80 A
( I 4) 177.82 234.08 226.17 252.13 246.65 229.95 189.70
(15) 212.63 197.47 185.97 224.58 B	 D
(16) 235.15 246.50 189.57 A*
(17) 228.01 215.19 226.14 B	 D
(18) 191.30 202.66 148.53 A
(19) 176.42 199.27 236.25 C E
(20) 241.50 227.76 A
(21) 217.90 198.55 A
(22) 222.26 202.64 217.39 13	 D
(23) 244.18 174.78 207.65 237.05 C E
(24) 195.76 A
(25) 240.17 211.66 222.47 197.22 221.12
(26) 219.85 176.59 204.99 13	 D
(27) 243.58 219.14 213.71 205.74 221.29 229.38 C E
(28) 161.82 200.80 190.89 C E
(29) 199.83 249.53 246.91 243.57
(30) 192.14 236.50 207.48 C E
(31) 218.28 215.34 185.77 231.84 B	 D
11) consistent with mixture of B and C (or of D and E)
1a) number consistent with either A or B or C: 27 (out of 31) (1 borderline), (h) number
consistent with either A or D or E: 27 (out of 31) (1 borderline). (c) subjects consistent
with none of rules (nor mixture): 9, 14 and 29.
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APPENDIX 4:1 (b) 
Raw data of Case 2.
Parameters: x =100, c= 2.0, m=86.0, a =10.0.
no. Price quotes obtained in chronological order
Consistent
with
rule(se•b
(1) 84.25 80.74 71.37 111.78 B D
(2) 108.34 71.74 A*
(3) 88.64 91.76 97.96 101.82 100.65 67.11 A*
(4) 94.35 70.20 76.18 B
(5) 87.41 101.40 B D
(6) 84.57 103.38 106.10 C E
( 7) 82.33 103.63 B D
( 8) 79.37 99.00 B D
( 9) 68.63 93.69 82.05 C E
(10) 101.92 74.79 35.51 102.95 C E
(11) 88.25 69.20 90.86 84.42 71.05
(12) 82.63 92.52 72.87 A*
(13) 93.97 90.91 87.84 85.74 81.02
(14) 94.30 80.05 A*
(15) 100.98 67.07 91.08 B D
(16) 106.32 85.62 78.50 86.34 B D
(17) 106.71 82.33 96.86 90.97 C E
(18) 72.53 82.29 85.93 70.14 A
(19) 87.41 74.71 A*
(20) 79.18 86.51 B D
(21) 79.09 90.98 71.14 A
(22) 92.41 85.02 88.18 89.57 C E
(23) 86.71 68.84 94.60 73.25 83.76 82.04 92.75
(24) 116.08 68.50 A*
(25) 94.25 98.17 80.08 85.08 (1)
(26) 67.45 80.18 91.80 C E
(27) 84.82 84.82
(28) 64.82 91.13 B D
(29) 86.07 76.11 88.58 B D
(30) 85.90 89.31 88.71 C E
(31) 90.18 91.52 89.48 A E
*(1) consistent with mixture of B and C (or of D and -E).
b(a) number consistent with either A or B or C: 27 (out of 31), (b) number consistent
with either A or D or E: 28 (out of 31), (c) subjects consistent with none of rules (nor
mixture): 11 and 23.
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APPENDIX 4:1 (c) 
Raw data of Case 3.
Parameters: x = 250, c= 5.0, p=215.0, i= 25.0.
no. Price quotes obtained in chronological order
Consistent
with
rule(s)"
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
229.47
215.23
227.63
200.89
184.34
253.66
190.79
178.24
173.77
206.42
235.12
197.09
259.63
206.13
224.13
233.51
245.88
213.04
228.62
220.11
199.34
228.97
178.37
225.62
214.05
217.87
229.46
225.75
230.34
200.59
223.25
223.55
255.46
185.85
. 176.29
198.83
237.35
209.99
223.07
234.15
206.11
210.27
236.72
248.66
188.54
196.02
200.62
201.33
203.15
222.90
189.35
209.54
207.86
181.25
214.09
248.15
229.01
241.88
214.71
237.34
225.05
231.18
226.66
263.45
241.57
240.25
211.79
208.84
205.45
227.32
177.85
203.77
289.36
204.65
226.73
217.05
201.22
204.63
222.04
255.31
230.54
225.83
212.49
187.48
206.01
214.38
209.23
181.88
203.88
218.58
202.87
256.95
181.56
226.34
209.59
176.70
B
C
A*
B
A*
A*
A*
C
B
A•
A*
(1)
(1)
A*
A*
A*
A•
A
A•
A
C
B
A
B
A
A*
13
D
E
D
E
D
D
E
D
D
D
D
'(1) consistent with mixture of B and C (or of D and E).
b(a) number consistent with either A or B or C: 25 (out of 31), (b) number
consistent with either A or D or E: 25 (out of 31), (c) subjects consistent with
none of rules (nor mixture): 6, 8, 12 and 23.
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APPENDIX 4:1 (d) 
Raw data of Case 4.
Parameters: x= 100, c=4.0, p =86.0, o= 10.0.
no. Price quotes obtained in chronological order
Consistent
with
rule(s)"
(1) 78.02 85.66 79.04 C	 E
(2) 78.56 79.90 76.20 77.06 (1)
(3) 81.00 74.57 72.36 A	 D
(4) 91.14 74.57 78.69 B	 D
(5) 93.36 A
(6) 74.36 84.41 72.90 96.89 96.83 93.70
(7) 93.23 81.32 A*
(8) 78.99 87.34 75.81 A	 E
(9) 85.20 80.43 77.94 A	 D
(10) 78.05 85.35 B	 D
(II) 87.93 75.82 76.59 77.73 77.26
(12) 83.46 89.80 B	 D
(14) 91.33 71.73 A*
(15) 73.39 88.40 86.31 83.72
(16) 75.99 81.76 B	 D
(17) 85.46 86.34 82.89 87.05 (1)
(18) 91.67 79.79 A*
(20) 85.09 94.89 B	 D
(21) 88.19 77.83 A*
(22) 84.05 97.30 B	 D
(23) 82.11 89.96 B	 D
(24) 79.10 A*
(25) 64.51 83.75 87.89 C	 E
(26) 87.43 95.36 B	 D
(27) 88.52 83.58 A*
(28) 79.70 72.32 70.81 A	 D
(29) 82.31 A*
(30) . 79.00 A*
(31) 99.92 84.83 A*
'(I) consistent with mixture of B and C.
"La) number consistent with either A or B or C: 24 (out of 29), (b) number
consistent with either..A or D or E: 24 (out of 29), (c) subjects consistent with
none of rules (nor mixture): 6, 11 and 15.
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APPENDIX 4:2 
This appendix summarises the results obtained in the
"Still Searching" experiment, Hey (1987).
Expti
subject
Trials Number of offers in round Rules with which behaviour
consistent in round
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
71 3 2 1 4 1 1_ A* A* A* A* A*
22 4 1 10 2 1 2 A* A* A A
73 2 1 10 2 4 9 A* A* BD A* A*
74 10 4 2 5 32 A* A A A*
15 7 1 1 2 1 2 A* A* A* A A*
76 4 2 1 10 5 2 B A A A*
77 15 1 2 7 5 2 A* A BD
78 5 1 2 2 1 1 A* A A* A* A*
/31 4 1 3 3 7 2 A* A* AE A A*
132 3 2 3 5 12 A A A* A*
/33 2 1 2 2 1 1 A* A* A* A* A*
/34 5 1 4 5 2 7 A* A A* A* A*
135 8 1 2 3 6 1 A* A* A A
166 15 3 1 4 1 3 A* A* A* A* A*
)37 5 2 3 6 2 1 A* AE A A A*
/38 3 5 1 1 5 1 A* A A*
.
A A*
7 1 7 2 3 8 7 3 B B CE
y2 3 2 4 6 32 A* BD BD
73 10 1 4 8 6 2 A* A* A*
74 8 1 4 11 15 3 A* A A
7 5 2 1 3 4 2 2 A* CE CE BD BD
y6 7 2 2 4 6 1 B AD CE A* A*
7 7 2 2 3 5 3 1 A* BE CE BD BD
78 2 1 3 5 3 1 A* A* A* A*
61 15 2 1 3 1 1 A A CE A A*
62 1 1 2 4 5 3 A* A* CE A*
63 11 2 1 1 1 4 A A* A* A*
64 6 1 5 7 5 8 A* A* A* A A*
65 5 1 3 10 4 1 A* A* A* A*
66 9 1 13 4 1 2 A* A A* A*
67 6 3 4 6 5 2 A A A* A*
68 6 3 1 1 2 3 C A A A A*
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CHAPTER FIVE
BETTER HEURISTICS 
FOR ECONOMIC SEARCH -
EXPERIMENTAL AND 
SIMULATION EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter extends the experimental work reported in
the previous chapter using a partial replication and
extension of the Hey (1982) study. It is concerned with
two important issues. What rules do individuals actually
use to govern their search for a sufficiently low price,
and how well do these search rules perform when compared
with an optimal reservation price model.
The first part of the chapter, then, describes a new
experiment aiming to assess the extent to which Hey's
"reasonable rules of thumb" correspond to observed
behaviour, and to determine any other rules of thumb that
match this behaviour better. By analysing the price
quotations received by subjects in conjunction with
verbal protocols recorded at the time of the experiment,
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several such rules are derived, both in the "no
knowledge" and "full knowledge" conditions.
The second part of the chapter describes a series of
simulations aiming to discover how well these search
rules perform over a very large number of trials. That
is, how little extra expenditure could be incurred, on
average, as a result of adopting one of these rules of
thumb instead of the optimal reservation price rule. The
simulation process also fine-tunes the proposed rules to
produce the variations on each rule that either match
observed behaviour best, or perform most closely to the
optimal. Thus, some heuristics are developed that, when
compared with the reservation price rule, are easier to
understand and easier to use, with only a small loss in
performance.
THE EXPERIMENT
Task
Subjects were required to purchase unspecified, common
items. In each case there was some variation in the price
quotes that could be received, and so a potential benefit
from "shopping around". There was, however, a constant,
non-zero search cost. Thus, subjects needed to balance
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the expected costs and benefits in determining their
decision strategy. Price quotes received were always
available for the duration of the experiment, that is,
there was full recall, and, within each purchase, were
from the same distribution. Prices were generated,
displayed and selected by means of an easy-to-use
interactive computer program.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of four groups.
For each subject, the experiment consisted of an initial,
single trial with non-random prices, to enable
familiarisation with the program, followed by three
phases. Phase 1 (groups A and C only) comprised four
trial runs from different price distributions, group C
having no knowledge of the distributions, group A having
full knowledge in the sense of knowing them to be normal
with specified means and standard deviations. In phase 2,
the rewarded part of the experiment, four further
purchases were made using the same four normal
distributions as used by Hey (1982). These are summarised
in Table 5:1. Only groups A and B had full knowledge of
the distribution in phase 2.
,
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TABLE 5:1
PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS WITHIN PHASE 2 
Standard	 Search Reservation
Number Mean	 Dev'n (a)	 Cost (c)	 Price 	 a/c
$	 $	 $	 $
1	 215	 25	 2.5	 192.50	 10
2	 86	 10	 2	 81.10	 5
3	 215	 25	 5	 202.75	 5
4	 86	 10	 4	 86.10	 2.5
In phase 3, the availability of knowledge was reversed,
the distributions used being simple multiples of the ones
in phase 2. Designing the experiment in this way not only
enabled a sufficient volume of data to be obtained from
which to gain insights into search behaviour, but also
allowed some investigation into any "learning" effects
arising from the initial trials or from changes of
knowledge levels. Table 5:2 summarises the difference
between the four groups.
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TABLE 5:2
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN SUMMARY BY GROUP
Number of Trial Runs
in Phase 1
4	 0
Level of Knowledge about
the Distribution in
Phase 2	 Phase 3
Full
	 No	 A	 B
No	 Full	 C	 D
The subjects performed the experiment in separate 15
minute sessions in the presence of the author to avoid
any misunderstandings or problems. They were encouraged
to think aloud, their verbal protocols being recorded on
tape.
Subjects 
24 subjects participated in the experiment (6 in each
group), all being second or third year undergraduate
students from the Warwick Business School, with no
previous exposure to search theory. As an incentive,
subjects were paid a fixed fee of El plus a bonus
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proportional to their performance in phase 2. Performance
was calculated by comparing the amount spent by the
subject with the amount that a computer would have spent
using an optimal, full knowledge, reservation model.
Where there was no difference, the incentive bonus was
50p., reducing linearly to zero where the subjects'
overall performance was 25% or more worse than the
optimum. A "lucky" student could earn a bonus more than
50p.
A subject's pay-off might be linked to "ability". That
is, participants who are more intelligent, more numerate,
or more used to making consumer purchasing decisions,
might perform better (and, therefore, earn more money)
than other participants. No explicit tests were
undertaken, however, to measure this variable either in
the current experiment, or in the price search with
partial prior knowledge experiment described in Chapter
6. This is for the following reasons. First, the
objective of the experiment was to discover general
search heuristics, and not to explore explicitly any
links between the types of rules adopted by subjects and
their individual level of competence. Second, each
subject made only a small number of purchase decisions
that could be used in the formal analysis - four in Phase
2 and four in Phase 3. Given that each purchase involves
the search for, on average, only two or three prices,
this represents too small a sample to enable ability to
be tested in a way that will allow meaningful results.
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Further work in the future, however, will investigate in
more depth the whole issue of subjects' learning
behaviour over a large number of trials. Some measure of
"ability" will be an important component of the analysis
of such learning processes.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT
As stated above, a reward scheme linked to performance in
phase 2 of the experiment was incorporated as an
incentive to participants. The mean pay-offs per subject
were	 group A
	 £1.42 (a = 0.07), group B
	 £1.49
(a = 0.07), group C £1.43 (a = 0.12), and group D £1.45
( a = 0.10) It is surprising that subjects in groups B
and D, without the benefit of the four initial trials,
out-performed subjects in groups A and C. The difference
in pay-offs, however, is not significant at the 10% level
(t 10 = 1.22). Further, although on average, subjects with
full knowledge (groups A and B) out-performed those with
no knowledge, again the difference in pay-offs was not
significant at the 10% level (t 10 = 0.24). As might be
expected, however, the no knowledge groups exhibited a
wider range of performance.
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Appendix 5:1 contains details of the sequences of price
quotes received in phases 2 and 3. Careful analysis of
these sequences, together with the verbal protocols taken
at the time of the experiment, led to the formulation of
several new search rules. These are described and
discussed below. Excerpts from the protocols have been
reproduced as supporting evidence for these new rules,
though these are necessarily restricted due to space
limitations. Results from phase 3 have also been included
in the analysis despite performance not being formally
rewarded. This is justified since comparing the frequency
with which 'different search rules matched observed
behaviour between the two phases revealed no significant
difference at the 10% level for the no knowledge
condition (chi 7 2 = 2.284) or the full knowledge condition
(chi 6 2 = 1.638).
No knowledge rules 
Four new rules (F, G, H and J) are proposed that describe
search behaviour in situations where a decision maker has
no knowledge of the distribution. Their relative
occurrence is summarised in Table 5:3, and compared with
that for Hey's four "no knowledge" rules (B, C, D and E).
The overall average occurrence referred to in Table 5:3
represents the percentage of all trials in which observed
behaviour matched the given search rule. Note that it is
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possible for the same search behaviour to correspond to
several search rules.
TABLE 5:3
NO KNOWLEDGE OF DISTRIBUTION - SEARCH RULES OCCURRENCE
Current Experiment Prior Work Overall
Average
Phase 2 Phase 3
*1 *2 Occur.
Group A
24 24 24	 24 122 40
Hey's Rules
B 5 8 4	 7 30 10 25%
C 6 5 7	 5 21 5 19%
D 6 9 3	 9 35 7 27%
E 6 5 9	 7 22 5 21%
New Rules
F 9 8 7	 13 35 - 33%
G 11 9 10	 15 36 10 35%
H 11 12 9	 16 38 - 39%
J 6 5 7	 9 28 - 25%
* 1	... Hey (1982)
* 2	... Hey (1987)
-	 ... not available
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Rule F
Have two searches, receiving quotes p i and p2.
If IP - 102I  2c , where c is the search cost, stop.
Otherwise search once more.
The form of this rule was partly suggested by Hey (1981,
p 62). The idea behind the rule is that where IP' P2I
is small, it is likely that the standard deviation of the
price distribution is small, and so, therefore, are the
expected benefits from further search. An illustration of
the adoption of rule F is provided by subject D3, run 2
"[ 81 ]... price given 81, cost of search 2 ... [ 90 ]
... price difference there is 9 dollars more
expensive, 2 dollars cost of search ... so it's
probably worth doing one more, and if it's higher I'll
accept the first quote ... [ 87 ] ... it is ... so the
distribution there seems to be fairly close, within 10
... and, furthermore, five costs of search would
totally eradicate any savings I have by a lower quote
... I'll go for the first quote."
On average, the behaviour of just over one-third of
subjects with no knowledge in the current experiment was
consistent with the adoption of rule F. From Table 5:3,
35 of 122 subjects in Hey's "Search for Rules for Search"
experiment behaved in accordance with rule F. In this
sense, it was not out-performed by any of Hey's six
search rules.
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Rule G
Have three searches.
This is the simplest rule, its rationale being that three
quotes is enough to be confident about the nature of the
distribution. As an example, consider subject C3, run 2
"[ 89 ] ... this one's only 2 dollars (the cost of
search), so I wouldn't be too worried about spending
that much having a look ... [ 84 ] ... and that one's
cheaper ... [ 99 ] ... I think I'll probably buy
there."
Despite its simplicity, rule G is consistent with the
behaviour of subjects in 35% of all the trials in the
current experiment and in Hey's two experiments.
Obviously, though, such a fixed sample size strategy
would not be appropriate where subjects had full
knowledge of the price distribution.
Rule H
Have two searches, receiving quotes p i and p 2 • If
search cost, c, > 10% min fp 1 ,p 2 }, stop. Otherwise
search again receiving quote p 3 • Stop searching unless
P2  pl - c, and p 3  p2 - c, in which case keep
searching until the first "modified bounce".
This rule is a variation on rule G, as in most cases it
will result in three searches. There are, however, two
exceptions First, a subject would search only twice
where the cost of search was prohibitive. Second, a
subject will keep playing "winning streaks", as in Hey's
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modified bounce rules (D and E). As an illustration of
rule H consider the following protocol extract from
subject C3, run 1
"[ 223 ] ... well this is just two and a half dollars
(search cost) and the price is 223 dollars, so it's
hardly anything for cost, so I'd have a good look at
the other prices ... [ 218 ] ... so that one's
actually cheaper ... I'll have a look at another one
'cos it's not going to cost very much ... [ 189 ] ...
and that one's even cheaper ... and I think I'd look
at another one 'cos for two and a half dollars it's
probably worth it ... [ 159 ] ... it's getting
cheaper, which means I'm more tempted to have a look
at another one ... [ 194 ] ... yes, and I think I'd
buy ... because that's got more expensive."
Rule H explains subjects' behaviour in 48 of the 96
trials in the current experiment, and as Table 9:3 shows,
it has an overall average occurrence of 39%, the highest
of all the no knowledge rules.
Rule J
Keep searching until the total search cost, nc, is
such that nc > 7.5% min p i , where n is the number of
searches so far.
Rule J, then, focuses solely on the total amount spent on
search as a function of the most favourable price so far
received. The following example from subject D2, run 3
demonstrates the use of total search cost as a deciding
factor
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"[ 239 ]
	 ...	 let's see what you get next time
	 ...
[ 168 ] ... the price is a lot lower ... it might well
be worth searching further and seeing if you're likely
to get a lower price still or if you get a much higher
quote ... [ 202 ] ... now, the third price is just
somewhere in-between the first two ... but, they are
quite expensive search costs ... it's costing me 5
dollars each time ... so judging from the prices
you're given, if you search further, even if you get a
lower price, it would just be outweighed by at least
20 dollars searching costs you'd be getting, so I'll
take the second price."
Although rule J matched observed behaviour less
frequently than the three other new rules, only rule D of
the four Hey rules did better than its 25% overall
average occurrence. The performance of all the new no
knowledge rules is discussed further in the simulation
section of this chapter.
In addition to the no knowledge rules described above,
several alternative search rules derive from the
literature on "optional stopping" (see, for example,
Rapoport and Tversky, 1966, 1970, as discussed in Chapter
4). Thus, a subject would sample n prices and then stop
at the first subsequent price that is lower than all
previous prices. In the 96 no knowledge trials in the
current experiment, the overall frequency of matches
between observed behaviour and the behaviour that would
be predicted from use of an optional stopping model was
17% for n = 1, 23% for n = 2, and 7% or less for any
other value of n. Optional stopping rules, then, do not
seem to describe observed behaviour as well as any of the
new rules developed, nor did any subject's protocol
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suggest their use. They may be more appropriate in a "no-
recall" setting, but are not pursued further here.
Full knowledge rules 
Three new rules (K, K * and L) are proposed that describe
search behaviour in situations where a decision maker has
full knowledge of the distribution. Their relative
occurrence is summarised in Table 9:4 and compared with
the corresponding results for rules A and A * , Hey's "full
knowledge" rules. Although A * is a special case of A, its
overall average occurrence is separated from A for
purposes of exposition.
Rule K
Keep searching until a price is found at least one
standard deviation below the mean, up to a maximum of
a/c searches (rounded).
This rule makes simple use of the distribution parameters
available to the subject recognising that once a price
has been located at least one standard deviation below
the mean, there is little likelihood of bettering it. The
constraint on the number of searches takes into account
the impact of high search costs, relating the cost of
search to the price dispersion. It was shown in Chapter 3
that the expected number of searches is a decreasing
function
	 of	 c/a	 (and,	 therefore,	 an	 increasing
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TABLE 5:4
FULL KNOWLEDGE OF DISTRIBUTION - SEARCH RULES OCCURRENCE
Current Experiment Prior Work Overall
Hey (1987) Average
Phase 2 Phase 3 Occur.
Group A B C D
n 24 24 24 24	 40
Hey's Rules
A* 14 13 14 13	 23 56%
A 5 5 7 6	 9 24%
New Rules
K 10 9 12 9	 - 42%
K * 13 12 12 11	 - 50%
L 15 16 12 12	 - 57%
Expert Rules
M 12 13 15 13	 - 55%
N 12 13 14 12	 - 53%
- ... not available
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function of a/c), thus justifying the use of a/c as a
decision criterion in the current rule. Illustrations of
rule K include subject A2, run 1
"The mean is 215, the standard deviation is 25, so to
judge it I'll take the standard deviation away from
the mean ... which would be 190 ... so the price given
[ 239 ] is much higher than that and the cost of
search is quite small, so I think it's worth some
searches ...
On the fifth search, subject A2 encountered a price of
190, and duly accepted it. Subject Al, run 4
"[ 100 ] ... mean of 86, standard deviation of 10,
cost of search 4 dollars ... I think I'm going to go
ahead and search for one ... [ 84 ] ... price of 84
now, cost of 92 ... so if I go ahead and do another
search I'll be at least paying 96 ... the chances of
me getting something cheaper than about 80 or so to
take care of that extra cost of search are ... let's
see ... yes, I think I'll try one more ... [ 89 ] 6..
I'm going to stop, just because it's 4 dollars for
each search."
Thus, the subject stopped searching after a/c searches.
Rule K reflected the behaviour of subjects in 40 of the
96 trials in phases 2 and 3. However, the one standard
deviation requirement is, perhaps, a little too rigid.
Rule K *
 is a slight modification
Rule K*
Keep searching until a price is found at least 0.75
standard deviation below the mean, up to a maximum of
a/c searches (rounded).
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That is, to be acceptable a price needs to be nearer to
one standard deviation below the mean than half a
standard deviation. For example, subject 36, run 3
"Mean 215, standard deviation 25, cost of search 5 ...
[ 230 ] ... right, well 230 is well above the mean, so
I'll search ... [ 194 ] ... that's 21, almost one
standard deviation, below ... yeah, I'll settle for
that one."
Exactly one half of the trials revealed behaviour
consistent with rule K*.
Rule L
Keep searching until a price, p, is located such that
the chance of obtaining a price less than or equal to
p - c is less than or equal to 30%.
Essentially, rule L is another modification of rule K
where the "reservation" price is p - 0.53a + c and there
is no restriction on the number of searches. Note that
the reservation price for rule L is a function of all
three given parameters. For example, consider subject 35,
run 4
"[ 78 ] I'm going to stop at that one ... because
mean's 86, standard deviation 10, so I'd be lucky if I
got anything less than 76 ... I've got quite a high
cost of search in comparison to what the average is
... so I shall stop right now."
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Overall, 57% of the full knowledge trials in phases 2 and
3 indicated behaviour consistent with rule L. As such, it
out-performed all the other rules in this category.
Expert rules 
In addition to the full knowledge rules above, two
further "expert" rules have been developed. These are
less trivial to remember than rules K, K *
 and L above,
and involve greater computational requirements, though
remaining much simpler than rule A* . Again, the apparent
overall average frequency of occurrence of these rules is
shown in Table 5:4. It is not suggested, however, that
subjects were actually using these expert rules.
Rule M
Let m represent the minimum price so far encountered.
Calculate the probability, p, of receiving a price
quote lower thari m - c, where c is the search cost.
Then calculate the probability of receiving a price
quote lower than m - c/p. If this is  5% stop,
otherwise search again and repeat.
The rationale underlying this rule is that the expected
number of searches to achieve a price quote lower than
m - c is 1/p (see Chapter 3). Thus, to gain over the
current minimum requires a price low enough to cover the
expected future search cost (c/p). Being a second-order
rule, rule M is more complex than rule L above.
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Rule N
Continue searching until a price is received less than
or equal to a reservation price, R, where R = p + az
and z = 3;c/a - 2.
This rule is an attempt to approximate the true
reservation price using a relatively simple formula
derived from straightforward regression analysis of the
true reservation price against c/a using a large set of
distributions of p, a and c. The formula has a
correlation coefficient of 0.98 with the true reservation
price using the distributions in Table 5:5.
Clearly, the a/c parameter is of crucial importance in
determining high performance behaviour. Over the small
number of purchases that each subject made, however, this
factor was very rarely explicitly identified as
important. More purchases, probably with feedback, would
be necessary before subjects are likely to learn the
importance of the a/c parameter.
Both expert rules exhib_t excellent performance when
compared with the optimal, but more complex, reservation
rule, as discussed in the next section.
126
THE SIMULATION
Having identified some rules of thumb which are
reasonably consistent with observed behaviour, a suite of
three additional computer programs was developed to
enable further analysis. The programs performed the
following tasks
1) ... test the performance of each rule against very
large sets of simulated purchases using prices
generated from the same distributions (simulation has
the immense advantages of speed and consistency over
live subjects!).
2) . test the matching of the rules with the
experimental data (giving the results in Tables 5:3
and 5:4 above).
3) a combination of the above two programs
generates a set of purchases with random stopping, and
tests the rules against this data to discover any
underlying fit of the rules which might not be
accounted for by intelligent behaviour.
4) ... (and fundamentally) the computer program
enabled simulation of the performance and matching of
variations in each of the rules. Suitable variations
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in the parameters embedded within the rules were
simulated systematically in an effort to ascertain
both sensitivity to the parameters and the overall
"best performing" and "best matching with student
behaviour" variant of each rule.
Optimising Performance
"Performance" is defined as the average percentage spend
over the theoretical average spend of the optimal rule,
A * . Thus, the expected stopping price (given that it is

 R) is given by
[R
j_. Y f (Y) dY
P
where	 P	 =	
JR
 f(y) dy , the probability of a price
-m
less than or equal to R on any given search;
	 and the
total expected spend is, therefore,
( c + JR y f(y) dy )
-m
1
_
P
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using equation [3:3] from Chapter 3. This last
expression, when combined with equation [A31:1] and
noting that the net expected gain, E, is zero when the
minimum price received, m, is equal to R, surprisingly
reduces to simply R!
For consistency, this performance measure is applied to
both "full knowledge" and "no knowledge" rules. The
program generated prices randomly and in turn from five
pre-defined Normal distributions as shown in Table 5:5.
These distributions are based on Hey's in that three of
them (2,3 and 4) are identical to his, and the other two
have the same realistic (see Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser,
1979) mean to standard deviation ratio of 8.6. The extra
two distributions have been added with more extreme
values of the standard deviation to search cost ratio
(a/c), in order to be able to average performance over a
reasonable spread of possible distributions. The rules
tested include all the new rules, and all Hey's rules
except rule A, since rule A is non-deterministic as
previously mentioned.
129
TABLE 5:5
SIMULATION PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS
Stan Search	 R-p	 Resvn
Dist	 Mean	 Devn Cost	 c/a	 a	 Price
	
(P)	 —TiT	 (c)	
—TITY-
$	 $	 $ $
1 86 10 10 1 0.9 95.0
2 86 10 4 0.4 0.01 86.1
3 86 10 2 0.2 -	 0.49 81.1
4 215 25 2.5 0.1 -	 0.9 192.5
5 215 25 1.25 0.05 -	 1.25 183.75
Each run simulated 5,000 purchases for each distribution
under the same constraints as the live student
experiment, except that up to 20 searches were possible
for each purchase. This is a reasonably high number of
purchases and is over three times as many as in Hey's
simulations. The program generated enough prices for each
purchase to test each decision rule. The expenditure for
each decision rule was accumulated and then averaged over
each distribution and for the run overall.
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The simulation for each distribution for each rule took
around five minutes. This was small enough to allow many
runs to be made, varying parameters for each rule, in the
search for the optimum performance for the rule. For
example, rule F was tested for the difference between the
first and second prices being less than "r" search costs,
with "r" varying over a suitable range of values. The
results showed the sensitivity of the rule's performance
to this parameter, as well as optimising its overall
performance. Appropriate parameters for all the rules are
presented in Table 5:6. Note that some rules
(specifically, A, A * , B to E, and N) permitted no
variations in format; similarly rule K *
 is simply a
variation of rule K. These rules, therefore, are excluded
from Table 5:6 (and Table 5:7).
Some slightly more complex variations were investigated,
but eventually discounted since they did not
significantly improve performance. The simulation also
included a test of the optional stopping rule, and the
performance of random stopping, the results of which are
discussed in due course.
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No Knowledge
F	 Stop after 2 searches
if Ip l - p 2 1 < rc
G Stop after r searches
H Stop after 2 searches
if c > r% of the
lowest price so far
J Stop when total search
costs > r% of the
lowest price so far
Full Knowledge
K Stop when a price is
reached 5 p - ra
L Stop when probability
of finding a price
lower than current
min less c is 5 r%
Expert Rules
M Stop when probability
of a low enough price
is 5 r%
TABLE 5:6
OPTIMISING PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
Perfor- Average Param.
Rule	 Parameter (r)	 mance
	 Occur.	 Value 
%	 (r)
5.8 35% 3
6.5 47% 3
4.7 45% 5%
2.2 24% 5%
1.1 42% 1
1.0 49% 20%
0.3 55% 0.05
This table shows the results of choosing the parameter
value for each rule which gave the best performance in
terms of the average % spend above the theoretical
minimum, and also shows the % occurrence of the rule with
this parameter value for the current experiments only.
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Optimising Occurrence 
A program was developed as stated above to allow the same
rules and variations in them to be matched against the
fixed experimental data (that is, the subject behaviour)
in order to establish the best match with, and therefore
the best possible explanation for, this behaviour. This
program generated the basic analysis for Tables 5:3 and
5:4, but, more importantly, the optimisation results
which are in Table 5:7. It included matching with the
optional stopping rule discussed above.
Identifying Underlying Occurrence of Rules 
The third area of analysis was to match simulated totally
random stopping behaviour against each rule, in order to
gain a feel for the underlying occurrence of rules,
independent of the human behaviour.
Random stopping between 1 and n searches (with n varying
from the minimum of one to the maximum of 20 searches)
was matched against all the optimised rules. The results
of this matching for n = 4 are shown in Table 5:8.
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TABLE 5:7
OPTIMISING OCCURRENCE PARAMETERS
Perfor-
	 Average	 Param.
Rules	 mance	 Occur.	 Value 
%	 (r)
No Knowledge 
F 6.4 48% 0
G 6.5 47% 3
H 5.3 50% 10%
J 2.2 32% 7%
Full Knowledge
K 2.5 59% 0.3
L 1.8 57% 30%
Expert Rules
0.7 57% 0.15M
This table is similar to Table 5:6 but shows the results
of optimising the occurrence data.
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Findings 
The objective was to discover rules which either
performed well, or matched well, with subject behaviour,
or both. Ideally, the rule should also be simply
expressed; a good match only means that the subject
behaves as if she were using the rule, but if the rule is
sufficiently simple, the subject is more likely to have
been using the rule. Sometimes there had to be a trade-
off between these criteria, depending on the particular
sensitivities (see, for example, rule J in Tables 5:6,
5:7 and 5:8)..The results are summarised in Table 5:8.
Note that rule A * , the optimal rule, clearly should
perform best, which it does, but it is still subject to
random "lucky" or "unlucky" prices, as are all the rules,
so on some runs it would perform better or worse than the
theoretical optimal minimum spend.
In addition, it was found that the optional stopping rule
described earlier gave at best (n = 1) an average
performance 10.9% worse than the theoretical optimal.
This is lower than any of the other rules identified, and
is another reason for discounting such rules.
In general, in the no knowledge situation, the rules
perform better with medium values of a/c. All the rules
perform better than rules B to E, and match as well or
better with the current experimental data.
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TABLE 5:8 
PERFORMANCE OF RULES FOR DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTIONS 
Parameter
Percent spend over
theoretical minimum
on distributions
Average
Perfor- Occur-
Under-
lying
Occur-
Rule nru 1 2 3 4 5 mance rence rence
No Knowledge
11.8 4.4 3.6 5.7 8.4 6.9% 25% 24%
27.5 8.9 4.0 3.8 5-3 8.5% 24% 14%
8.4 4.3 3•9 5.7 8.4 6.5% 28% 24%
16.6 6•9 3.8 4.0 5.6 6.7% 28% 18%
2 7.8 4.6 .1
- •6 5.3 7.3 5.9% 39% 25%
3 13.5 4.4 3.1 4 . 7 7.2 6.5% 47% 25%
10 6.3
4.7 3.2 4.5 6.9 5.3% 50% 25%
7.5 1.5 ,
s3.4 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.4% 28% 15%
Full Knowledge
A
* 0.6
1 1.5
0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2% 56% 19%
K
* 0.75 1.5
2.5
2.0
1.3
0.7
0 .6
0.6
0.6
1.9
1.1%
1.3%
42%
50%
17%
20%
30 1.2 0.5 0.2 1.5 3.8 1.8% 57% 22%
Expert Rules
0.05 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3% 55% 18%
0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3% 53%
This table shows the varying performance of the final form of each
rule over the different simulation distributions. The value of the
parameter described in Table 5:6 is shown in the second column. It
also reproduces the average performance and experimental occurrence
rates, and includes the underlying occurrence of the rule when
matched with random stopping.
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Rule G (have three searches), the simplest rule of all,
was popular in practice, and performs reasonably well
compared with rules B to E. Rule F performs slightly
better by sometimes stopping after two searches. Rule H
performs better still and also coincides well with the
experimental behaviour. Rule J, however, is by far the
best performer of the no knowledge rules, and its
adoption could save substantial amounts of money on the
purchase of high value goods. It does not match the
subject behaviour as well as other rules, but this could
merely confirm that not many students had learned a
strategy that used this rule. Rule J's other strength is
that its performance does not deteriorate much for
extreme values of a/c; indeed rule J is at its best with
low values of this ratio.
There is a clear difference in performance between no
knowledge rules and full knowledge rules. Knowledge is
required in order to achieve performance within 2% of the
optimum. Some of the new full knowledge rules can achieve
as little as 1% from the optimum without explicitly
having to calculate the reservation price. Students
appear to use a form of full knowledge rule quite
frequently. Indeed the best match of all with the subject
data comes with a variant of rule K where the
"reservation price" is given by R = p - 0.3a ; this
occurrence was reflected by comments from the protocols,
but at the same time demonstrates conservative behaviour
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since, on average, this variant stops too early. It seems
likely, though, that it is a variant of rule K that
subjects are actually using when they behave consistently
with rule A* . Rule L also matches experimental data well
and could reflect the gambling nature of some of the
students. None of the full knowledge rules performs badly
with extreme values of a/c.
The expert rules M and N perform very closely to the
optimum rule. They do not require the explicit
calculation of the true reservation price, though the
former does require tables or computation. Rule N can
easily be computed approximately in the head, and
therefore, could reasonably be called an "expert rule of
thumb". Subjects certainly did not "know" this rule,
however. Both these rules perform well because they
approximate to rule A* , and they match well with subject
behaviour because they also approximate to rule K.
Comparing the performance and matching of all the rules
with their underlying performance and occurrence against
a random stopping rule (see Table 5:8), several of them
show surprisingly little improvement over random
behaviour. (Random stopping after up to 4 searches gave
the best underlying performance with which to compare,
that is 7.7%). This applies particularly to rules B and
D. This would suggest that these rules are not serious
candidates	 as	 "reasonable"	 or	 "high performance"
heuristics.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has reported an experiment that extends the
work on single parameter search, explicitly
distinguishing the no knowledge and full knowledge
situations. It has shown that knowledge of the parameters
of the price distribution is often a highly valuable
asset in terms of performance. Some heuristics have been
identified that are more soundly based, perform better,
and concur with actual behaviour better than previously
suggested heuristics, and are more likely to explain the
behaviour than the theoretically optimal rule.
In particular, where a consumer wishes to purchase some
product or service, the price of which may vary across
different suppliers, but where that consumer is unaware
of the statistical parameters of the price distribution,
a new search rule (rule J) has been found which offers
high performance, yielding an average expenditure within
2.4% of the theoretical minimum
Keep searching until the total search cost is greater
than seven and a half percent of the minimum price
received.
Similarly, where the consumer is aware of the price
distribution parameters, a simple search rule (rule K*)
has been found that gives high performance, within 1.3%
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of the theoretical minimum, and can account for subjects'
behaviour in a substantial number (50%) of trials
Keep searching until a price is found at least 0.75
standard deviations below the mean, up to a maximum of
a/c searches.
While these are important findings in the context of
single parameter search, there are some minor limitations
of the current experimental design. First, 24 subjects
represented a rather limited sample, and necessitated the
results to be analysed by trial instead of by subject. In
fact, across the whole experiment, there were five
instances (out of a possible 48) where a subject's
behaviour was consistent with the same rule during all
four trials within the same phase - two full knowledge
(rule K and rule L), and three no knowledge (rule B, D or
H; rule G or H; and Rule F, G or H). An experiment with a
larger pool of subjects and a larger number of trials
would provide a more appropriate basis for analysing
results at the subject level. In particular, this would
enable an examination of learning effects, both within
and between search rules, and could incorporate measures
of "ability", to test whether more "able" subjects
exhibit better performance (earn more money), and learn
more quickly than subjects who are less able.
Second, under the incentive structure offered to
participants, total payments averaged around £1.45 per
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student for about 15 minutes work, of which El was a
fixed fee unrelated to performance. Although all
participants were observed to be serious and enthusiastic
about the task, a more rewarding incentive structure
would help reduce any uncertainty concerning motivation.
The experiment was mainly concerned with developing and
testing new search rules both with and without knowledge
of the underlying price distribution. In doing this, some
analysis was carried out considering the impact of the
key variable, a/c. Indeed, some of the rules are quite
sensitive to this ratio. For instance, in the no
knowledge condition, a high a/c ratio will lead to a
high, average, optimal number of searches. In such cases,
rules F, G and H (as well as B, C, D and E) with their
strong likelihood of an early stop, may not perform so
well.
The experimental work described here is extended in the
next chapter to investigate search behaviour in the
situation where searchers have partial prior knowledge of
the underlying price distribution. That is, they have a
preliminary idea of the anticipated price level, but do
not know (in advance) the representativeness of that
preliminary idea, nor the location of any specific
prices. A wide range of a/c values are used in both the
experiment itself and the subsequent simulation.
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APPENDIX 5:1 (a) 
rhis appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
ao knowledge condition from experimental group C during phase 2.
Stud.
No./
Trial Price Quotes Received
253 214 195
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
Consistent with
Search Rules
H
H
H
H
H
H
J
J
J
J
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
226
81
234
74
184
84
219
81
223
89
274
83
219
80
248
76
211
96
202
97
197
100
180
89
196
101
182
102
208
104
195
97
218
84
158
78
231
75
247
95
245
94
203
84
214
96
253
89
240
75
233
79
239
88
231
189
99
210
84
175
207
90
224
75
168
103
204
79
190
198
80
168
159
205
78
200
100
178
97
211
73
234
194
94
203
97
234
85
90
218
218
D
D
D
D
D
D
E
E
EFGH
EFGH
F
F
F
F
EFGH
EFGHJ
FGHJ
G
G
G
G
G
G
5 6 6 6 9 11 11 6
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APPENDIX 5:1 (b) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
no knowledge condition from experimental group D during phase 2.
Stud.
No./
Trial Price Quotes Received
255
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
Consistent with
Search Rules
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
J
J
J
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
245
85
194
92
226
98
239
94
275
81
238
76
218
90
221
87
200
89
175
91
215
73
300
91
188
96
206
79
188
90
168
84
200
90
240
93
197
75
177
66
191
87
184
81
199
80
226
88
231
97
168
82
192
90
202
73
195
87
194
87
223
62
218
92
177
91
217
66
199
81
188
78
208
96
222
83
179
94
196
230
75
100
81
219
87
215
93
196
84
92
241
212
80
195
212
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
E
E
E
F
F
F
F
EFGH
EFGH
FGHJ
FGHJ
G
G
G
G
G
8 5 9 5 8 9 12 5
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APPENDIX 5:1 (c) 
Chis appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
lo knowledge condition from experimental group A during phase 3.
Stud.
go./
rrial Price Quotes Received
308 372	 315
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Consistent with
Search Rules
H
H
H
H
J
J
J
J
J
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
311
119
323
110
386
136
357
143
241
162
254
117
332
155
306
112
326
125
356
135
264
123
384
143
355
127
291
146
350
134
311
132
316
104
216
108
362
126
327
138
321
131
295
132
277
140
322
137
327
152
281
154
411
328
132
365
145
300
370
142
311
123
146
360
136
306
120
293
124
314
273
321
142
316
163
374
389
307
157
316
114
D
D
D
E
E
E
E
E
F
F
EFGH
EFGHJ
EFGH
EFGH
FGHJ
G
G
G
G
G
4 7 3 9 7 10 9 7
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APPENDIX 5:1 (d) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
no knowledge condition from experimental group B during phase 3.
Stud.
No./
Trial Price Quotes Received
C
C
C
C
C
Consistent with
Search Rules
H
H
H
H
H
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
319
127
342
117
317
117
295
134
416
143
379
152
322
141
313
125
327
121
324
146
389
121
290
118
309
141
375
150
247
135
285
122
355
140
320
131
375
121
330
121
302
128
275
143
347
135
234
148
356
146
352
120
323
139
326
102
260
139
339
140
317
108
290
329
137
346
124
350
115
317
132
302
126
289
354
324
267
128
125
335
289
270
B
B
B
B
B
D
D
D
D
D
D
E
EFGH
F
F
F
EFGHJ
EFGH
EFGH
EFGH
FGHJ
FGHJ
FGHJ
FGHJ
G
G
G
G
G
G
7 5 9 7 13 15 16 9
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APPENDIX 5:1 (e) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
full knowledge condition from experimental group A during phase 2.
Stud.
No./
Trial Price Quotes Received
167
Consistent with
Search Rules
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
MN
MN
MN
MN
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1
2
3
4
5
61
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
2
3
4
238
95
213
100
239
81
200
89
268
107
220
78
189
76
221
75
258
97
250
81
205
78
184
100
179
90
198
84
200
96
65
191
80
184
228
205
222
77
212
81
92
204
82
89
232
100
213
194
180
248
83
228
207
84
194
213
218
190
92
201 217
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A
A
A
A
A
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
L
L
K*
K*
K*
L
K* L
L
K* L
K* L
K* L
L
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L
14 5 10 13 15 12 12
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APPENDIX 5:1 (f) 
rhis appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
full knowledge condition from experimental group B during phase 2.
Stud.
No./
Trial Price Quotes Received
82
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
Consistent with
Search Rules
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
MN
MN
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
205
88
219
87
245
77
224
79
194
91
243
84
221
81
252
100
205
89
213
78
218
83
230
94
164
77
228
87
229
215
77
212
75
197
93
217
96
221
94
230
88
194
250
79
194
70
84
214
62
202
272
87
226
203
229
85
206
76
204
96
199
75
183
223
85
235
80
221
191
110
183
241
A
A
A
A
A
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L
K* L .
K* L
K* L
L
L
K* L
K* L
13 5 9 12 16 13 13
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APPENDIX 5:1 (g) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
full knowledge condition from experimental group C during phase 3.
Stud.
No./
Trial Price Quotes Received
Consistent with
Search Rules
11 317 A
2 115 A* K* L M N
3 353 339 290 A* K* L MN
4 125 131 118 126 114 A
2 1 309 251 A* K K* L M N
2 147 143 130 102 A* K K* L M N
3 305 A L
4 155 132 126 A* K K* L M N
3 1 249 A* K K* L MN
2 157 162 128 141 134 K K*
3 320 304 A L
4 124 A* L M N
4 1 294 337 294 303 342 316 259 A* K M N
2 112 A* K K* L MN
3 262 A* K K* L M N
4 101 134 144 113 109 118 127 117 148 143
5 1 298 240 A* K K* MN
2 116 134 123 155 127 94 A
3 260 A* K K* L M N
4 136 140 116 135 133 136 142 114 126 124
6 1 291 282 A* K MN
2 130 123 119 A* M N
3 340 302 372 302 A
4 127 102 A K K* M
14 7 12 12 12 15 14
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APPENDIX 5:1 (h) 
his appendix reproduces the experimental data for subjects in the
full knowledge condition from experimental group D during phase 3.
Stud.
No./
Trial Price Quotes Received
111
330 287
Consistent with
Search Rules
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
MN
MN
MN
MN
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
338
152
327
124
334
124
315
150
363
108
282
116
313
134
399
136
203
118
229
120
284
100
292
93
299
117
366
329
102
349
119
356
139
302
164
308
135
131
314
138
307
307
136
310
313
310
366
127
314
119
134
105
145
307
273
127
309
351
132
121
294
316
137
349
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A*
A
A
A
A
A
A
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K*
K*
L
K*
L
L
K* L
K* L
K* L
L
L
K*
K* L
L
K* L
K*
K* L
13 6 9 11 12 13 12
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CHAPTER
SIX
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CHAPTER SIX
PRICE SEARCH BEHAVIOUR WITH
PARTIAL PRIOR KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION
In the experimental work described in chapters 4 and 5,
search rules have been suggested that match well with
observed behaviour and perform well in comparison with
the optimal model, both when searchers have "full" prior
knowledge of the price distribution (that is, searchers
know its shape, and, in the case of the Normal
distribution, its mean and its standard deviation), and
no prior knowledge.
In practice, neither of the knowledge conditions above is
likely. Full knowledge is implausible given that markets
exhibit continual change in terms of the number of
participants at any one time, and the specific price and
availability of specific items at specific outlets. No
knowledge, though, is equally unlikely. The mind is a
consuming organ that stores vast quantities of
information that may or may not be useful at some future
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time (Schelling, 1988). An individual buyer searching for
a specific product is likely from the outset to have some
idea of an expected "ballpark" price level for that
product from, for example, previous purchases of related
products, from catalogues, and/or from word of mouth.
This chapter describes a new experiment conducted in the
more realistic setting where purchasers initially have
partial knowledge of the price distribution. This prior
knowledge can be used, in conjunction with knowledge
gained from the search process itself, to determine an
appropriate course of action. The aim of the experiment
is to discover the search rules that might be employed in
this context, and to assess their performance in
comparison with an optimal full knowledge model.
In the first part of this chapter, the experimental
details are described, and some new search rules are
presented that have been derived by analysis of the price
quotations received in conjunction with verbal protocols
recorded at the time of the experiment. The second part
of the chapter describes a series of simulations that
seek to discover how well these new search rules perform
over a large number of trials. That is, how little extra
expenditure is incurred, on average, as a result of
adopting one of the new rules instead of the optimal
reservation price rule.
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THE EXPERIMENT
Task
Subjects were required to purchase unspecified, common
items. In each case there was some variation in the price
quotes that could be received, and, therefore, a
potential benefit from shopping around. There was,
however, a constant non-zero search cost. Thus, subjects
needed to estimate and compare expected costs and
benefits in determining their decision strategy.
A partial knowledge framework was established by
presenting the subject, at the outset of each purchase,
with two initial prices generated randomly from the
distribution. These act as "guide prices" though the
searcher is unaware of their representativeness, in terms
of where they occur within the distribution, or their
specific location, in terms of which sales outlet
supplies them at these prices. All price quotes received
were available for the duration of each experiment (ie.
there was full recall), and, within each purchase, were
from the same distribution. Prices were generated,
displayed and selected by means of a user-friendly
interactive computer program (developed and implemented
in Turbo-Pascal on an IBM compatible).
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Procedure
For each subject the experiment consisted of two initial
trials, to enable familiarisation with the program,
followed by six separate purchases. These purchases were
made from each of the six price distributions described
in Table 6:1 below, the exact sequence being randomly
determined. The distributions were similar to those used
in the experiment and simulation of chapter 5.
The subjects performed the experiment in separate 15
minute sessions in the presence of the author to avoid
any problems or misunderstandings. They were encouraged
to think aloud, their verbal protocols being recorded on
tape.
TABLE 6:1
PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS
Standard	 Search Reservation Std.Dev./
Number Mean Deviation Cost	 Price	 Search
£	 £	 £	 £	 Cost
1 86 10 4 86.1 2.5
2 86 10 2 81.1 5
3 215 25 5 202.5 5
4 215 25 2.5 192.5 10
5 215 25 1.25 183.75 20
6 86 10 10 95.0 1
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Subjects
34 subjects participated in the experiment, all being
second or third year undergraduate students at the
Warwick Business School with no previous exposure to
search theory. As an incentive, subjects were paid a
fixed fee of £2 plus a bonus proportional to their
performance. The bonus was calculated by comparing the
amount spent by the subject over the six purchases with
the amount that would have been spent using an optimal,
full knowledge, reservation price model. Where there was
no difference, the incentive bonus was £5, reducing
linearly to zero where the subject's overall performance
was 10% or more worse than the optimum. A "lucky" student
could earn more than £5 by successfully taking advantage
of the random nature of the prices generated.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT
Students exhibited a wide range of performance in the
experiment, bonuses achieved varying from zero to £6.50.
with a mean of £3.74 and a standard deviation of £1.62.
Appendix 6:1 displays details of the price quotes
received for all 34 subjects. Careful analysis of such
sequences, together with the verbal protocols recorded,
led to the formulation of several new search rules. These
are described and discussed below. The search rules with
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which observed behaviour was consistent are also
highlighted in Appendix 6:1. Excerpts from the verbal
protocols have been reproduced as supporting evidence,
though they are necessarily restricted due to space
limitations.
Three categories of search rules are distinguished.
Simple rules are concerned with either a maximum number
of searches or a fixed target value, but not both.
Intermediate rules contain a target value, which may be
fixed or variable but is related to the guide prices
only, plus a limit on the number of searches allowed.
Complex rules again contain a target value and possibly a
search limit, but are characterised by using all
available price and search cost data. Note that it is
possible for the same observed search behaviour to
correspond to more than one search rule.
In describing the rules, G will represent the higher
guide price, g the lower, p i the actual price quotes
received, n the number of searches, c the search cost,
and p the average of all guide and actual prices so far
received.
Simple rules
Two simple rules (P and Q) are proposed. Table 6:2
summarises their overall average occurrence across the
varying values of a/c. This relates to the percentage of
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all trials in which observed behaviour matched the given
rule.
TABLE 6:2
OVERALL AVERAGE OCCURRENCE OF SIMPLE RULES
Standard Deviation / Search Cost
1 2.5 5 10 20 Overall
(n 34 34 68 34 34 204	 )
Rule
P 50% 29% 26% 15% 0% 25%
Q 53% 53% 47% 41% 56% 50%
Rule P - Keep searching until the total search
cost, nc  5% p.
This rule simply requires the searcher to focus solely on
the total amount spent on search as a function of all
price information so far gathered, and then accept the
lowest price to date. As such, it is a variation of the
no knowledge Rule J described in chapter 5. The protocol
extract below for subject 32, purchase 5 (distribution 4)
illustrates this focus on search cost:
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[g 210, G 215, c 2.5]: "[204] ... The price given
this time is lower than the guide prices, so perhaps
I shouldn't search, but I think that I shall ...
[238] ... this time I've been given a high price ...
I'll search again ... [225] ... and the cost has
gone up ... might as well try again ... [208] ...
this time the price has gone down again, but the
cost is more ... I'll try again ... [250] .. this
time it's gone up a lot; my cost is continuing to go
up ... I think I'm best stopping there, because my
cost keeps on going up."
Although the overall average occurrence of Rule P is
relatively low, especially for high values of a/c, it is
included here because it performs well in comparison with
the optimal, full knowledge model (see later).
Rule  Q - Keep earching until a price, p, is
located such that p 5 g + c.
Thus, this rule sets a target value that focuses on the
lower guide price, after allowing for the extra cost that
an additional search would involve. The rationale then,/
is simply to try to beat the guide prices. Rule Q
reflected the behaviour of subjects in 101 of 204 trials.
As an illustration, consider the protocol extract
reproduced below for subject 5, purchase 5 ( distribution
3):
[g 213, G 238, c 5]: "[240] ... Search cost of 5 ...
the price is too high ... [215] ... the price is
quite low compared to the guide prices ... I think
I'll stop there."
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Although simple, Rule Q is likely to perform badly in
situations where the guide prices are high compared with
the true mean and the search cost is low, as it will lead
to search ceasing too early. Additionally, it may perform
badly in situations where the smaller guide price is
comparitively low, as search may continue too long. The
latter problem would be mitigated to some extent by
introducing a constraint on the number of searches, while
at the same time maintaining a target value. This forms
the basis of the intermediate" and "complex" rules
described below.
Intermediate rules
Two intermediate rules (R and S) are proposed, their
relative average occurrence being shown in Table 6:3.
Rule R - Keep searching until a price, p, is
located such that p + nc  g, but with
a maximum total search cost of 10% p.
This rule sets a target value lower than the target value
of Rule Q above, but restricts the number of searches
available to achieve this target. The rule focuses on the
total cost that would be incurred at any one time; that
is the minimum price received plus the total amount spent
so far on search.
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TABLE 6:3
OVERALL AVERAGE OCCURRENCE OF INTERMEDIATE RULES 
Standard Deviation / Search Cost
1 2.5 5 10 20 Overall
(n 34 34 68 34 34 204	 )
Rule
R 74% 53% 37% 29% 47% 46%
S 68% 53% 46% 32% 41% 48%
Rule R matched observed behaviour in 46% of purchases. As
an illustration of its adoption, consider the following
two extracts from the protocol of subject 22 in purchases
5 and 6 (distributions 3 and 6):
[g 207, G 216, c 5]: "[192] ... Guide prices 207,
216 ... price 192, cost 197 overall ... I think I'll
buy, it seems like a reasonable purchase."
[G 97, g 95, c 10]: "[86] ... The search cost is
quite a lot here, 10, so that's going to push the
cost up ... so, again, I think I'll buy; I'm
sticking on 96."
The two sequences are consistent with Rule R and indicate
a definite focus on the total cost to date, p + nc. Note
that a property of this rule is that as search continues
over time (up to the maximum allowed) the price required
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to satisfy the target value for p + nc must decrease by c
each search in order to compensate.
Rule S Keep searching until a price, p, is
located no greater than the targets
defined below:
g + c - 1/2 (G-g)
	
if	 nc <	 5% p
g + c	 if	 nc < 10% p
g + c + 1/2 (G-g)
	
if	 nc < 15% p
G + c	 if	 nc < 20%p.
G + c + 1/2 (G-g)	 if	 nc < 25% p
Stop if the total search cost exceeds
these limits.
Rule S, like Rule R, sets a target value dependent on the
guide prices only. This target, though, varies and
becomes less restrictive as search costs increase, so
that its performance is not too adversely affected in
situations where the minimum guide price is very low in
the distribution. The following three consecutive
extracts from the protocol of subject 27, purchases 1, 2
and 3 (distributions 6, 2, and 4), are examples of its
adoption, illustrating how the level of acceptability of
a price quote in relation to the guide prices can vary
with the total search cost to date.
[G 76, g 73, c 10]: "[88] I'll try another one,
because it's quite a high price, though it's
expensive ... [80] ... I think I'll stop there,
because it's going to cost me a lot more as the
search cost is so high. I just think I'll have too
many costs, so I'll accept that one."
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[G 93, g 88, c 2]: "[69] ... I think I'll stop
there, because it's a low price compared to the
guide prices."
[g 216, G 230, c 2.5]: "[259] ... It's quite a low
search cost and it seems to be quite a high price,
so I'll try again and search for another one ...
[211] ... which is a lot better ... I'll stay there,
because it's quite a low price."
A property of rule S is that a price originally rejected
as being too high, may subsequently be acceptable as the
target value increases. For instance, subject 29 purchase
6 (distribution 2) was presented with guide prices of 91
and 83, with a search cost of £2. The first actual price
quote received was 83, slightly higher than the rule S
target of 81 (83 + 2 - 1/2[91 - 83]). The second quote,
98, was also unacceptable, the target still being 81. The
third quote was 88, but by now £6 had been spent on
search, 6.77% of the average of all the prices so far
encountered. The target price, therefore, was now 85, and
so the initial quote could be accepted.
Overall, rule S matched 48% of observed behaviour, having
a similar occurrence profile to rule R across the
distributions.
Complex rules
Two complex rules (T and Z) are proposed, their relative
average occurrence being shown in Table 6:4.
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TABLE 6:4
OVERALL AVERAGE OCCURRENCE OF COMPLEX RULES
Standard Deviation / Search Cost 
1	 2.5
	
5	 10	 20	 Overall
(n	 34	 34	 68	 34	 34	 204 )
Rule 
T	 59%	 53%
	 29%	 35%	 29%	 39%
Z	 53%	 50%	 44%	 29%	 24%	 41%
Rule T	 Keep searching until a price, p, is
located such that p  90% p, but with
a maximum search cost of 10% p, unless
minimum p i
 > p + c.
Essentially, rule T is seeking to locate a bargain; that
is, an actual price at least 10% lower than the current
average of all available data. A search limit again
applies, though this restriction may be lifted where
there seems to be a strong likelihood of improvement, by
allowing an extra search if the minimum, actual price
quote received is more than one search cost above the
current estimate of the mean. This situation may occur
where one or both of the guide prices are low in the
distribution. 39% of observations matched rule T, and the
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following extract from the protocol of subject 8 f
purchase 1 (distribution 2) illustrates its adoption:
[g 78, G 95, c 2]: "[83] ... I'm looking at the
prices trying to get a guess at the spread of the
distribution, and then relating the value that I've
been given to that spread ... on t - . t. basis, I'm
going to try again ... [83] ... hasn't worked, costs
are going up ... [97] ... computer's not being very
helpful, try again ... [74] ... I've got a good one;
I'm going to take it."
Again, rule T has the property that a price initially
seen as being too high may later become acceptable as
subsequent price quotes are received.
Rule Z - Estimate the mean of the distribution
(p as above) and the standard deviation
(a, by standard calculation using all
data) after each search. Keep searching
until a price is located less than or
equal to a reservation price, R, where R
= p + az, and z = 3;c/a - 2.
This rule is an attempt to estimate a reservation price
from the available data, using the best available
statistical resources. The given formula is taken from
expert rule N in chapter 5, and has a correlation
coefficient of 0.98 with the true value of the
reservation price. It is included here for comparison,
but it is not suggested that any students adopted it in
practice, and so no protocol extracts are presented.
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THE SIMULATION
The previous section identified six rules of thumb which
match student behaviour reasonably well. In order to
analyse these rules further, some additional computer
programs were developed. The particular tasks performed
by these programs were: first, to test the matching of
the rules with the experimental data (thus, giving the
results shown in Tables 6:2, 6:3 and 6:4); second, to
test the performance of each rule against large numbers
of simulated purchases; and third, to generate a set of
purchase decisions based on random stopping, against
which all of the rules can be tested to discover any
underlying fit that might not be accounted for by
"intelligent" behaviour.
To some extent, the first two of the above tasks
constitute an iterative process, in that the programs
enabled systematic fine-tuning with the objective of
discovering the form of each rule that represented the
best compromise between matching and performance, while
retaining a reasonable degree of simplicity. The six
rules presented in the paper are the versions established
after such an iterative process.
In all cases, "performance" was defined (consistently
with previous studies) as the average percentage spend
over the theoretical average spend of the optimal (full
knowledge) model discussed earlier. It was shown in the
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simulation section of chapter 5 that this definition
reduces to simply the average percentage spend over the
true reservation price, R, for each distribution.
The simulation program generated prices randomly and in
turn from five of the six Normal distributions in Table
6:1, thereby ensuring a reasonable spread of possible
price distributions, the a/c parameter ranging from 1 to
20. Distribution 2 was excluded as it is a simple
multiple of, and therefore equivalent to, distribution 3.
Each run simulated 5000 purchases for each distribution
in turn under the same constraints as the live student
experiment. The program generated enough prices for each
purchase to test each decision rule. The spend for each
rule was accumulated, and then averaged over each
distribution and for the run overall. The results are
shown in Table 6:5.
For a simple rule, rule P performs exceptionally well,
and is reasonably consistent across all price
distributions. Indeed, where the search cost is very low
in comparison with the standard deviation of the price
distribution, rule P out-performs all of the other rules.
Rule Q is the simplest search rule both to remember and
to use, but is the worst performer with an average excess
spend of 3.8%. This performance, however, is still better
than all but one of the eight "no knowledge" rules
reported in prior studies. Several variations of this
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rule were tested, using a target "reservation" value of
the form g + ac + p(G - g). Setting a = 2 and p = 0
improves performance to 3.0% above the optimal, while a
performance of 3.3% together with an occurrence matching
of 51% is achieved by setting a = 1 and p 1/3; that is
the target is twice as near to g as to G, after allowing
for the cost of one more search. The addition of a cut-
off on the number of searches (thereby producing an
intermediate" rule) can further improve performance. For
example, a 10%p search limit with a target of g + c,
performs at 2.6% while retaining a 50% matching.
Eventually, 'however, rule P was chosen for its
simplicity, intuitive plausibility, and contrast with the
intermediate rules that follow.
The two intermediate rules, R and S, behave similarly,
both performing progressively less well as the parameter
a/c increases. Both rules suffer relatively badly when
a/c = 20, as they are likely to set too high a target
value compared with the true reservation price.
Rule T is the best performing rule, averaging a less than
1.2% extra spend above the theoretical minimum for values
of a/c from 1 to 10, though once again losing out a
little on distribution 5 (a/c = 20) with an overspend of
3.1%. Only rule P, however performs better than rule T on
this rather extreme distribution. The other complex rule,
rule Z, averages an overspend of 2.7%, which is a poorer
performance than rule T or either intermediate rule. This
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is perhaps surprising as, supposedly, rule Z uses all
available knowledge in the way that statistical methods
would best prescribe. Clearly this outcome demonstrates
the potential inaccuracy inherent in any attempt to
formally estimate the parameters of a distribution on the
basis of a very small sample size.
Finally, totally random stopping behaviour was considered
by testing the performance of stopping after a random
number of searches between one and r, over 5,000
simulated purchases for integer values of r varying from
one to ten. The best performance was 7.1% above the
theoretical minimum, corresponding to r = 3. That is, the
search rule requires one, two or three searches
(determined randomly), and then acceptance of the lowest
price offer received.
The matching of all six quoted rules was compared with
their underlying occurrence when measured against 5,000
generated sequences of random (1 to 3) stops, for each of
the five distributions. The results are shown in the
final column of Table 6:5. Most rules exhibit an apparent
occurrence substantially higher than their underlying,
random occurrence. Rule P is an exception to this,
however, and so cannot be said to match well with student
behaviour.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has extended the work on single parameter
price search to consider the situation where searchers
have partial prior knowledge of the price distribution.
The partial knowledge framework is not one that prior
research studies have investigated, which is surprising
as, in general, it would seem a more realistic setting
than the full or no knowledge settings previously
adopted.
Six search heuristics have been discovered, characterised
by varying degrees of complexity, that perform well in
comparison with the theoretical, optimal, reservation
price model, and/or concur well with observed behaviour.
Table 6:6 below compares rule T, the best performing of
these new heuristics, with the best performing search
rules in the full knowledge and no knowledge states.
The results indicate clearly the value of knowledge.
Thus, the better informed a searcher is about the
underlying price distribution, the better, on average,
will he/she perform in comparison with an optimal (full
knowledge) model, by utilising the best available search
heuristics.
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TABLE 6:6
A COMPARISON OF THE "BEST" SEARCH RULES
State of Prior Knowledge	 Search	 Average spend above
about the distribution	 Rule	 theoretical minimum
Full
Partial
None
The findings of this experiment will help set some
interesting research questions for the future, including,
in particular, the issue of how do individuals change
their search behaviour over time (if at all)? In this
context, a "learning" effect might be characterised by
settling onto one rule. In the current experiment, the
behaviour of one subject matched the same rule (rule Q)
throughout all six trials, while eight other subjects
matched the same rule in five of the six trials. The
average bonus payment earned by these nine subjects was
£4.50, compared with £3.46 for the remaining 25, thus
suggesting that these nine had "settled" on, or learned,
a strategy they believed reasonable, and, consequently,
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had gained some advantage in performance. Five further
subjects matched the same rule on their last three
purchases, again indicating a possible learning effect.
An alternative learning process would be shown by a
gradual migration to more complex, and better performing
rules - for example, from rule Q to rule S, and then to
rule T. To investigate this possibility in particular,
and learning effects in general, however, further
experimental work is required, with more subjects making
many more purchase decisions. The results of such work
will lend important insights to understanding the search
behaviour and purchasing strategies of individuals over
time, both in the single parameter price search situation
discussed here, and in broader, more general, decision
making contexts.
Finally, it is noticeable that of the five search rules
apparently being used by subjects (rule Z is excluded as
there was no evidence of its adoption), only one (rule T)
is characterised by a target value dependent on all
available price information. No target value is used in
rule P, while rules Q, R and S have target values based
on the guide prices only. This suggests that subjects may
have difficulty in using price quotes received to update
their knowledge of the distribution. Instead, they are
seen solely as offers to sell at thàt price. This is
linked to the concept of functional fixation in
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psychology. The next chapter reviews some findings from
the human information processing literature that are
relevant to price search studies, and focuses in
particular on functional fixation, as a foundation for a
new experiment concerning this phenomenon described in
chapter 8.
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APPENDIX 6:1
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for all subjects.
Student!
Trial/
Dist'n.
Guide
Prices Price Quotes Received
Consistent with
Search Rules
1 1	 3 223 233 232 226 204 P	 R S
2	 5 217 146 222 226 218 177 222 256 230 218 225 161 QRS	 Z
36 101 97 92 PQRS T Z
4 4 222 224 198 212 247 225 193
5	 2 75 89 84 79 93 75 QRST
6 1 97 72 99 90 90 70 Q	 S
2 1	 5 213 219 211 252 212
2 3 238 243 194 QRSTZ
3 6 71 89 75 85 82
4 4 199 221 242 242 240 191 Q	 T Z
5 2 84 69 90 84 86 76 86 83 65
61 88 98 99 70 PQRSTZ
315 217 235 207 QRS
2	 3 238 213 182 QRSTZ
32 73 89 83 78
46 83 84 89 88 80
5 4 248 173 193
61 96 92 83 QRSZ
41	 2 79 95 87 87 97 104
2 3 169 196 223 221 232 200 R	 T
3	 6 86 75 94 85 Q R S
4 1 85 92 99 88 PQRS T Z
5 4 233 234 248 187 QRS T Z
6	 5 196 242 203 193 Q R
511 78 91 79 83 92 69
2 6 97 71 80 81 76 81 73 96 88 93
3	 5 194 175 208 207 203 198 185 206 203 201 251 250 QRST
42 86 86 69 QRSTZ
5	 3 213 238 240 215
6 4 208 246 232 260 224 184 QRSTZ
616 91 77 81 PQRSTZ
21 90 87 86 75 91
32 90 108 83 92
4 5 232 255 230 237 211 204 208
5 4 249 271 200 228 218
6	 3 195 245 215 187 T Z
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APPENDIX 6:1 (continued) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for all subjects.
St3Ident/
Trial/
Dist'n .
712
2	 3
3 6
41
55
6 4
812
2 1
3	 6
4 4
5	 5
6	 3
91 4
2 5
32
41
56
63
0 1 3
2 5
36
4 2
51
6 4
U 1 3
2 5
32
4 6
51
6 4
2 1 5
2 4
32
41
56
6 3
Guide
Prices Price Quotes Received
Consistent with
Search Rules
72
206
76
100
243
221
78
84
80
185
191
190
195
198
85
97
84
211
279
198
89
93
86
180
220
231
90
66
97
188
212
173
94
82
68
220
74
218
70
76
248
247
95
99
64
207
215
197
240
209
82
100
96
204
218
216
92
73
90
212
224
197
94
76
80
256
208
180
84
87
86
183
82
208
73
88
213
238
83
74
94
249
238
199
250
276
89
77
96
180
207
203
85
81
75
243
160
272
103
77
113
203
207
217
84
87
89
217
71
240
112
72
236
83
102
197
199
240
163
219
81
244
99
199
228
236
92
76
82
233
190
202
85
94
161
206
81
181
97
92
239
245
216
198
201
98
197
191
85
93
188
199
185
93
74
78
210
212
186
231
73
194
225
217
236
89
186
173
192
239
206
186
'
PQ	 SZ
P	 s
PQRSTZ
QRS
QRSTZ
QRSTZ
QRSTZ
PQ	 ST
QRSTZ
QRST
QRST
Q	 T
Q	 S	 Z
QRSTZ
P	 RSTZ
QRSZ
Q R	 T
Q
PQRSTZ
QRSTZ
QRSTZ
PQRSTZ
P	 R	 T
P	 RTZ
PQRSTZ
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APPENDIX 6:1 (continued) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for all subjects.
Student/
Trial/
Dist 'n.
Guide
Prices Price Quotes Received
Consistent with
Search Rules
0 1 2
2 4
85
238
81
224
94
182
93
200
84
36 70 76 109 82 RSTZ
41 83 79 75 90
5	 5 201 201 181 187 207
6 3 194 206 221 201 194 P Q	 S
14 1	 5 196 202 227 266 219 194 Q	 S T
2 1 100 91 91 85 P	 RST
3 4 209 178 189 227 224 198
46 87 66 77 90 81
5	 3 199 188 205 234
6 2 77 94 76
15 1	 5 223 215 251 193 QRST
22 93 77 78 82 77
3	 3 200 235 238 259 217 272
4 6 83 69 96 103 80 94 82
5 4 222 176 203 258 237
6 1 90 87 75 QRSTZ
16 1	 4 206 205 198 QR S	 Z
2	 3 214 216 258 206 Q	 S	 Z
3	 5 177 191 197 196 207 209
41 102 99 83 QRSTZ
52 100 70 90 80 97
66 79 84 93 84 QRS
1711 106 99 91 73
2	 3 209 211 253 195 183 231 224
36 89 95 88 PQRSTZ
4 4 239 230 224 223 197 219 207
5	 5 198 229 245 206 256 247 179 QRSZ
62 89 112 91 87 85
1811 88 85 82 Q	 S	 Z
2 3 163 233 258 238 228 198 R	 T
3	 5 201 219 212 208
4 4 219 191 220 211 200
5	 2 70 100 78
66 97 72 93 P	 RSTZ
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APPENDIX 6:1 (continued) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for all subjects.
Stmdent/
Trial/
Dist i n.
19 1	 3
2 4
3 1
4 5
56
62
2012
2 5
3 1
4 6
5 4
6 3
21 1	 5
2 4
3	 3
42
56
61
n 1 5
2 4
32
41
53
66
23 1	 4
2 6
31
4 3
5	 5
6 2
241	 2
26
3 4
4 5
5 3
61
Guide
Prices Price Quotes Received
203 225 229 270
Consistent with
Search Rules
235
236
84
252
81
92
94
196
76
89
238
212
249
243
248
99
73
86
220
212
80
73
207
97
180
76
88
187
231
77
77
91
231
212
202
84
186
209
96
238
80
74
100
262
75
79
249
180
228
183
207
93
102
89
242
174
83
91
216
95
236
92
101
236
193
87
76
72
233
193
264
93
152
263
94
184
85
84
88
262
104
77
178
207
213
200
233
87
88
91
234
212
79
99
192
86
225
66
85
229
167
76
88
95
241
252
228
83
161
89
201
86
204
98
229
239
213
252
237
86
198
204
97
93
191
70
219
191
92
80
91
212
212
88
82
266
72
221
220
226
75
84
222
78
208
198
80
85
204
230
66
201
203
228
187
201
246
220
QRST
QRSTZ
PQRSTZ
QRSZ
QRSTZ
PQRSTZ
QRSZ
P	 RSTZ
PQRST
QRSTZ
Q R S
QRSZ
PQRSTZ
PQRSTZ
RS
Q	 S	 Z
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APPENDIX 6:1 (continued) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for all subjects.
Student/
Trial/
Dist ' n
Guide
Prices Price Quotes Received
92
249
68
194
224 223 199
Consistent with
Search Rules
n 1 5
21
3 4
4 3
5	 6
6 2
2611
2 3
3 4
4 5
5	 2
6 6
2716
22
3 4
4 5
51
6 3
28 1	 4
2	 5
3	 2
4 6
5 1
6 3
n 1 4
21
3	 5
4 3
5	 6
62
301 	 1
2 5
32
4 6
5 4
6 3
217
89
227
264
96
75
91
164
171
228
103
83
76
93
216
267
104
217
229
207
74
75
76
272
214
75
185
238
81
91
71
207
77
81
212
247
233
104
214
222
94
83
73
273
199
275
78
90
73
88
230
196
89
236
200
188
65
91
72
221
186
88
202
272
86
83
78
217
96
99
239
184
201
91
222
217
70
107
80
183
221
216
75
77
88
69
259
186
93
187
206
243
82
77
92
199
236
80
261
200
76
83
80
246
89
106
230
245
74
253
84
222
219
94
80
211
147
85
78
172
188
98
94
244
66
75
177
171
217
170
77
80
176
88
76
227
209
93
105
178
93
225
174
89
89
216
94
217
94
93
239
88
213
QRS
P	 RS T
QR
PQRSTZ
Q	 T
QR
PQRST Z
QRS
QRSTZ
Q R S
Q R	 T
QRST Z
QRST
PQRSTZ
RST Z
QRST
QRST
QRSTZ
PQRSTZ
QRST Z
QRSTZ
QRST
QRSTZ
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APPENDIX 6:1 (continued) 
This appendix reproduces the experimental data for all subjects.
Student/
Trial/
Dist'n.
Guide
Prices Price Quotes Received
Consistent with
Search Rules
31 1	 3
25
3 4
46
5 2
6 1
n 1 5
21
32
4 3
5 4
66
3316
2 3
3 5
4 4
52
6 1
A 1 3
21
3 2
4 4
5	 6
6	 5
189
277
251
93
81
80
203
96
97
232
210
86
88
172
241
193
74
77
232
79
88
269
94
213
202
257
219
88
101
73
191
85
88
229
215
82
84
211
241
200
96
77
208
101
86
221
90
208
219
206
204
84
72
100
212
86
86
247
204
107
95
195
245
187
85
88
192
84
76
216
57
169
188
173
81
84
94
223
110
79
235
238
75
94
228
255
189
71
99
99
73
229
184
75
71
176
79
217
225
94
228
249
79
198
101
259
208
228
253
73
81
246
250
224
80
200
PQ	 SZ
QRST
T Z
P Q	 S
QRST
R	 T Z
QRSZ
Q	 T Z
QRS	 Z
P	 R	 T
PQRSTZ
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CHAPTER
SEVEN
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CHAPTER SEVEN
HUMAN INFORMATION
PROCESSING CONSTRAINTS
INTRODUCTION
The central context of this thesis is the search for a
suitably favourable price quotation for a consumer
product or service, where some variation exists in the
prices that might be located. An individual, then, sets
out with whatever initial information she has about the
price distribution, and then receives her first price
quote. The acceptability of this quote is determined in
comparison with her prior knowledge about both the price
distribution and future search costs, and a choice is
made either to accept the current offer (in which case,
the search process is terminated), or to look for a
better offer (in which case the process continues).
This chapter seeks to embed the scenario described above
into an overall conceptual model of judgement, and then
to examine some constraints or barriers that might
interfere with an individual's decision making processes.
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Mostly, these barriers will be discussed only briefly as
no new, formal work concerning them is presented in this
thesis. One potential interference effect source,
however, "functional fixation", is reviewed in greater
detail as a prelude to a new research experiment
presented in Chapter 8.
First, though, consider the following extract from
Carroll (1980, p 69):
"You sit in the audience as the magician makes pigeons
appear and disappear. You know it is a trick, that the
pigeons are stowed quietly in the magician's clothes.
You watch with intense concentration to see the pigeon
transferred from hand to coat or coat to hand. You are
sure that it happens, but you never see it. The
magician is the master of illusion and we are
enthralled by illusion.
Why can't we catch the magician? One reason is mis-
direction : the magician gets us to look at his or her
face or hand gestures, the behaviours to which we
continually attend. A second reason is mis-
representation : we believe we know how the trick is
done and attend carefully to our "theory" of the
trick, but we are wrong and the magician works the
trick through unmonitored paths. Related to this, we
perceive the trick as composed of those elements we
can see. We under-estimate the back-stage preparation
- the props, the teamwork, the hours of practice. A
third reason is that we have misplaced faith in our
eyes : we believe that we can see any hand movement
the magician makes, but we are wrong. In front of our
bright and wary eyes, the magician's hands are simply
faster than our perception.
In some ways, recent research reveals the decision
maker and the decision analyst in the roles of
magician and audience. The decision analyst is mis-
directed by the importance of the moment when the
decision maker identifies a selection. We are seduced
by language and common sense into believing that the
choice is the decision. Yet ... the choice is the end
product of the decision, the moment when we see the
pigeon in the magician's hand. The decision is a
process of arriving at a choice, the process by which
the pigeon got into the magician's hand."
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This extract is an important reminder that a decision is
more than a final choice, more even than a problem
solving strategy or a heuristic such as those identified
in earlier chapters. Thus, for example, Rule K from
Chapter 5, which states in the context of price search
"Keep searching until a price is found at least one
standard deviation below the mean, up to a maximum of
a/c searches (rounded)",
tells only a part of the decision making story. Akin to
the magician producing the pigeon, it is the rule that
governs selection In order to understand the decision
making process more fully, however, it would be necessary
to understand why Rule K is adopted. This would involve
assessing, from the outset, how the decision maker
portrays her representation of the task, how data is
generated, used and processed, and how the outcomes of
past decisions might be fed back into future selections.
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF JUDGEMENT
Hogarth (1987) has developed a conceptual model to help
structure the various findings of research studies into
decision processes adopted in the context of tasks
involving human judgement. He conceives of judgement
taking place within a system composing of three elements
- the individual, the task environment, and the actions
resulting from judgement. These three are inter-related
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(6) Action
(7 - Outcome
via a continuous feedback loop. The model is reproduced
as Figure 7:1 below.
(1)	 Task environment
2	 Schema
Acquisition
+
Processing
1'
Output
3
(4)
Figure 7:1 ... A conceptual model of judgement
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Hogarth (1987, p 157) offers the example of a waiter in a
restaurant to illustrate this inter-relatedness
"(The waiter) believes that young people do not tip
generously. Consistent with his belief, he
concentrates attention on older customers. The result
is that younger customers receive poor service which
they reflect by giving small tips. This, in turn,
reinforces the waiter's beliefs."
Judgement, then, occurs within a task environment (box 1)
within which is the individual's schema (box 2). This is
concerned with the individual's beliefs regarding the
task environment and her representation of it, and
includes the actual processing of information, as
decomposed into acquisition of information (box 3),
processing (box 4) and output (box 5). The latter is
characterised as being at the interface of the person's
schema and the task environment to emphasise the location
of its occurrence, and may be indistinguishable, at least
to a third party, from the action (box 6). The choice of
action leads to an outcome (box 7), (for instance, the
level of tips in the waiter example), which may then
reinforce, or possibly alter, the person's schema, and
even, perhaps, the task environment itself (young diners
may choose to eat elsewhere, thus effecting the overall
age distribution of the restaurant's clientele).
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Other proposed models of human information processing are
broadly similar to that outlined above. For example,
Libby and Lewis (1982) employ a three-way classification
of information processing variables into input (concerned
with information set cues), process (concerned with the
characteristics of the judge, and the characteristics of
the decision rule adopted), and output (concerned with
the quality of the judgement, and subsequent self-
insight).
The important issue with which this chapter is concerned
is whether, ' in considering the conceptual model of
judgement in its entirety, there are any judgemental
biases, inherent in an individual's decision processes,
that might impact on the accuracy and optimality of
subsequent choices.
In the case of the price search examples discussed in
earlier chapters, several of Hogarth's "boxes" are clear
and unambiguous. Since the context is so precisely
structured, the task environment (box 1) can be
straightforwardly defined as a search for a suitably low
price, though the exact interpretation of "suitably" will
vary from individual to individual. Again, within a
person's schema (box 2), the acquisition of data (box 3)
is restricted to the direct visual display of the search
cost together with all prices so far received, and,
further down Hogarth's model, boxes 5, 6 and 7
representing respectively output, action and outcome are
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similarly clear. The output of the decision process is
either to search again, or to stop searching and accept
the lowest price to date; and the action and the outcome
are direct consequences of this output.
Thus, the main potential source of judgemental error or
bias occurs in the processing of data (box 4). Apart from
basic arithmetical errors that may infiltrate any
calculation, inaccuracies may also occur where subjects
attempt to assess probabilities, for example the
probability that the next price is more than one search
cost lower than the minimum price so far. Kahneman and
Tversky (1972, p 430) conclude about this aspect of the
psychology of uncertainty that:
... perhaps the most general conclusion, obtained
from numerous investigations, is that people do not
follow the principles of probability theory in judging
the likelihood of uncertain events. This conclusion is
hardly surprising because many of the laws of chance
are neither intuitively apparent, nor easy to apply.
Less obvious, however, is the fact that the deviations
of subjective from objective probability seem
reliable, systematic, and difficult to eliminate.
Apparently, people replace the laws of chance by
heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable estimates
and quite often do not."
This conclusion is also confirmed by several later
experimental studies investigating the manipulation of
probabilities, for example, Bar-Hillel (1982) and Salop
(1987).
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An additional potential source of bias is known as
"anchoring and adjustment". This may occur where a
subject estimates some value by starting with an initial
value, and then adjusting. Typically, the size of
adjustment is insufficient (Slovic and Lichtenstein,
1971), being biased towards the initial values, which
consequently are labelled anchors. Tversky and Kahneman
(1974, p 1129) reported the following powerful
demonstration of this effect:
"Subjects were asked to estimate various quantities,
stated in percentages (for example, the percentage of
African countries in the United Nations). For each
quantity, a number between 0 and 100 was determined by
spinning a wheel of fortune in the subjects' presence.
The subjects were instructed to indicate first whether
that number was higher or lower than the value of the
quantity, and then to estimate the value of the
quantity by moving upward or downward from the given
number. Different groups were given different numbers
for each quantity, and these arbitrary numbers had a
marked effect on estimates. For example, the median
estimates of the percentage of African countries in
the United Nations were 25 and 45 for groups that
received 10 and 65, respectively, as starting points.
Payoffs for accuracy did not reduce the anchoring
effect."
The experiments on price search suggest two ways in which
an anchoring effect may occur. First, where subjects have
an initial budget against which to judge expenditure, the
budget figure may be used as a target value, and,
therefore, strongly influence search behaviour (in the
partial or no prior knowledge cases). However, although
the Hey (1982) experiment provided subjects with such
targets, they were excluded in the experiments reported
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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Second, in the situation where subjects are given two
guide prices as partial prior knowledge of the price
distribution, commonly subsequent quotes received were
evaluated in relation to the two guide prices only,
rather than in relation to all the gathered data. The
guide prices, therefore, acted as anchors. This also
suggests that the price quotes actually received are
often perceived simply as offers to sell at that price,
rather than as offers to sell plus data which may be used
to update an individual's knowledge of the overall price
distribution. Thus, subjects may have difficulty in using
the same data for two different purposes. This is the
concept of "functional fixation". It is discussed further
in the next section, and investigated experimentally in
the next chapter.
FUNCTIONAL FIXATION
In many situations, solutions to problems may depend on a
subject's ability to represent the environment in novel
ways. Generally, decision making is facilitated and
improved with the benefit of previous training and
experience. As Eyesenck (1984, p 273) notes, however,
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"...it is perhaps less obvious that knowledge acquired
in the past can sometimes seriously disrupt, and
interfere with, subsequent attempts to solve problems.
for example, we tend to regard any particular
object as suitable for a strictly limited range of
purposes, and often experience difficulty in realising
that the object can be used in other ways."
This phenomenon is known as "functional fixation", and
was first investigated by Maier (1931). In his
experimental design, subjects entered a room in which two
strings were hanging from the ceiling, the strings being
sufficiently far apart that they could not both be
grasped at once. The task was to tie the strings
together. Other objects in the room included a chair and
a pair of pliers. Many subjects unsuccessfully attempted
to solve the problem using the chair. The "correct"
solution, however, involved tying the pliers to one
string, swinging them like a pendulum, and holding the
other string until the swinging string was close enough
to grasp. The two strings could now be tied together. In
Maier's experiment, only 39% of subjects managed to solve
the problem within ten minutes. The difficulty arises
from not perceiving that the pliers could be used as a
weight at the end of a pendulum as an alternative to
their more conventional use.
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Experiments seeking to investigate functional fixation
should be characterised, therefore, by the following
three properties:
(1) - the behaviour of individuals is investigated,
(2) - subjects have undergone some pre-utilisation 
training	 (either within the
	 experimental
instrument itself, or within general past
experience) for some specified object, and
(3) - subjects are required
	 to discover	 a new
function for the specified object above.
Over the last few decades, several research studies that
focus on experience as a barrier to problem solving have
been reported in the accounting literature. In
particular, the issues addressed have included the
influence	 on managerial
	 decisions
	 of	 alternative
inventory flow assumptions (Dyckman, 1964a, 1964b
Bruns, 1965 ; Dopuch and Ronen, 1973), the influence of
changes in the underlying cost information provided on
pricing decisions (Ashton, 1976 ; Barnes and Webb, 1986),
the ability to respond to valuation method changes (Chang
and Birnberg, 1977), and the effect of cost and profit
information on market-based decision models (Haka,
Friedman and Jones, 1986). In each case, available
evidence indicated that decision makers' behaviour is
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impaired; that is, decisions were made that were, in some
sense, sub-optimal.
Detailed reviews of (most of) these studies and their
link with the functional fixation literature in
psychology are provided by Ashton (1976) and Wilner and
Birnberg (1986).
None of the studies reported in the accounting
literature, however, have maintained all three of the
characteristics mentioned above within their experimental
design. For instance, in Ashton's (1976) study, subjects
were required to establish selling prices for products
that their hypothetical company planned to introduce in
the future. They were presented with three variables
"generally recognised" as being important in pricing
decisions - elasticity of demand (see Watson, 1968, pp
51-54), unit product cost (see Horngren, 1972, pp 373-
374), and the nature of competition (see McCarthy, 1964,
pp 327-337). Only the second of these was manipulated
experimentally, subjects being presented with either full
cost data, including fixed factory overhead cost, or
variable cost data. Thirty pricing decisions were then
made using one type of cost data. This enabled a decision
model to be established for each individual, in a linear
regression form. Subjects then made 30 further pricing
decisions using (except for those subjects in control
groups) the other type of cost data'. This second set of
prices was then compared with the set of prices that
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would have been predicted by each subject's decision
model, that is with the prices obtained under complete
fixation where no change occurs in the process used.
Ashton (1976, p 14) found that:
"the data suggest that a large proportion of the
subjects in the experimental groups failed to adjust
significantly their decision processes in response to
an accounting change, thereby providing evidence of
the existence of functional fixation in an accounting
context."
While this is an interesting finding, in reality it is
not evidence of functional fixation in an accounting
context. In fact, it is better described as evidence of
"data fixity" in an accounting context, since subjects
were required to make the same type of decision with two
different types of data. They were finding one "function"
for two "objects", rather than two "functions" for one
"object".
A similar criticism applies to the other published
research studies reputedly concerned with the issue of
functional fixation in accounting. No study has yet
attempted to investigate dual applications for the same
accounting object.
The experiment reported in Chapter 8 attempts to remedy
this deficiency. It investigates whether familiarity with
a data set and a method for its application, prohibits
subsequent uses of that data set for different purposes.
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Thus, the current study differs from prior accounting
research, and is closer to the concept of functional
fixation in psychology, because it stresses a new use for
a familiar data set. In this experiment, subjects,
accustomed to using a component's "cost-card" for
inventory valuation, are required to use a similar "cost-
card" to calculate a component's minimum cost. Hence, the
study explores subjects' ability to find two distinct
functions for the same object, as required.
SUMMARY
This chapter has introduced a conceptual model of
judgement within human information processing. Decisions
are not always totally objective in nature; they are made
by humans. Their subjective component can interfere with
choice behaviour that might be prescribed by an outside,
"rational" observer (though again, it is unlikely that
the outside observer herself is totally objective).
In particular, one potential source of bias in decision
making - functional fixation - has been reviewed in
some detail. This is directly relevant to the work on
price search since, especially in the normal situation
where a subject has partial prior knowledge of the
underlying price distribution (in the form of two initial
"guide" prices), there is a general tendency to view
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subsequent price quotes received solely as possible
purchase prices, and not additionally as data with which
to update the knowledge of the overall price
distribution.
Some new experimental evidence concerning the existence
of functional fixation in an accounting context is
presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER
EIGHT
CHAPTER EIGHT
NEW EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
ON FUNCTIONAL FIXATION
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter some potential sources of
judgemental error or bias were introduced and discussed.
In particular, individuals may suffer an interference
effect when attempting to use price quotes not only as
straightforward offers to supply the product or service
at that price, but also as sources of information with
which to update their knowledge of the overall price
distribution. They may be "functionally fixated", finding
it difficult to discover this new function for a familiar
object (a price).
This chapter describes a new experiment that seeks to
investigate this phenomenon. It is set, however, not in
the context of the partial knowledge price search
framework described earlier, but in a different, though
related, context, so designed in order to facilitate the
objectivity of analysing any possible fixation effects.
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That is, the context has been deliberately chosen so that
the given problem has a unique "correct" answer, which
may be compared with a specific "incorrect" answer that
would be consistent with a fixation effect.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Hypothesis 
The research hypothesis of the current study is that
prior use of a data set will inhibit the creative use of
that data set in a new way. The null hypothesis is that
familiarity with a procedure that uses a data set for the
valuation of inventory will not affect subjects' use of
that data set for minimum cost calculation.
Task and Procedure
Subjects were undergraduate students from the Warwick
Business School. All were enrolled on a Managerial
Accounting course and all had previously taken (and
passed) an Introduction to Accounting course.
Subjects were divided into two equal groups of 40 by the
random selection of playing cards (without replacement)
on entering the lecture theatre. All subjects completed
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an objective test on basic accounting topics in order to
establish equivalence between the two groups. The
objective test is also a useful mechanism for assessing
the ability of subjects, as individuals with little or no
competence in accounting might use previously learned
data-handling techniques for a new task for reasons other
than being functionally fixated (as discussed later).
The main drawback of using an objective test is that the
test itself may cause interference effects, especially if
it focuses on directly relevant knowledge. For the
current experiment, it was decided that the benefits of
using an objective test outweighed this drawback, and so
a short, five question multiple-choice test was adopted
(question 2 is reproduced in Appendix 8:1 as an example).
Experimental Group
On completion of the pre-test, subjects in the
experimental group were given some background information
on Shannon Engineering Technologies Limited (SET), as
reproduced in Appendix 8:2 (a). SET was described as a
long-established manufacturing company. The description
also included details of SET'S adopted inventory
valuation procedures 	 (see Appendix 8:2	 (b)).These
procedures essentially valued materials and labour on the
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basis of standard cost, although adjustment would be made
to current cost in certain, specified circumstances.
Overheads, split between specific and general, were added
on a standard allocation rate basis, and a provision was
deducted amounting to 3 percent of the total materials
and labour costs. This provision represented an allowance
for losses from total inventory value arising from
obsolescence etc.
Subjects were also presented with the up-to-date "cost
card" for one component and a solution for its overall
valuation. Their task was to apply the inventory
valuation procedures to three finished goods components,
a cost card being given for each one (Appendix 8:2 (c)).
The importance of this preliminary task was for subjects
to become accustomed to, and to try to apply, the given
inventory valuation procedures. Analysis of responses to
this part of the experiment revealed that 28 subjects
valued all three components correctly. The other 12
subjects (9 of whom scored two or fewer on the multiple-
choice test) all valued the first two components
correctly, but made the same error on the third, using
current cost for one of the labour processes where this
was 8 percent less than standard cost. SET's procedures,
however, only allow a current cost basis for labour where
current cost exceeds standard cost by 5 percent or more.
In the second part of the experiment, subjects were again
presented with a cost card, but the task was now to
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calculate the minimum cost at which a particular
component (the ZV I() ) could be produced (as described in
Appendix 8:2 (d)). This might lead to a management
opportunity to utilise spare capacity and make extra
profit by offering the component at a special, reduced
price. The component required two parts and three labour
processes (in none of which did standard cost exceed
current cost by 5 percent or more). Table 8:1 compares
the cost of the ZV I() component based on SET's usual
inventory valuation procedures with the minimum cost for
the special order.
Control Group
The members of the control group were given similar
background information on SET (see Appendix 8:2 (e)), but
not the data on SET's inventory valuation procedures.
They carried out only the "minimum cost" part of the
experiment. After calculating the "minimum cost" they
attempted an additional question on break-even analysis
intended to keep them occupied for the same length of
time as the experimental subjects. The overall sequence
and timings are summarised in Table 8:2.
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Include	 Include
Labour
Process R
Process N
Process V
Overheads 
Specific
Current cost
Current cost
Current cost
Standard cost
Current cost
Standard cost
TABLE 8:1
VALUATION BASIS FOR THE ZV10 COMPONENT
Inventory	 Minimum cost
Materials
Part A56	 Standard cost	 Current cost
Part B30	 Current cost	 Current cost
General	 Include	 Exclude
Provision
Obsolescence	 Include	 Exclude
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Objective test	 20
SET 1
(inventory val'n)	 35
SET 2
(minimum cost)	 15
Objective test
SET
(minimum cost)
Break-even analysis
question
20
20*
30
TABLE 8:2
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Task
	
Duration	 Task	 Duration
(mins)	 (mins)
70	 70
* - the control group's extra five minutes enabled
familiarisation time with SET and the cost card
format.
A final issue regarding the experimental design concerned
the choice of an appropriate incentive scheme; one that
would motivate subjects to perform to the best of their
ability. An incentive scheme that pays a fixed fee to
each subject would certainly help to ensure a high number
of volunteers, but if receipt of the fixed fee is not
conditional upon performance, then the scheme is not
actually providing any incentive. An improvement on this
would be a scheme that rewards subjects by paying a
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variable fee directly linked to performance (perhaps with
a fixed payment element as well as this).
The special difficulty in the current experiment, though,
is that there is not a suitable, variable performance
measure that might act as a basis for such an incentive
scheme. Subjects either achieve the "right" answer or
they do not. It would seem a contradiction to reward a
"wrong" answer, but payments only for "right" answers
would raise issues of equity, since subjects in the
control group could earn the same bonus as those in the
experimental • group, with a substantially reduced,
relevant workload (the bonus only being linked to SET),
and with less interference effects to overcome.
After weighing up these considerations, and in common
with most previous experimental studies on functional or
data fixation, no incentive scheme was adopted. Although
this represents a design limitation, almost 90% of
students registered on the course agreed to participate
in the experiment, and there was no indication that they
did not work through their tasks in a serious and
committed manner.
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RESULTS
No significant (p < .05) difference was found between the
performance of the experimental and control group members
on the initial objective test. It can be concluded that
the two groups were equivalent for analytic purposes.
Subjects' solutions revealed, however, a lower standard
of accounting knowledge than had been anticipated. 24
experimental group members and 19 control group members
correctly answered fewer than three of the five
questions. This suggested that these subjects had a poor
general comprehension of accounting and could not be
relied upon to sufficiently understand the SET problem
which confronted them. For these students rather than
causing fixation, the inventory valuation procedures may
have actually provided a means of achieving a solution
a way out of their confusion. An examination of these
subjects' responses supports this view. For example; of
the 24 experimental group members, labour cost was
calculated correctly by 8 (33%), as per inventory
valuation procedures by 15 (63%), and in some other way
by 1 (4%). Corresponding figures for the 19 control group
members were 8 (42%), 0, and 11 (58%), respectively.
Thus, most (86%) of the shift is from "other" in the
control group to "inventory valuation" in the
experimental group. For this reason, these subjects'
responses to the minimum cost experiment were excluded
from analysis.
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The remaining subjects' responses were classified into
five categories and three conditions. The five categories
are
(1) - overall	 •.. the complete response
(2) - materials •.. responses for the two parts
within the ZV I() component taken
together
(3) - labour	 ... the three processes taken
together
(4) - overheads ... specific and general
(5) - provision ... obsolescence
The three conditions of response within each category
represent minimum cost calculated
(1) - correctly ... see Table 8:1
(2) - as per inventory valuation procedures 
... see Table 8:1
(3) - other	 ... any other way
These responses are presented in Table 8:3 on the next
page.
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TABLE 8:3
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO THE SET
MINIMUM COST PROBLEM
Group	 Overall Mats Labr Ovhd Prov
Experimental (n=16)
% calculating min. cost
- correctly 19 62 31 69 81
- as per inventory
valuation rules 19 50 6 19
- other 81 19 19 25
100 100 100 100 100
Control	 (n=21)
% calculating min. cost
- correctly 57 100 62 95 100
- as per inventory
valuation rules 5
- other 43 38
100 100 100 100 100
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A fixation or interference effect would be demonstrated
by a movement away from the "correct" condition in the
control group to the "inventory valuation" condition in
the experimental group. Its magnitude is the lower of the
decrease in the percentage of subjects calculating
minimum cost correctly (from the control group to the
experimental group) and the increase in the percentage
calculating it as per the inventory valuation procedures.
Across the sample of 16 experimental group members an
interference effect is apparent in 3 (19 percent)
regarding materials, 5 (31 percent) regarding labour, and
3 (19 percent) regarding the obsolescence provision.
A two-way chi-square test with Yates' correction was
conducted over the two groups for each of the response
categories. First, the number of subjects calculating
minimum cost (for the category) correctly or in
accordance with the inventory valuation procedures was
compared with the number calculating minimum cost in some
other way. There were no significant differences. The
"other" responses were excluded, therefore, and a second
two-way chi-square test (again with Yates' correction)
compared for each category the number of subjects
calculating minimum cost correctly with the number using
the inventory valuation rules. A significant (p < .01)
difference was found only for labour (chi 2 = 8.847).
Thus, there is some support for the interference effect
described above for the labour valuation, though a cell
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size of four for two of the cells indicates rather a weak
test.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The experiment revealed limited evidence of functional
fixation in an accounting context. There were, however,
several weaknesses in the experimental methodology that
must be considered in evaluating any extrapolations from
these findings.
Firstly, the sample size was small. After excluding 24
subjects following their poor performance on the
objective test, only 16 subjects remained in the
experimental group. This led to rather weak statistical
evidence. Any re-run of the experiment should be
performed with a larger and more knowledgeable pool of
subjects.
A second concern relates to the initial objective test.
It is a useful instrument for ensuring the competence of
individual subjects and the equivalence of the two
groups. It is possible, though, that the presence of the
test, and in particular the presence of a question on
relevant costs for decision making, may itself have
induced a set response. The effect • would be to magnify
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the difference between the two groups as the control
group had sat the objective test immediately prior to the
experimental task. This would be alleviated in any re-run
by having the control group perform the break-even
analysis question before the SET problem. In addition,
this would balance any fatigue effects across the two
groups.
Thirdly, no reward structure was provided to motivate
subjects in the direction of the correct answer. This
lack of incentive may have adversely affected subjects'
performance in the experimental task, especially
experimental group members' who had been at work for
almost one hour before attempting the minimum cost
problem.
Another concern relates to the lack of feedback given to
subjects regarding their performance in the experimental
tasks. This is in common with all previous accounting
studies on fixation, but as noted by Wilner and Birnberg
(1986, p 6)
“ ...feedback information about the quality of prior
decisions may be a useful signal that the decision
process needs adjustments or that it should be left
alone."
The experimental task had one right answer, yet subjects
had no way of knowing whether they had achieved it or
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not. There was no learning process, therefore, that could
aid subsequent attempts at a similar task.
Finally, it must be recognised that an individual
calculating minimum cost in accordance with the inventory
valuation procedures may have done so for reasons other
than fixation. He may have had other preconceptions about
how to respond; he may have mis-understood the task
itself or felt it was framed ambiguously; or, perhaps,
for some or all of the reasons already discussed, while
realising that a change in decision process was required,
he simply did not want to make the effort.
Despite these initial weaknesses of experimental design,
the results presented here show tentatively that
familiarity with a data set, and a method for its
application, can interfere with subsequent, alternative
applications of the data set. If a more rigorous
experimental design reinforces these exploratory results,
there remains a clear need to understand why people are
functionally fixated.
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Raw materials
Direct labour
Factory overhead
Selling and dist'n
expenses
£200,000
£80,000
-
-
£3.00 per unit produced
£2.00 per unit produced
£1.00 per unit produced
£1.00 per unit sold
APPENDIX 8:1 
This appendix reproduces question 2 from the five question
multiple-choice objective test.
Last year, a firm started to produce a single product with a
unit selling price of £16. In the first year of operation
standard capacity was 50,000 units, production was 50,000
units, and sales were 40,000 units. The actual costs incurred
were
Fixed	 Variable
Actual variable costs did not diverge from standard.
Using absorption costing, what was the unit cost of closing
inventory?
A £	 6.00
B £ 7.00
C £10.00
D £11.00
E £13.00
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APPENDIX 8:2
This appendix reproduces the complete experimental details and
handouts used in the Shannon Engineering Technologies Limited
study. The details are organised as shown below.
Appendix 8:2 (a) - Background Information for
Experimental Group
(1 page)
Appendix 8:2 (b) - SET Stock Valuation Procedures and
Example for Experimental Group
(3 pages)
Appendix 8:2 (c) - Stock Valuation Cost Cards for
Experimental Group
(3 pages)
Appendix 8:2 (d) - Additional Task Information for
Experimental Group
(2 pages)
Appendix 8:2 (e) - Background and Task Information
for Control Group
(1 page)
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APPENDIX 8:2 (a) 
BACKGROUND
You are a recently appointed Cost and Management Accountant for
Shannon Engineering Technologies Ltd. (SET), a well-established
company manufacturing a wide range of components mainly for use in
the automotive and aerospace industries.
The year-end figures are currently being prepared, but
unfortunately, there has been a breakdown in the company's
management information system. While most essential year-end
figures had been produced prior to the breakdown, the computer
information concerning the valuation of finished goods in stock has
been lost. This part of closing stock, therefore, must be
calculated manually.
Relevant available information consists of
1) ... Details of SET's valuation procedures for finished goods
in stock.
2) ... Up-to-date cost cards for each component.
3) ... Year-end stocktake sheets listing quantities of finished
goods in stock.
TASK
Using the attached SET finished goods valuation procedures and the
given example as a guideline, you are required to produce the stock
valuation for the three components - ZE 40 , ZX7 and ZNi . A cost
card information sheet is given for each component. Quantities in
stock per the year-end stocktake sheets were as follows
Quantity of Finished
Component	 Goods in Stock 
ZE 40	3
ZX7	1
ZN1	 0
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APPENDIX 8:2 (b) 
SET STOCK VALUATION PROCEDURES
SET operate a standard costing system for materials, labour inputs
and overheads. Generally, the year-end stock valuation is based on
the above standard costs, though, in certain circumstances,
adjustment may be made to current cost. Specifically, the valuation
procedures for finished goods in stock are as given below
Materials - valued at standard, unless current cost differs by
more than 10% of standard, in which case current cost is used in
the valuation. There are never any materials usage variances.
Labour - inputs are costed at standard hours and standard rates
(and are paid on a piece-rate basis). SET make every effort to
ensure the standard hours for a process are an accurate reflection
of the time actually taken. Standard hours figures can, therefore,
be relied upon for valuation and decision making purposes. However,
if current labour rates exceed standard labour rates by more than
5%, then the current rate would be used in the year-end stock
valuation.
Overheads - (a) Specific - those overheads identifiable as
relating to the finished goods themselves.
(b) General	 - other allocated overheads.
Both types of overhead are included in the year-end stock valuation
using standard overhead absorption rates per unit. Overhead
variance calculations indicate these rates to be acceptable.
Stock Provision - A provision of 3% of the total materials and
labour costs is deducted from the finished goods valuation as an
allowance for obsolescence and other expected losses. The provision
is rounded to the nearest E.
Final Valuation - The overall unit cost (materials + labour +
overheads - provision) is then multiplied by the number of units in
finished stock to arrive at the final stock valuation.
This stock valuation system has been in existence for several
years, and has the approval of internal management and external
auditors alike.
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STOCK VALUATION EXAMPLE
COMPONENT 	 ZX3	 (Quantity in Stock - 8)
COST CARD INFORMATION
Materials 
Costs per unit in £ 
Part No.
	 Quantity	 Standard	 Current	 Variance 
A118
	 10	 23	 23
A119
	 2	 145	 128	 - 12%
Labour
Labour Rates per hr in £
Standard
Process
	 Hours	 Standard	 Current	 Variance
5	 5.00	 5.40	 + 8%
X
	
20
	
4.80
	
4.90	 + 2%
Overheads 
Standard Absorption Rate
per unit in £ 
Specific	 70
General	 50
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STOCK VALUATION EXAMPLE - SOLUTION
COMPONENT	 ZX3	 (Quantity in Stock - 8)
Materials
Basis Working
=
Valuation
Standard
Current
Current
Standard
:
10 x £23
2 x £128
5 x £5.40
20 x £4.80
3% x £609
8 x £711
t	 t
230
256
486
A118
A119
Labour
27
96
123
C
X
Overheads
609
70
50
120
Specific
General
Less Provision
729
- 18
UNIT VALUATION 711
OVERALL VALUATION £5,688
217
APPENDIX 8:2 (c) 
COMPONENT 
	
ZE40
COST CARD INFORMATION
Materials 
Costs per unit in £ 
Part No.	 Quantity	 Standard	 Current	 Variance 
A56	 5	 14	 15	 + 7%
B103
	 3
	
36	 36
Labour
Labour Rates per hr in £
Standard
Process
	 Hours
	 Standard	 Current	 Variance 
E	 10	 4.70
	 5.00	 + 6%
Overheads
Standard Absorption Rate
per unit in £ 
Specific	 37
General	 20
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Process
X
COMPONENT
COST CARD INFORMATION
ZX7
Costs per unit in £
Materials
Part No. Quantity Standard Current Variance
A91 6 30 26 - 13%
B22 1 150 138 -	 8%
B23 3 40 47 + 18%
Labour
Labour Rates per hr in £
Standard
Hours	 Standard	 Current	 Variance 
10	 5.00	 5.30	 + 6%
5	 4.80	 4.90	 + 2%
Overheads
Standard Absorption Rate
per unit in £ 
Specific	 45
General	 30
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COMPONENT 
	
ZNi
COST CARD INFORMATION
Materials 
Costs per unit in £ 
Part No.	 Quantity	 Standard	 Current	 Variance
A73 3 8 9 + 13%
B 66 2 39 41 +	 5%
Labour
Labour Rates per hr in £
Standard
Process Hours Standard Current Variance
J 5 5.00 5.20 +	 4%
K 5 5.00 4.60 -	 8%
N 2 4.50 4.50 -
Overheads
Standard Absorption Rate
per unit in £ 
Specific	 13
General	 8
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APPENDIX 8:2 (d) 
SET - ADDITIONAL TASK
The directors of the company are keen to utilise some of the
existing spare capacity. One way of achieving this is to
manufacture a new component, the ZVI.° , currently required by the
Ministry of Defence. In order to assist the directors with their
negotiations, you have been asked to calculate the minimum cost for
which a Z1/10 component can be produced.
FURTHER INFORMATION
Attached	 is	 the	 cost	 card that	 has	 been	 prepared	 for	 component
ZVi 0 •
Note,	 in addition, that
1) Materials	 - Parts A56 and B30 are often used by SET for other
components.	 Though	 none	 is	 currently	 in	 stock,
both	 parts	 are	 readily	 available	 from	 local
suppliers.
2) Labour	 - Labour is paid on a 	 piece-rate	 basis.	 There is
sufficient spare capacity on each of processes R,
N and V to enable production of the ZV10.
3) Overheads	 - SET's overall general overheads will not alter as
a result of producing the Z1/10.
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COMPONENT
COST CARD INFORMATION
ZV10
Materials
Costs per unit in £
Part No. Quantity Standard Current Variance
A56 3 14 15 +	 7%
B30 4 63 72 + 14%
Labour
Labour Rates per hr in £
Standard
Process Hours Standard Current Variance
R 15 5.00 5.20 +	 4%
N 8 4.25 4.50 +	 6%
V 20 5.50 5.30 -	 4%
Overheads
Standard Absorption Rate
per unit in £ 
Specific	 72
General	 30
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APPENDIX 8:2 (e) 
TASK
You are a recently appointed Cost and Management Accountant for
Shannon Engineering Technologies Ltd. (SET), a well-established
company manufacturing a wide range of components mainly for use in
the automotive and aerospace industries.
The directors of the company are keen to utilise some of the
existing spare capacity. One way of achieving this is to
manufacture a new component, the Mri o , currently required by the
Ministry of Defence. In order to assist the directors with their
negotiations, you have been asked to calculate the minimum cost for
which a ZVI() component can be produced.
FURTHER INFORMATION
SET operate a standard costing system for materials, labour inputs
and overheads. While materials prices, and labour and overhead
rates change from time to time, there are never any materials usage
variances, and SET make every effort to ensure the standard hours
for a process are an accurate reflection of the time actually
taken. Standard hours figures, therefore, can be relied upon for
valuation and decision making purposes.
For any component, all accounting information regarding the unit
costs of that component is kept on an individual and up-to-date
cost	 card.
	 Attached is	 the	 cost	 card that	 has been prepared for
component ZV10.
Note,
	 in addition, that
1) Materials -	 Parts A56 and B30 are often used by SET for other
components.	 Though	 none	 is	 currently	 in	 stock,
both	 parts	 are	 readily	 available	 from	 local
suppliers.
2) Labour Labour is paid on a	 piece-rate	 basis.	 There is
sufficient spare capacity on each of processes R,
N and V to enable production of the ZV10.
3) Overheads These	 are	 split	 between	 "specific"	 (those
overheads identifiable as relating to the
finished component itself), and "general" (other
allocated overheads). SET's overall general
overheads will not alter as a result of producing
the ZV10.
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CHAPTER
NINE
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CHAPTER NINE
SEARCH BEHAVIOUR IN A LESS 
WELL STRUCTURED ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
The information search behaviour described in the
chapters so far, has been investigated with particular
emphasis on search processes in experimental product or
service markets that are homogeneous in all aspects
except price. The experiments conducted have been highly
structured, in that they have been characterised by a
single, clear objective, with participants being fully
aware in advance of the type and form of all additional
information available, and being confronted by a simple
two-way choice mechanism	 search again or buy.
While the findings from these experiments are important
in themselves, they may also lend insights to information
search behaviour in decision situations that are less
well structured. This chapter describes an experiment
that is designed to explore individuals' information
search behaviour in a more complex •decision environment
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a competitive tender. The experiment is an exploratory
one, since in spite of the number of developments that
have occurred in academic management over the past few
decades (for example, the information "economics"
revolution, agency and contingency theories etc.), there
has been a surprising lack of attention given to the
issue of how managers search and use information for
business decisions. Partly, this absence may be due to
there being no clearly defined methodology for
researching the complexities of business decisions.
Nevertheless, the growing number of MBA courses demanding
a more integrated approach to the teaching of accounting,
economics, business policy and strategic management, may
eventually force this situation to be changed.
This chapter describes the results of conducting a
relatively unstructured business decision game; the
purposes of the description being twofold. First, to
share the initial understanding that the experiment has
given as to how information for business decisions is
searched and used. Second, to highlight and discuss a
number of the methodological issues that were encountered
during the study.
Whilst information is clearly needed at a number of
levels in the management of the firm, the primary concern
here was to understand the search for and use of
information for strategic decisions. The business context
adopted to explore this was a competitive tender. In the
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business world competitive tendering has long been
commonplace for large one-off contracts; for example, the
building of part of a chemical or steel plant. In recent
years, competitive tendering has spread from the private
to the public sector, where a number of organisations
have assigned parts of their activities to outside
contractors; for example, hospital cleaning services and
local authority waste collection (see Domberger, 1989,
for a discussion of the potential efficiency gains
achievable by subjecting public sector activities to
competitive tendering). Generally, situations of this
type are characterised by incompleteness of information
and uncertainty about competitors' actions. Decision
makers are faced with two important issues, therefore:
choosing an appropriate problem solving strategy, and
searching for further, relevant information. As will be
discussed below, these should not be seen as two
independent issues.
In the next section, a general model of decision making
is presented as a framework, and three hypotheses are
developed from the existing literature on information
search and use. While most of this previous work has been
developed within the confines of highly structured tasks,
it suggests one relevant hypothesis that warrants testing
in more complex tasks such as a competitive tender. The
general literature on decision making and information use
suggests two further hypotheses concerning information
search in a business decision context. Following this
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review, the experimental procedure is described, and
methods of analysis together with the results of the
experiment are then presented and discussed in detail.
BACKGROUND AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES
Most text books on management accounting and control
include at least one chapter devoted to analysing
relevant costs for decision making, and incorporate some
decision making model as a framework for general
consideration. Figure 9:1, reproduced from Arnold and
Hope (1990, p 12), is typical. Two important properties
implicit in such search models are first, that the
decision is presented as following a logical, step-by-
step flow from conception to implementation and review,
and second, that each step in the process is well defined
and straightforward. This is certainly true for the
highly structured price search studies discussed earlier.
In a competitive tender, however, working through the
model is a less clear-cut procedure. In particular, the
collection and analysis of data about alternative courses
of action (step 2) may involve a search into the unknown,
as the type and form of information available may not be
known at the outset, and, further, neither may be the
total number and type of alternatives open to management.
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Make a decision and
state expected outcome
Report actual outcome
of decision
Monitor actual outcome
to ensure actions
are under control
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Identify goals of
organisation
Collect and analyse
data about alternative
courses of action
Choose decision rules
Rank alternative
courses of action
Figure 9:1 ... A framework for managerial planning,
decision making and control (including
two feedback loops)
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Although the existing literature on information search
and use has been concerned primarily with highly
structured situations (as per chapters 3 to 6), it does
provide some general guidelines for the analysis of the
unstructured experiment described here. A common,
relevant finding of these studies (as well as other
studies concerned with decisions across two or more
parameters, such as a product's price, size and location;
for example, Payne, 1976; Shields, 1980) is that the
problem solving strategy adopted by a participant governs
to some extent the subsequent information search
procedure. For instance, in the price search studies
discussed earlier, Hey suggested six rules of thumb that
might be used in considering each price quote received.
The simplest such rule, Rule B, (1982, p73) stated:
"have at least 2 searches; stop if a price quote is
received larger than the previous quote".
Adoption of a Rule B problem solving strategy
unambiguously determines how long to keep searching.
Accordingly, the first of the information search
hypotheses that will guide the analysis of the experiment
considered here is as follows:
H1 - Information searched will be influenced by the
problem solving strategies adopted by participants
concerning the pricing of the tender and the
overcoming of the capacity constraint.
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As the business problem considered in this chapter is
relatively unstructured, hypotheses derived from the
wider decision making and information use literatures
should prove useful in conducting the present analysis.
One of the major developments in decision theory post war
was Simon's (eg. 1957) recognition that in complex
decision situations individuals may act in a boundedly
rational way, as discussed in Chapter 1. In particular,
they may satisfice rather than optimise because of the
costs (in the most general sense) involved in gathering
and evaluating information. From this view of decision
making the second guiding hypothesis regarding
information search and use is derived:
H2 - Where it is possible from the given information,
participants will choose to accept given costs or
estimate costs rather than explicitly search for
them.
A similar but distinct view of decision making proposed
by Lindblom (1959, 1979) argues that, contrary to the
usual assumptions inherent in classical decision theory
(for instance, expected utility theory), decision makers
in practice have difficulties in isolating how a problem
should be defined, how it should be approached, how
courses of action should be identified, and how actions
should be evaluated, chosen and implemented.
231
In terms of the decision analysed in this study, the
pricing of a competitive tender by an outside contractor
would normally involve the contractor requesting certain
information from the "purchaser", and searching his own
organisation's information system for data relevant to
the estimation of costs. As the contract will often
involve new and unique characteristics of operation for a
contractor, the information available may have to be
substantially adjusted to reflect these characteristics.
Thus, the total number of dimensions of information
required for a complete analysis of the problem will not
necessarily be apparent from the outset. At each stage
the information acquired and the conclusions reached
might feed into other stages of the analysis. It may even
lead the decision maker to re-think his objective
function. Such feedback loops are familiar components of
conceptual models of judgement (see, for example, Hogarth
1987, as reproduced in Chapter 7). This "muddling
through" view of decision making gives rise to the third
and final research hypothesis:
H3 - Information search will not flow directly from an
initial identification of the objectives to be met.
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THE EXPERIMENT
Task
The experimental instrument used to analyse information
search and use within a business context was a modified
version of Moon's (1988) incident process case on
competitive tendering and under-capacity. Each
participant represented an identical manufacturer of
garden gnomes with the opportunity to tender for a
special offer, and, therefore, make some use of existing
spare production capacity. A block order of 300 gnomes
was required by GGC (Galactic Gnome Corporation) for
export to the Far East, the gnomes having to be ready for
delivery within 3 months.
Procedure
A profit and loss account for the year just ended,
together with some brief supporting notes, was given to
each participant at the outset, as a reflection of
information that would be readily available to the
manager(s) responsible for the decision. Participants
were also given a problem sheet containing details of the
opportunity facing the company to utilise the existing
spare capacity. The handouts are reproduced in Appendix
9:1. This background information enabled a preliminary,
ballpark estimate of the costs involved in pursuing the
233
tender. The intention was to provide .sufficient
information to make a start, but not enough to enable an
easy conclusion.
Participants were informed that further information could
be searched. This raised the difficult issue of how to
provide further information; the adopted solution needed
both to approximate reality and be experimentally robust.
From the latter viewpoint an interactive computer program
would have been ideal, as it would have ensured
consistency of information provision. A menu driven
databank was clearly unacceptable from a reality
viewpoint, however, as it would have "falsely" directed
the search process. Other forms of computerised databank
were also inappropriate because of the possibly wide
ranging style and type of information requests.
Consequently, the approach adopted was one where the
author acted as the available dataset. While this has the
benefit of being able to decode similar questions with
different phrasings, it does have the shortcoming that it
could lead to potential inconsistencies in the provision
of information. This was overcome, as far as possible, by
running the case a large number of times befOre the
formal experimental run was conducted. These pre-
experimental runs highlighted the questions which were
commonly asked, and, for these, standard written answers
were prepared (for example, the cost of manufacturing a
mould, the overtime rate etc.). Other questions were
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treated as being equally admissible, and answered as
considered most appropriate, the answers given then being
carefully recorded to ensure consistency in the event of
another participant asking the same question. A fixed fee
of A$200 was charged for each and every information
request, in order to render the information costly. This
is a relatively unsatisfactory part of the experimental
process, but there seems to be no obvious alternative
solution.
An additional associated problem is that the individual
sessions could not be run in parallel, thereby risking
subjects discussing the case with those still to
participate, and colluding. The random element embedded
within the incentive scheme (see below) alleviated the
latter risk, while, regarding the former risk, subjects
were specifically requested not to discuss the case until
after all sessions had been completed.
Participants were informed that they were competing
against four other similar companies. They were allowed a
maximum of 45 minutes to decide on the action they wished
to take and to submit a sealed tender if desired. Again,
this time limit was set following the experience of
several pre-experimental trials. The experiment was run
in separate, individual sessions in the presence of the
author. Subjects were repeatedly encouraged to think
aloud, and their verbal protocols recorded along with all
information requests and responses.
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Subjects
Several pre-experimental trial runs were undertaken
involving, at various times, undergraduates, MBA students
and corporate executives. While, in theory, the latter
are likely to be more familiar with the characteristics
of competitive tenders, and so might be preferable
subjects, the trials revealed no systematic differences
in information search, use, and price setting behaviour
across the different types of subject. The participants
in the current experiment, the last in a long series,
were 20 undergraduate students majoring in Economics and
Accounting at the University of Sydney, all of whom had
previously taken and passed courses in both financial and
management accounting.
As an incentive each subject was paid a fixed fee of A$5.
Following all 20 experimental runs, the sealed bids were
randomly divided into four equal groups. The sealed bids
were then opened, and within each group, the contract
awarded to the company submitting the lowest priced
tender (there are no quality differences). This produced
four "winners" each of whom was paid a bonus in addition
to the fixed fee. This bonus was at the rate of A$1 for
every A$200 profit made from the contract (after
deducting the cost of information requests), with a
minimum bonus of zero, and, at least theoretically, no
upper limit. Structuring the incentive scheme in this way
motivated participants to take the experiment seriously,
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minimised the risks of collusion, and maintained realism
in that it was a reasonable model of the actual direct
benefits of a successful tender.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The basic data to be used to derive the results of this
paper are the direct recording of specific information
requests and the verbal protocols. A primary problem was
ensuring that the output of participants was interpreted
consistently. One of the main purposes of the analysis
was to establish the type and sequence of information
searched and used. As individual participants' train of
thought often stopped and started and meandered from
objectives to information requirements, it was not always
clear exactly which pieces of information were being
sought and used at any given time. Accordingly, an
iterative process was adopted whereby the recorded
protocols were monitored carefully, thus enabling an
initial analysis of the information search and use. This
analysis was then explored further by listening again to
the protocols, and refining, until eventually a final
analysis was reached as complete and precise as possible.
The results and findings are presented •in three sections,
focussing in turn on the choice of strategy, flows of
information search, and the three research hypotheses.
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The Choice of Strategy
The decision problem facing the participants necessitated
their making a number of strategic choices - whether to
tender, how to overcome the capacity constraint, and what
pricing strategy to adopt. These three choices are
investigated below.
Tender Choice: ... despite the possibility of not
submitting a tender, all participants decided to do
so. This is not surprising given that to win one of
the bonus payoffs, a participant had to have
submitted the lowest tender within his grouping.
This drive towards competing also effectively
precluded participants from giving much
consideration to any alternative uses they might
choose to make of the available spare capacity.
Thus, although the problem states,
... as director of the company you are now
considering alternative ways of utilising the
existing spare capacity ... decide on the action
you wish to take."
any action other than tendering was effectively
taken as not competing in the game. Only two
subjects specifically considered alternative uses,
and one of them, subject 3, made no use of the
information acquired due to insufficient time.
Subject 8 raised the issue early on:
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” ... I think I'm also going to be assuming in
all this that I can't use the excess capacity for
anything else ... although it says that 'the
company now trades from significantly larger
premises' ... looks like I possibly could
increase the production because I've still got
20% excess capacity ... so probably take into
account other ways of utilising spare capacity. I
guess a possible question that I might consider
asking would be: do I have any information on any
other projects I could use? ... I'm not going to
ask that question yet ... though I may later"
The	 subject	 later	 requested	 information	 on
alternative items that might be manufactured using
the existing spare capacity. This led to an
allowance being made for an extra opportunity cost
(though it was incorrectly calculated).
These instances apart, then, the strategic options
are basically restricted to a choice of the methods
used for dealing with the capacity constraint in
meeting the GGC order, and to the choice of pricing
strategy. This raises the issue of how to motivate
subjects to actively and realistically participate
in an experiment without directing their basic
strategic choices.
ii) Capacity Constraints: ... working at full capacity
would enable 250 additional gnomes to be produced in
the ten week period. There are three alternative
ways of creating the production needed for the extra
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50 gnomes required for the GGC contract. Normal
output could be reduced (13 subjects), incurring a
consequent loss in contribution (and risking an
additional loss in goodwill as existing customers
may decide to purchase elsewhere), normal stock
levels could be built-up before the start of the 10
week special production period (1 subject), risking
a subsequent fall in activity levels in the event of
the tender being unsuccessful, or capacity could be
increased by hiring extra employees or asking
existing employees to work overtime (1 subject).
Some subjects considered more than one alternative,
while five subjects effectively ignored the whole
capacity problem. Table 9:1 discloses the capacity
strategies considered and adopted by all 20
participants.
iii) Price Strategy: ... Table 9:1 also indicates the
tender prices submitted by subjects, together with
the average cost per gnome of the tender (as
perceived by each subject) and the amount charged
for information requests. All subjects first
calculated the costs associated with making the
extra 300 gnomes, and then added a "suitable" profit
margin. Prices submitted varied from A$220.50 to
A$310.00 (II = 270.27, a = 27.03), with profit
margins varying from a maximum of 35.9% to a
marginal loss.
	 This reflects the substantial
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TABLE 9:1 
SUMMARY OF TENDERS SUBMITTED
Subject/ Tender Average Inf'n Tender Capacity Strategy 
2_1:21 P	 P.E.12'2	 cost costs margin adopted others
(*)	 (**)	 considered
A$ per
gnome
A$ per
gnome
A$
1 B 256.00 212.40 400 16.5 R S
2 A 277.49 269.61 600 2.1 - -
3 D 230.00 214.40 1,000 5.3 R
4 C 283.75 236.44 400 16.2 R -
5 A 297.50 208.34 600 29.3 S
6 B 263.29 239.11 1,000 7.9 R S 0
7 D 296.67 237.42 800 19.1 R
8 B 306.67 299.00 400 2.1 R
9 C 270.00 218.01 800 18.3 0
10 B 244.67 227.00 200 6.9
11 C 310.00 310.00 200 (	 0.2) R
12 D 279.08 253.71 200 8.9 R
13 A 295.00 294.92 200 (	 0.2) R
14 C 240.00 227.66 1,000 3.8 R 0
15 C 241.38 211.40 600 11.6 R
16 A 300.00 192.18 - 35.9 R
17 D 220.50 210.80 400 3.8
18 B 255.00 206.93 800 17.8
19 A 288.46 262.84 400 8.4 R S 0
20 D 250.00 231.90 - 7.2 - -
Entries in bold represent winning tenders
(*) as per the subject's data, excluding information costs
* *	 as per the subject's data, including information costs
Capacity Strategies - R = reduce normal output
S = stockpile
0 = work overtime
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differences in price strategies adopted.	 For
instance, consider the following protocol extracts:
[subject 161 " ... Last year we sold our gnomes
for a price of A$300 each ... but this may need
to be increased as it is a special order."
[subject 14] " ... I should at least break even
... but why would you go into business to break
even? Garbage! I wouldn't ... but then this could
be one of those types of project that opens the
door ... but I don't know ... I still want to
make some money out of this, but I mean if it's
going to open the door, I could accept less."
The former subject eventually settled on the
existing A$300 sales price, while the latter applied
half of last year's average net margin to the
incremental cost of the order, arriving at a rounded
price of A$240. Only the lower tenders, however,
were likely to win the GGC order, the average
winning bid being A$245.67. Bonus payments to
winners were A$36 for subject 2 and A$1 for subject
14, while winning subjects 10 and 17 both made
losses on the order and so received no bonus. The
bonus calculations were based on the most accurate
available information for labour rates, extra fixed
costs etc., but retained subjects' own assumptions
concerning, for example, discounts and the number of
moulds (if greater than three).
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Flows of Information Search
As one of the primary purposes of this experiment is to
start to understand how information to deal with an ill-
defined problem is accessed, a classification of the ways
in which information is searched is needed. Figure 9:2
displays an information search model, derived from the
iterative analysis of participants' responses to the
simulation.
The flow diagram starts from the idea that a cost element
or piece of data is somehow highlighted and then
evaluated in terms of its relevance for the decision at
hand. The data might be implicitly evaluated and
discarded without becoming part of the protocols. This
is, of course, a problem affecting all research based on
verbal protocols - the non-verbalisation of part of the
process. Alternatively, a piece of data could be
highlighted, explicitly evaluated, but then discarded for
its lack of relevance. This is traced as information
search route H. For example,
[subject 18; discussing advertising] " well,
advertising's going to remain the same, because I'm
going to be selling straight to GGC ... so, there's
no need for me to advertise."
Where a piece of data has been considered relevant, the
flow diagram continues by considering whether its need
was signalled within the given information, whether there
is sufficient information to calculate its relevant cost,
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Figure 9:2 ... An Information 'Search Flow-chart
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whether to accept that information and, finally, whether
to estimate or search. As examples, consider the
following two extracts that illustrate respectively
routes B and E:
[subject 4; discussing electricity] " ... we're
increasing production, so we're bound to need more
electricity ... A$23,600 last year and we made 4,800
gnomes ... so that's A$4.92, say about A$5 per gnome
to add in ... but it probably won't go up that much
... so, I'm going to say an extra A$3 per gnome."
[subject 12; discussing the cost of moulds] " ... we
wouldn't need to have standard replacement moulds
bought-in from outside suppliers; we would have to
manufacture the moulds ... but I don't know how much
they cost ... OK, how much would the moulds cost to
manufacture?"
The particular "routes" used by the subjects to gather
the information they needed to arrive at a tender bid are
summarised in Table 9:2. It is clear from the results
presented in the table that certain pieces of information
were acquired in the same way by all of the participants
(crates and paints), while other types (capacity of
moulds) were acquired via different routes. Explanations
for these similarities and differences are explored in
the next section as part of the discussion of the three
guiding hypotheses outlined earlier.
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Information Search Hypotheses
Hl: (Influence of Strategy on Search) 	 ... As discussed
above, differences occurred in the subjects' strategy
choice for dealing with the capacity constraint. Of the
15 subjects that addressed the issue, 13 reduced normal
output, one stockpiled, and one required employees to
work overtime. The first method would require some
allowance to be made in costings for the subsequent loss
of normal contribution. Accordingly, this was done by
eight subjects, all using route F in the flow diagram to
arrive at a suitable estimate. Three subjects considered
the possibility of losing contribution on the normal
output reduced, but concluded that no allowance was
necessary. For example,
[subject 7] " ... well, if we cut production, during
the ten weeks, of five normal gnomes per week, it
wouldn't be a great loss ... because, you can always
make it up after these ten weeks by operating at
over 80%."
The other two subjects who reduced normal output did not
explicitly explore the lost contribution. Subject 5
adopted a stockpiling strategy and again used route F to
estimate an interest cost to compensate. The final
alternative - working overtime - was adopted by subject 9
and resulted in explicit search for the overtime rate
(route G).
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The choice of problem solving strategy, then, has clear
implications for the type of information required and in
some circumstances this will lead to explicit information
search.
H2: (Acceptance or Estimation in Preference to Search) 
This hypothesis is concerned with whether subjects
are reluctant to undertake search in circumstances where
some other alternative exists. All subjects assumed
(correctly) that the materials cost was wholly variable.
One area of difference, though, involved their treatment
of discounts on stonemix. Subjects might be expected to
search for as high a discount as possible on the extra
stonemix required for the order. The problem is
confounded, however, by the presence of some initial
information on discounts received during the previous
year, and this seems to have led some subjects to simply
accept the given data and pro-rata it across all
purchases, thus arriving at an assumed discount rate of
83 cents per gnome, rather than the maximum available
rate of A$6 per gnome. Five subjects explicitly searched
(route C), while seven chose to estimate, adopting the
pro-rata solution above (route A). Surprisingly, eight
subjects ignored discounts completely.
In terms of labour costs, the given background
information enables last year's average hourly labour
rate to be calculated at A$7. In any organisation, let
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alone one that has experienced such rapid growth, one
would not normally expect the average rate to equate with
the current rate due to the effect of pay rises. For
decision making purposes, the relevant cost is the
current cost. Explicit search would have revealed this to
be A$8 per hour. In the event, only three subjects
specifically requested the current rate (route C), the
others all using the average, route A rate to arrive at a
final figure for labour charges. Here, the reluctance to
search probably reflects the fact that a solution, albeit
an inaccurate one, is readily calculable. The following
interchange was typical:
[subject 11 S] "Is the wage rate given to us?"
[author Al "You can ask me for it, and I can tell
you."
[S] "No, no, I just wondered. There are Production
Wages A$672,000 ... that relates to?"
[Al "That relates to producing the gnomes."
[S] "About 4,800 gnomes this year."
The subject then proceeded to calculate the labour cost
per gnome and per hour.
Considering the treatment of other costs, the case
signals the importance of moulds, but contains
insufficient information to enable the two key questions
- how much and how many - to be answered. Accordingly,
all but two of the subjects followed route E to
explicitly request the cost of manufacturing a mould. Ten
subjects additionally requested information about the
capacity of moulds (route E again), while the others
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guessed (route F), estimates ranging from 1 mould (four
subjects) to an extreme of 300 (one subject).
Regarding other overheads, subjects needed to assess
which items were fixed costs and which were variable.
Mostly, overheads were regarded as fixed, and, therefore,
irrelevant for the decision at hand, but there were some,
specific exceptions to this. For example, eight subjects
considered that depreciation would increase if the
contract was gained. Five of the eight used the existing
data to derive an incremental depreciation charge (route
A), while the other three searched for further specific
information (route C). Four subjects were out of line
with the others in their decision to include an
allocation of all overheads in the cost structure for the
GGC contract. In each case, their calculations were based
on several cost behaviour assumptions for individual cost
elements, but made no use of explicit search.
Overall, this section offers evidence in support of
hypothesis H2 that subjects only explicitly search for
information when there is no viable alternative.
H3: (Muddling Through) ... In the current study it was
apparent that most subjects "muddled through" the task to
some extent. For instance, the protocol extract below
illustrates how the capacity constraint was discovered
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only after considering the availability and amount of
discounts.
[subject 5] " ... 20% discount on stonemix, A$6 per
gnome. Discounts last year A$4,000 ... but they must
have produced more than that ... (reads note 1 of
the background information) ... 100 per week ...
(long pause) ... 80% capacity means they can only
make an extra 25 per week. So, they've got ten
weeks, that's 250, and they need 300."
A second "muddling through" effect is where the
evaluation of a particular set of alternatives might lead
to other alternatives being searched without complete
resolution Of the initial area. Subject 2 moved to and
from mould costs a number of times considering several
other items in the interim:
... I've got to put in an arbitrary price on what
I think the mould ... these moulds ... will cost.
But that's a question I could ask you is it?"
["yes"]
(subject then spent 4 minutes considering extra
information that might be available, whether she
needed to be totally accurate, and profit margins)
then:
... but then I face the problem of these moulds; I
don't know how much it will cost ...
(3 minutes attempting calculations of mould costs
based on existing data, and considering price
strategy again):
"OK. I'll ask you. How much will a mould cost?"
(The next 9 minutes were spent considering the
depreciation policy for moulds, explicitly searching
for the labour rate, establishing that she could
discover how many moulds were needed to fulfil the
contract by asking, but, finally, choosing to
estimate):
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"I've just come to a very intuitive figure ...
because I don't know exactly, I'm just taking what I
suppose you could almost say is a number out of the
air ... I'm assuming I need 8 or 9 moulds. I've put
down the figure 8, to be lower."
Thus, the resolution of the problem and the search for
information do not seem to flow clearly and directly from
an initial identification of objectives.
SUMMARY
This chapter has tried to extend the work on the search
behaviour of individuals reported in previous chapters,
by developing an initial understanding of how accounting
information is searched and used for a strategic
decision. Somewhat surprisingly, there is currently an
absence of literature addressing this topic. Whilst this
might be surprising from a user perspective, it is not so
when a research perspective is adopted. The study has
highlighted a number of methodological issues that
condition the success of researching the area. In
attempting to gain an initial understanding of
information search and use in a business context, a
competitive tender experiment was analysed.
Several general conclusions arise from the study. In
particular, two factors influence the specific type and
amount of information search - choices concerning the
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problem solving strategy, and the viability of accepting
given information about a cost element or estimating.
These results have important ramifications for the design
of appropriate information systems. Given that a firm
will face many different strategic choices throughout its
life, the information system should be flexible in the
type of information that can be accessed, and should not
be viewed as providing information that is applicable for
all purposes. Further, the findings suggest a need for
systems to be designed so that they do not overly lead
the information search process.
These conclusions, however, must be considered in
conjunction with the inevitable constraint under which
all experimental research must operate; classroom
exercises cannot perfectly model the real world. While
the incentive scheme used motivated participants to take
the simulation seriously, its one-sided nature (profits
are rewarded, but losses are not penalised) may have
driven tender offers lower than they would otherwise have
been. Most participants submitted tenders at a discount
(sometimes substantial) from the normal selling price,
creating little extra profit for all their extra effort
(at least in the short-term). Ethical considerations,
however, prevent the running of experiments that might
result in subjects losing their own money. Although, this
may be unrealistic, however, the choice of margin is not
one that explicit information search can help anyway.
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The experiment has also highlighted a number of other
methodological issues that need to be considered when
researching the search for and use of accounting
information for strategic decisions. Particular problems
that need to be addressed, in addition to the design of
incentive scheme discussed above, include ensuring full
and complete verbalisation of subjects' decision
processes, finding an appropriate and consistent medium
for the provision of additional information, and adopting
a rich and incisive method for the analysis of data. A
further issue in the current experiment concerns the lack
of feedback given to subjects. This is a one-off
simulation and so there is no learning curve effect, and
subjects do not necessarily know whether they are
approaching the task correctly. The only formal feedback
is the response to questions asked. This limitation could
only be overcome by running repeated experiments
concerned with similar tasks.
Overall, then, the chapter informs as to the viability of
conducting relatively unstructured business simulations,
and helps approach a more complete understanding of
problem solving strategy and information search, at least
in competitive tendering contexts.
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2 09.3 )
123.9Net Profit (before tax) 
APPENDIX 9:1 
This appendix reproduces the initial background information
and problem sheet given to participants.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
You are the director of a company that manufactures and sells
very high quality garden gnomes of various shapes and sizes.
The enterprise was started just over four years ago in a small
garden shed, but since that time, growth has been rapid -
profits exceeding A$100,000 for the first time last year -
and the company now trades from significantly larger premises.
The profit and loss account for
is shown below.
Sales
Cost of Goods Sold
- Materials
- Production Wages
- Depreciation
Gross Profit
Selling & Distribution Costs
- Advertising
- Export Expenditure
Administrative Costs
- Management Salaries
- Rent & Insurance
- Electricity
- Sundry Expenditure
- Discounts on Stonemix
A$'000
the year-ended
(
31
A$'000 
1,440.0
1 ,052.8
August	 1990
Notes
1
2
3
4
)
5
)
339.8
672.0
41.0
34.0
20.0
387.2
54.0
121.6
48.8
23.6
19.3
(	 4.0 )
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144.0Stonemix
5
4
3
5
2
1
NOTES
1. 4,800 gnomes were produced and sold during the year
at a steady rate of 100 per week (there are 4 weeks
annual holiday when the factory is closed). At this
level of production, which will continue for the
foreseeable future, the company is operating at 80%
of its capacity.
2. Materials consisted of the following
A$'000 
Wooden crates and other
packing materials
	 120.0
Paints
	 72.0
Moulds .	 3.8
2 large bags per
gnome, at A$15
per bag
A$25 per gnome
A$15 per gnome
339.8 
While the company has the equipment and the
expertise to manufacture the moulds themselves, none
were made internally last year. The A$3,800 relates
to standard replacement moulds bought-in from
outside suppliers.
3. Labour is paid on a piece-rate basis. The standard
labour time required to complete a gnome is 20 hours
comprising
Mixing and moulding
Tidying-up and inspection (after setting)
Painting : first coat
second coat
Touching-up
Packing
20
4. Depreciation mainly relates to heavy lifting gear
needed to move the set gnomes around the factory.
5. A$20,000 was spent during the year attempting to
break into the export market. The campaign was not
successful, and so the costs have been written off.
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THE PROBLEM
It is now early September 1990, and as director of the company
you are considering alternative ways of utilising the existing
spare capacity.
You have heard that the Galactic Gnome Corporation (GGC)
wishes to purchase several gnomes made to a certain
specification with a view to exporting them to the Far East.
Further investigation reveals that GGC actually require 300
identical gnomes for a one-off order. The firms invited to
tender have been selected by GGC because they all offer the
required quality of product.
The materials input and the labour time necessary for each
gnome is the same as for those currently being manufactured by
your company. Before production can commence, however, new
moulds will have to be made, due to the somewhat unusual
nature of the required stance of each gnome. For similar
reasons, it is not possible to buy-in these moulds from
outside.
All the gnomes must be ready for collection by GGC within 3
months. After allowing 2 weeks for calculating costs and
prices, and submitting tenders, and 1 week for the preparation
of moulds, that leaves 10 weeks for actual production.
GGC has not yet decided which company will win this
prestigious order, but all tenders must be received by last
post today.
REQUIRED 
Decide on the action you wish to take. Quotations for the GGC
order must be submitted in a sealed envelope to the instructor
by the end of the session.
Further information is available from the instructor at a cost
of AS200 per question.
PAYOFF
You are competing against four other, similar companies. The
order will be given to the company submitting the lowest
priced tender.
You will be paid a A$5 fixed fee for your participation. In
addition, if you win the GGC order, you will receive a bonus
payment of A$1 for every A$200 total contribution you make on
the order.
257
CHAPTER
TEN
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
This thesis has been concerned with investigating the
information search behaviour of individuals required to
make decisions in experimental markets. The majority of
the work presented has had a particular focus on consumer
product or service markets that are homogeneous in all
aspects except price, though the study reported in
Chapter 9 attempted to extend this focus to a wider, and
more general decision making context.
In the first part of this concluding section, the
contents and main findings of the thesis are summarised,
chapter by chapter. Following this, some of the main
methodological issues associated with running research
experiments of the type recorded here are explored,
while, finally, some suggestions are made for future
research studies in the area.
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SUMMARY OF WORK DONE AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
As stated above, the primary concern of this thesis has
been to explore information search behaviour in markets
characterised by price dispersion, but retaining equality
in all other attributes. Chapter 2 discussed the
empirical evidence concerning the existence of such
markets, and demonstrated price dispersion to be a
widespread phenomenon; the highest price for which a
specified item can be purchased, within a relatively
small geographical area, being more than double the
lowest price in about one-half of the cases surveyed, and
more than six times the lowest price in one case (the
styling brush).
Given this sometimes substantial level of price
dispersion, there is a potential benefit to be gained
from searching for a lower price. Thus, when making
purchasing decisions, it is in the interests of
individual consumers as well as managers within any
organisation to attempt to take advantage of this
potential benefit (particularly, in the latter case,
where incentive schemes may operate to reward cost
savings). In chapter 3 a formal, generalised search model
was derived, by comparing the expected likelihood of
finding a progressively lower price with the costs of
search. The optimal strategy, when a buyer knows the cost
of search and the general distribution of prices, though
not their specific location, is to keep searching until a
260
quote is received less than or equal to a given
reservation price. This quote should then be accepted.
The reservation price, R, is calculated from the
expression below, where F(.) is the cumulative
distribution function of the price distribution, and c is
the (constant) unit search cost:
R
F (x) dx
Although this formulation appears simple, applying it to
calculate a reservation price necessitates evaluating a
non-trivial integral. A new, alternative derivation
enabling a solution to be found from tables, was also
presented in chapter 3, though this method is limited to
price distributions that are normal.
Chapter 4 reviewed the experimental studies that have
sought to investigate whether individuals behave
consistently with a reservation price model. While this
has generally been found to be the case, the high
computational demands of the reservation price model
suggest that individuals were more likely to be employing
some high performing heuristics or reasonable rules of
thumb. The work of Hey (1981, 1982) led to the
formulation of six such heuristics, though he made no
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distinction between rules that might be used in different
prior knowledge conditions.
This theme was continued and developed in the new
experiments described and analysed in chapters 5 and 6.
In addition to the alternative states of prior knowledge
about the overall price distribution that are prescribed
in both the theoretical and experimental literatures
(full knowledge and no knowledge), the more realistic
partial knowledge setting was introduced. In this
condition, a searcher starts from a knowledge base
comprised of two "guide" prices taken (randomly) from the
overall price distribution, though he does not know their
representativeness nor their specific location. These
guide prices may then help in the searcher's evaluation
of subsequent, actual quotes received.
The studies uncovered several new search rules: four in
the no knowledge condition, five in the full knowledge
condition (including two "expert" rules), and six in the
partial knowledge condition, sub-divided into two simple,
two intermediate and two complex rules. All rules were
evaluated in terms of their consistency with observed
behaviour, and their performance in comparison with the
optimal model above; the latter being measured by their
average extra expenditure over a very large number of
simulated purchases. The "best" heuristics, in terms of
performance and plausibility, in each knowledge condition
are reproduced below:
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No Knowledge 	  Rule J ... (2.4% performance)
Keep searching until the total search cost, nc, > 7.5%
min p i
 (where n is the number of searches so far).
Partial Knowledge ... Rule T ... (1.6% performance)
Keep searching until a price, p, is located such that
p  90%11, but with a maximum search cost of 1041,
unless min pi > + c (where JL is the average of all
price data so far).
Full Knowledge 
	
 Rule K ... (1.1% performance)
Keep searching until a price is found at least one
standard deviation (a) below the mean, up to a maximum
of a/c searches (rounded).
As would be expected, the rules demonstrates the value of
knowledge, in that the more complete the knowledge level,
the better the possible performance; that is, the closer
the average expected expenditure will be to an optimal
search rule.
Chapter 7 introduced a conceptual model of judgement, and
investigated human information processing constraints
that might hinder the search process. In particular, one
potential constraint
	
-	
functional fixation	
-	
was
highlighted and reviewed in some detail. Functional
fixation relates to the difficulty commonly experienced
in using a familiar object in a novel way. Regarding the
price search studies, it was apparent that price quotes
were often perceived simply as offers to sell at that
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price, rather than additionally as data with which to
update knowledge of the distribution. Subjects acting in
this way could be said to be functionally fixated. A new
experiment concerning this phenomenon (though set in a
different context), was described in chapter 8, some
supporting evidence being found of the existence of
functional fixation in accounting.
Finally, chapter 9 reported an experiment aimed at
extending and developing the themes of the earlier
chapters, to investigate information search behaviour in
a wider, and less highly structured, decision making
situation. Accordingly, the way in which subjects
searched for and used accounting information in arriving
at a competitive tender for a special contract was
analysed. The main findings were that information search
is closely linked to specific problem solving strategies
adopted by individuals, and, inversely, to the ease with
which estimation is possible. Often, though, the process
is somewhat "muddled", rather than flowing from a clear,
initial identification of the objectives to be met.
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METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In conducting the four new research experiments, several
methodological issues were confronted: the design of the
experimental instrument, the design of the incentive
scheme, the means for providing additional information,
the means of recording decision processes, and the choice
of subjects. Each of these issues is discussed briefly
below.
i)	 Design of the Experimental Instrument 
It is most important that the experimental task or case
study be designed to meet the research objectives as
exactly and as neutrally as possible. First, then, it
should be sufficient to enable the investigation to
proceed as required, but be free from information that
might induce interference effects of some kind. Thus, for
example, a case designed to test performance evaluation
using accounting data, should not also contain non-
accounting measures that might bias judgement. Second,
the case should be neutral, in that a subject is not led
down one solution path at the expense of other possible
paths, because of the particular wording or emphasis of
the case.
In addition, the instrument should be clear,
understandable, and free from ambiguity. The time
available to participants must be sufficient to enable
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the task to be satisfactorily completed, but this must be
balanced by the possible fatigue effects associated with
too lengthy a task. For instance, a weakness of the
functional fixation study was that by the time subjects
in the experimental group attempted the "experimental"
task, they had been working on other tasks for almost one
hour, and so were possibly becoming tired.
Obviously, as well as the points above, all the
methodological issues below need to be addressed and
resolved at the design stage.
ii)	 Design of the Incentive Scheme 
For the results of any experimental study to be credible,
there must be some evidence that subjects were motivated
to approach the task seriously. Usually, this credibility
is provided in the form of some monetary incentive, which
might be a fixed fee just for participating, a variable
fee related to performance, or a mixture of the two. The
danger with the first approach is that as participants
know they will be paid anyway, they may not be encouraged
to concentrate throughout. Using a variable incentive
structure, however, runs the risk that subjects may be
de-motivated if they suffer a "bad" start, and feel they
have little or no chance of improving their earnings
position. A mixed incentive structure would seem to be
the best compromise.
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In the context of this thesis, one of the experiments,
the functional fixation study, did not utilise any
incentive structure (a design weakness). The other three
new experiments, however, were all characterised by
offering participants a fixed fee plus a bonus
proportional to performance, though the bonus element in
the first price search experiment (chapter 5) was
probably a little too small in relation to the fixed
element. Table 10:1 below summarises the incentive
schemes used in the four experiments, and offers an
assessment of them on a simple three point scale.
TABLE 10:1 
SUMMARY OF INCENTIVE SCHEMES USED 
-Incentive structure-
Chapter/
	
Fixed Bonus payment 
Experiment 	 Time Fee	 Min	 Max Value
(mins)
5 Price search -
full/no knowledge	 10	 £1.00	 £0.24	 £0.65	 Fair
6 Price search -
partial knowledge	 15	 £2.00	 £6.50	 Good
8 Functional
fixation	 70	 Poor
9 Competitive
tendering	 45	 $5.00	 $36.00	 Fair
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Note that the incentive for the competitive tendering
experiment is only considered "fair", since although
profits were rewarded, losses were not penalised. Ethical
considerations, however, are always likely to prevent any
alternatives that might involve subjects paying the
experimenter, since biases favourable to the
experimenter, and hindering subjects' performance, might
be built into the design of the experimental instrument.
iii)	 Provision of Additional Information 
Clearly, any experimental investigation into information
search behaviour necessitates there being additional
information that can be accessed by participants.
Ideally, perhaps, the type and form (though not the
content) of extra information available should be fully
known to subjects from the outset, and further, exactly
the same information set should be available to all
subjects, at least within the same experimental group.
This ideal is easy to arrange in highly structured tasks,
such as the price search experiments, where the extra
information simply comprises the next price quote
recieved. It is also met in multi-dimensional decision
making studies (for example, Payne, 1976) where the full
amount of data available for each alternative under
consideration is displayed form the outset, face-down on
an information board. An individual-'s search behaviour is
assessed by tracing which pieces of information are
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actually turned face-up. Here, though t as in any menu-
driven information search system, the advantages gained
in consistency and lack of ambiguity, must be off-set
against the disadvantage that the imposed structure may
actually lead the search and decision processes.
In a more complex, and less well structured task
environment, such as the competitive tender described in
chapter 9, the reverse may be true. Great care must be
taken in the choice of method for providing additional
information to avoid the possibility of ambiguity,
misunderstanding and/or inconsistency. The solution
adopted in the current study was to use a series of trial
runs to establish those questions which were commonly
asked, and then to prepare written responses to them.
Other questions were also seen as admissible and answered
as seemed most appropriate. In such cases, both the
question and answer were carefully recorded, so that in
the event of a similar question being asked by a
different subject, the same answer could be given. This
approach deals satisfactorily with the consistency issue
where the experiment is run in series, but may be less
effective where experimental runs are in parallel.
An additional drawback is that subjects may "game-play".
They are aware that the instructor has more information,
and so search may be motivated by trying to outsmart the
instructor, rather than by some systematic needs-based
analysis. However, no evidence was uncovered in the
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tendering study to suggest this to be a substantial
factor.
iv)	 Recording of Search and Decision Processes 
Essentially, there are two ways of assessing the search
and decision processes adopted by individuals the
"information search" approach and the "verbal protocols"
approach. The first of these simply records directly
which pieces of information were searched, when, and in
what order. Although this approach facilitates
measurement, only limited subsequent analysis will be
possible, since, as Payne, Braunstein and Carroll (1978,
p 36) note:
"One problem with the information search method is
that it focuses exclusively on the subject's use of
objective, external information. The method does not
easily allow for insights into a decision maker's use
of information stored in internal memory. Verbal
protocols, on the other hand, can provide data on both
external and internal search behaviour."
An analysis of verbal protocols, therefore, enables a
closer understanding of the decision processes actually
being adopted by the subjects.
Verbal protocols may be extracted either by asking the
subject to think aloud during the experiment itself
(concurrent data), or by asking him to summarise and
explain his actions after completion of the experimental
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task (retrospective data). Which method is preferable has
been the subject of much debate in the research
literature (see, for example, Nisbett and Wilson, 1977;
Ericsson and Simon, 1980), since while the timeliness of
concurrent data may imply more objectivity, the
requirement to verbalise may itself interfere with the
decision process. Generally, though, concurrent data is
usually considered superior (Bouwman, 1985). Accordingly,
the three experiments in this thesis that utilise verbal
protocols all adopt the "think aloud" approach.
There are, however, two further problems associated with
using verbal protocols in research experiments. First,
the protocols may be incomplete in so far as subjects
choose not to fully verbalise their decision processes.
There is some reported evidence that this may be linked
to routines, or sub-routines, that carry a particularly
high cognitive load (Johnson, 1964). Regular reminders to
subjects to think aloud seems the only way to minimise
this effect. Second, the procedure leads to the
accumulation of a large amount of data that is obtrusive
to collect, and does not lend itself easily to analysis,
there being no well developed standard summary statistics
applicable. Necessarily, then, conclusions may appear
rather "loose". This issue is best resolved by combining
concurrent protocols with directly recorded information
search data, and ensuring the two link together in a
plausible and consistent manner.
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v)	 Choice of Subjects 
The final methodological issue discussed here concerns
the choice of subjects to participate in the experiment.
Ideally, this choice should follow on directly from the
design of the experimental instrument, as the level of
expertise required may be specified, at least implicitly.
In the experiments reported in this thesis, all
participants were undergraduate or honours students. For
the price search studies, the requirement was simply for
general consumers, the research objective being to
uncover reasonable rules of thumb that might underlie
search behaviour. No particular expertise was necessary,
or even desirable, and so student subjects were an
adequate choice. In the cases of the functional fixation
and competitive tendering studies, however, subjects
should have been ideally managers at an appropriate level
within one	 or more	 organisations,	 perhaps	 cost
accountants in the former case, and sales managers in the
latter. Gaining access to a sufficiently large number of
such personnel, however, presents obvious, logistical
problems.
The limitation of using students is mitigated to some
extent by the fact that the students who participated
were all majoring in Accounting and Finance or Management
Sciences and in each case, therefore, should have had a
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reasonably high level of relevant knowledge, if not the
experience.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The research experiments documented in this thesis
contribute significantly to the understanding of the
information search behaviour of individuals in various
decision contexts, and lay a foundation from which to
investigate many, related research issues. Some of these
issues that are of particular interest to the author are
described below.
First, there is a need for further investigation into
search behaviour in the highly structured price search
setting. For example, the partial knowledge framework, as
defined in chapter 6, has yet to receive attention in the
theoretical search literature. It would be interesting to
discover its properties in comparison with full knowledge
models, and to see how these properties change as the
number of initial guide prices is changed and, further,
to examine the effect of having additional knowledge as
to the reliability of the guide prices being reasonably
representative.
Experimentally, there is a need for studies on search
behaviour over time, seeking to discover whether subjects
faced with a large number of consecutive purchase
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decisions, first learn specific strategies or rules that
govern their search behaviour, and then modify and refine
these rules in order to improve performance. For example,
an improvement might be achieved by gradually migrating
to one of the better performing, but more complex, rules
described in chapters 5 and 6. Note that in the case of
the partial knowledge setting, such a migration would
lead to subjects learning to use all data to update
knowledge of the overall distribution, thereby reducing
the likelihood of functional fixation. Varying levels of
feedback might also be used as a means of accelerating
learning processes. Some measure of "ability" (for
example, performance in a test designed to establish
numeracy) would be important here, to discover whether
more "able" subjects progress to and learn higher order
search rules more quickly.
Finally, within the price search context, there is a
clear need for empirical evidence reporting search
behaviour actually observed in the real world. An
appropriate research instrument might be some form of
brief questionnaire that would be completed by customers
at a suitable consumer product or service outlet (for
example, a van hire firm - see chapter 2). The type of
questions asked might include, for instance:
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"Have you used this organisation before?"
"Did you contact any other organisations? ... If so,
how many?"
"What prices were you quoted?"
Subsequently, the findings concerning actual search
behaviour could be compared with those from the
experimental studies, and explanations sought for the
similarities and differences.
1 second strand of future research possibilities builds
on the ideas discussed in the competitive tendering
experiment in chapter 9. The study attempted to develop a
..nodology for investigating information search and
decision processes in more complex, and less highly
structured business decision contexts. Two extensions
follow from this. First, the experimental instrument used
could be modified to allow alternative experimental
groups with varying amounts of information available from
the outset. The three hypotheses of chapter 9 could then
be tested across the experimental groups, to assess
whether there is an inter-relationship between search
behaviour and the amount of initial information.
A second extension would be to apply the methodology
across a whole range of other business decisions. The
potential scope for analysis here is vast, as any
decision requiring the examination of a large mass of
data, some but not all of which is given at the outset,
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as well as an element of human judgement, would be a
suitable candidate for investigation.
In particular, an important field of inquiry is concerned
with bank lending decisions and the prediction of
corporate distress. Previous work in this area has
utilised three different types of methodology.
Econometric models of bankruptcy (eg . Altman, 1968;
Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan, 1977) essentially involve
scoring the company on the basis of several, specific,
financial ratios. Behavioural studies of bankruptcy
prediction (eg .. Libby, 1975; Zimmer, 1980) assess the
success with which loan officers can predict failure
given certain sets of financial information. Thirdly,
simulation studies (eg Dietrich and Kaplan, 1982;
Leeming, Whittred and Zimmer, 1984) have attempted to
trace the judgemental process of the lender in a natural
setting.
Most of these experimental studies, however, have been
characterised by a menu-driven search procedure, with an
information set that is carefully pre-selected by the
experimenters. There is a clear need to carry out
research studies in this area where solution pathways are
not functions of the relatively rigid structure imposed
on the subjects. The methodology developed and discussed
in chapter 9 will be valuable in the design of such
studies.
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Attempts to explore these research directions will
provide a useful contribution to the decision making
literature, and increase further the understanding of the
information search behaviour of individuals, as developed
in this thesis.
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